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ABORTION COVERAGE STATISTICS

The only national statistics available on i nsurance coverage of abortion were
recently released by the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI) .
It has been noted that
the AGI is a non - profit reproductive health research organization connected to the
Planned Parenthood Federation of America .
According to a recent survey by AG I 1 :
• Two - thirds o f " typical fee - fo r - service " insu r ance plans " routinely " cover abo r t i on
services . One - third either restrict coverage , basing it on specific medical
indications (20 - 25 percent) , or do not cover it (10 - 15 percent)
Percent of Typical Plans in Which Induced Abortion is Routinely Covered , by Type
of Plan :

I

Indemnity Plans

I

I

PPO

I

HMO

<100
Emplys .

>100
Emplys .

Self
Ins .

D&C 2

64 %

66 %

68 %

67 %

70 %

D&E 3

66 %

69 %

68 %

67 %

70 %

I

Percent of Typical Plans in Which Induced Abortion Coverage is Subject to Additional
Restrictions , by Type of Plan :

I

Indemnity Plans

I

I

PPO

I

HMO

<100
Emplys .

>100
Emplys .

Self
Ins .

D&C

21 %

23 %

18 %

20 %

20 %

D&E

18 %

20 %

18 %

1 9%

20 %

I

1 The AGI study was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Founda tion and is based on a 1993 survey of the 100
largest commercial insurance carriers , all 106 HMOs with 100 , 000 or more enrollees , 107 smaller HMOs , and all 73
Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans.
plans , and 50 percent of HMOs .

Fifty - eight percent of commercia l i nsurers surveyed res p o nded, 53 percent of BC/BS
The margin of error is+/- 10 pe rcent .

2 o ilati on & Cutterage Suction
3 oilation & Evacuation
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Percent of Typical Plans in Which Induced Abortion is not Covered , by Type of Plan :

I

Indemnity Plans

I

I

I

HMO

<100
Ernplys .

>100
Ernplys .

Self
Ins .

D&C

15 %

11 %

14 %

13 %

10 %

D&E

16 %

11 %

14 %

14 %

10 %

• 70 % of HMOs and 66 % of large health plans cover abortion
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ACTIONS FLORIDA COULD TAKE TO IMPROVE THE HEALTH SYSTEM

1 . Assure good information f o r purchasers .
2 . Encourage prudent purchasing .
3 . Reform Medicaid .
4 . Encourage the development and use of prac t ice parameters .
5 . Control administrative expenses .
6 . Reform medica l professiona l liability .

IP2 - Novembe r 1992

ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION

The Problem

As health care costs have continued to rise , all segments of the health care system
have come under closer scrutiny to justify their expenses . A study by Lewin/ICF
estimates that as much as 24 % (or about $175 billion) of total health care costs
are attributable to administrative services . Other estimates range from 5 % to 22 %,
depending on what is included as administrative expenses (e . g ., planning , marketing ,
billing , sales , all expenses not directly attributable to patient care) . Lack of
agreement on how to define administrative costs makes comparison of studies on this
topic difficult .
Although administrative costs are necessary in the operation of any service , there
is widespread agreement that administrative costs in health care can be reduced .
Two views prevail on how administrative costs can best be reduced .
One view
maintains that the large number of payers ( over 1 , 500 insurance companies and several
public programs) in the current system inherently increase administrative costs ,
and the solution is to move toward a single payor system . Another view recognizes
the benefit of system- wide cost reduct i ons associated with the administrative costs
of certain services (e . g ., managed care) , and favors evaluating the benefits of
existing administrative costs , introducing greater efficiencies wherever possible .
On the surface , arguments for a single payor system appear attractive .
Canada ,
most often cited as a system to imitate , boasts of administrative costs at abou t
6% of their total health care expenses . As mentioned earlier , however , what is
included in the definition (or what is excluded) can make a large difference in
the outcome . Some studies of the U. S . system demonstrate a similar 5 - 6% of total
health care costs attributable to admi nist r ative functions .
These studi es have
included the administ r ation of government programs (e . g ., Medicare) and the
admin i strative costs and profits of private insurance companies .
Such findings
indicate that the U. S . may be more efficient than Canada in administer i ng health
care s ervices .
Studies comparing U. S . administrative costs to Canadi an admin i strative costs also
mention the different expectations that the two countr i es have of their
administrative systems .
In Canada , certain administrative functions do not occur
at the same level that they do in the U. S . (billing , marke t ing , utilization review) .
These functions have a smalle r r ole i n their health care system . Consequently ,
Canada ' s administrative system does not need to collect and maintain the same leve l
of financial and c li nica l info r mation t hat the U. S . does .
Access to detailed
f i nancial and clinical information is necessary for a private market system to remain
viable by continuously gaug i ng the efficiency of its operations .
A large part of administrat i ve functions are devoted to the co l lect i on and processing
of clinical and financial information . These costs occur at all levels of health
care financing and deli very .
Some of them are " hidden costs ", passed from the
government to insurers , patients , and providers .
It is estimated that 18 % of
hospital spending is spent on administration and billing , 45 % of gross physician
costs are spent on professiona l expenses (much of it for billing) . One visit to

1

the doctor generates 7 to 10 pieces of paper . Annually , over 450 different forms
related to the billing process are used . There is widespread agreement that efforts
aimed at simplifying and reducing data transacti on s among payers , regulators ,
providers , and patients will reduce overall administrative costs .

IP3 - August 1993

Current Efforts to Reduce Administrative Costs

A concerted effort to simplify and reduce data transactions is being supported by
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and the National Association of
Insurance Companies (NAIC) through the Workgroup on Electronic Data Interchange
(WEDI) , a coalition of major private and public payers created in 1991 . WEDI has
been working on the electronic transmission of claims data , the development of
confidentiality legislation , and the standardization of data formats , and data
elements .
Standardization of data formats and data elements has been developed
in cooperation with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) .
The standardizat i on and automation of data collection and transmission will reduce
the costs associated with collecting similar financial and clinical data for
different entities . Insurers and providers will decrease the amount of time they
spend fi l ling out paper - work , mailing forms , and waiting for reimbursement . Unlike
many other countries , in the United States transaction - related functions are applied
to a wide variety of purposes . Data generated for billing purposes are used for
quality assurance ,
research , planning ,
supporting managed care functions ,
education , and compliance with government regulations .
Standardiz i ng data will serve other purposes as well.
Consumers will be able to
use standardized information , as summary data are available , to compare various
providers and insurance plans . As consumers become informed decision makers , the
private market will become stronger and more cost - effective .
Clinical and
scientific communities will also benefit from the standardization of data . Research
efforts to develop scientif i cally- based practice parameters will be faci l itated
as will clinical comparisons of patient outcomes. Administrative costs in research
heretofore spent on seeking comparable data or i n translating data into usable forms ,
can be spent on other research needs .
In Florida , state sta t utes have charged the Department of Insurance (DOI) with
prescribing separate standardized claim forms for use by all hospitals , dentists ,
physicians , and pharmacists .
In all cases , the DOI has adopted nationally
recognized forms (HCFA forms , the American Dental Association form , and the Nat i onal
Drug Code form) . HCFA has mandated that the NAIC develop a standardized claim form
and electronic data system . The NA I C is in the process of adopting and standardizing
the nationally recognized forms ment io ned above.
Florida ' s DOI is working closely
with the NAIC in the deve l opment of the automated system .
A recent Florida statute charges the Agency for Health Care Administration with
developing a standardized claim form for use by insurers and health care providers .
The agency must have a draft of the standardized form by October 1 , 1993 .
The
finalized form must be included in the final Florida Health Plan which is to be
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submitted to the legislature by December 31 , 1993 .
While the standardization and automation of data will increase the efficiency of
many administrative functions , other efforts are underway in the heal th care industry
to address managerial inefficiencies .
These include the use of Total Quality
Management (TQM) or Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) to streamline and improve
operational activities . It is estimated that between 20 % and 30 % of operational
(administrative)
costs result from inefficient work systems .
CQI is an
administrative tool intended to correct systems - related inefficiencies and prevent
future inefficiencies from developing .
BCBSF Position

BCBSF supports current efforts in the heal th care industry to reduce administrative
costs and is encouraged by the government ' s support for the private sector ' s efforts .
IP3 - August 1993

In a private market , health care delivery systems are developed to achieve
cost - effective care (e . g ., managed care systems , HMOs , integrated health care
systems) . To remain competitive , unnecessary costs must be eliminated . Managed
care systems focus on lowering overall health care delivery costs . The value of
maintaining higher administrative costs is continually compared to the value of
achieving lower delivery costs .
In a well - functioning competitive environment , administrative costs
be kept to a minimum by consumers who will demand value for what
Cooperative efforts within the industry to reduce administrative
efforts through WEDI) should be encouraged as long as these efforts
the competitive forces of the marketplace .

naturally will
they purchase .
costs (such as
do not disturb

Administrative costs must be viewed within the larger context of the role they play
in the health care system . Some level of administrative costs are necessary and
add value to the health care system . Comparisons of U. S . administrative costs to
those of other countries may provide an incomplete picture . U. S . administrative
costs should be analyzed for the value that they add to the entire health care system.

IP3 - August 199 3
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ANTI-MANAGED CARE LEGISLATION

The Issue
During this legislative session in Tal l ahassee , several bills have been introduced
that have anti - managed care language . These bills have " any willing provider " and
" direct access " components that would destroy the effectiveness of provider networks
and eliminate the role of the primary care physician . This would result in less
efficient, more costly health care for employers and employees.
•" Any willing provider " bills require managed care organizations (MCOs) to include
in their network any providers who accept the MCO ' s payment schedule .
•" Direct access " legislation would forbid MCO ' s from agreeing with their policy
holders to use a care manager.
MCOs have contributed significantly to lower insurance premiums and lower health
care costs in Florida by increasing competition among providers .
"Any willing
provider " and " direct access " bills would destroy competition in health care by
eliminating two very important cost containment tools used by managed care
organizations . These bills would destroy managed care systems and the value they
bring to the health care market.

Effects
•" Any willing provider " and " direct access " bills are special interest legislation
that hurt the consumers and payers of health care services - employers and
their employees.
• The abi l ity to contract selectively with providers is the central concept of managed
care .
"Any willing provider " and " direct access " restrict i ons would de s troy
managed care and reverse the progress that employers have made in recent
years in controlling their health care costs .
• Selective contracting has led to lower costs because MCOs negot i ate the best payment
contracts with the most efficient providers of health care services .
In
return for better rates , provi ders get a high volume of patients .
• Costs have also been lowered by having primary care physicians act as care managers
for all of the patient ' s care .
• The Wyatt Company recently produced a report on the cost impact of any willing
provider legislation . The report concludes that :
-PPO costs would increase in the range of 30% to 50% under this legislative mandate

- such legis l ation would ultimately result in the elimination of PPOs from the market ,
since " if a large percentage of providers are willing to join a PPO ,
this legislative mandate would eliminate the value of that PPO to the
community " (p . 5) .

•The cost impact will be even greater on HMOs and their subscribers, since HMOs
tend to contain costs through even tighter management of provider networks
than PPOs .

I P4 - Apr il 11 ,
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• In south Florida , the effect will be far worse. A decade ago south Florida had
some of the highest health care costs in the nation . The introduction of
HMOs and PPOs , and subsequent competition among providers , has brought heal th
care costs under cont rol . HMO costs in Miami, today, are less than in most
areas of Florida . Passage of any willing provider/direct access legislation
will reverse this trend; within a few years costs would more than double.
•Taxpayers would be displeased as their taxes rise to pay for the increased cost
of city , county , and state government employee health benefits , since these
entities would no longe r enjoy the efficiencies associated with an MCO ' s
selective contracting arrangements .
•Supporters of market-based heal th care reform and citizens concerned about
intrusive government practices would be disturbed by the state ' s interference
in the business decisions of MCOs to develop products (health plans) that
meet consumer needs (fo r cost , access , and convenience) . They would further
be disturbed that these actions stifle competition and destroy the value
of MCO products (health plans) .

Conclusion
The state should not pass legislation which hinders the operation of MCOs.

Requiring MCOs to accept " any willing providers " will compromise the ability of
the network to choose its inputs and will discourage competition among providers ,
in turn raising prices to consumers without providing public benefit .
The private sector has responded to consumer needs for cost - effective health care .
One reason that businesses and consumers are choosing managed care plans is because
it provides high quality health care services along with cost savings.
In the past , managed care organizations were hindered in many states by special
interest groups that wanted to protect their economic base . The HMO Act of 1972
opened the way for managed care organizations to compete with traditional
fee - for - service plans .
MCOs have been so effective in controlling costs , that
special interest groups are trying once again to eradicate MCOs through laws like
" any willing provider " and " direct access ."
Special interest groups must not be allowed to erode the gains we have made in
providing high quality , cost - effective health care . Weakening MCOs so that they
cannot use competitive incentives will result in a market far less responsive to
the needs of patients for cost - effective , quality health care services .
I P 4 - April 11,
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ANTI-NETWORK LEGISLATION IS AN UNFUNDED MANDATE ON:
l)FLORIDA EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
Health Care Plans
If you have a network-based health care plan, these and similar proposals will
raise the cost of your coverage and lower the quality of your medical care:

ANY WILLING PROVIDER:
9 % to 29% in the short term according to an independent
actuarial study by Atkinson & Company (1994 )
DIRECT ACCESS:
4 % to
Wyatt Company (1991)

14 % according to an independent actuarial study by the

MANDATED POINT-OF-SERVICE HMO:
4% to 29% in the short term; same effect as Any
Willing Provider, according to an independent actuarial study by the Congressional
Budget Office (1995)
Workers' Compensation
Such legislation will also eliminate the cost savings available for Workers'
Compensation through managed care -- estimated by the State at savings of 28% to
54% on your Workers' Compensation medical costs ("Final Report to the Florida
Legislature: Workers' Compensation Managed Care Pilot Project," 07/15 / 94: Florida
Department of Insurance)

2)STATE TAXPAYERS
The cost of the Medicaid Program, and the State Employee Health Plan would skyrocket
if these proposals pass -- and taxpayers will have to bear the burden:

ANY WILLING PROVIDER:
9% to 2 9% increase adds $12 - 38 million to State Employee
Health Plan costs and $60 - 192 million to Medicaid Program costs
DIRECT ACCESS:
4 % to 14 % increase adds $5 - 18 million to State Employee Heal th
Plan costs and $27 - 97 million to Medicaid Program costs
MANDATED POINT-OF-SERVICE HMO:

same cost impact as Any Willing Provider

COUNTIES, MUNICIPALITIES, COMMUNITY COLLEGES, AND SCHOOL BOARDS WILL ALSO SUFFER!

ORGANIZED MEDICINE IS PUSHING THIS LEGISLATION TO STOP NETWORK-BASED
PLANS AND MOVE PEOPLE BACK TO THE "OLD STYLE" INDEMNITY COVERAGE
WITH RAPIDLY RISING COSTS, HUGE OUT OF POCKET EXPENSES -- TELL YOUR
LEGISLATOR TO VOTE NO!

IP4 . l
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ANTITRUST

Issue
The AHCA has proposed changes to facilitate greater cooperation among providers ,
purchasers , and third - party payers seeking to form new working arrangements in
response to state health care reform legislation .

The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
•Authorize the Department of Legal Affairs , Antitrust Division , in conjunction with
AHCA , to issue business reviews , advisory opinions , and " no action letters "
for proposed activities that comply with state antitrust laws .
•Allow the AHCA to collect data from providers and others to assess the market .

Effects
• Competition among all health care market players will be destroyed if proprietary
data is obtained by a governmental agency and becomes public information
for anyone to see . Patients and taxpayers would lose the cost - effectiveness
and innovation that is the hallmark of a competitive marketplace .
• The state will become the de facto controller of the market if they are given the
power to determine which organizations can preempt anti trust laws .
If
monopolies develop , taxpayers and consumers will be cheated out of the
efficiencies and innovations that are gained through a competitive market
system .
• The use of " no action letters " are potentially dangerous . They could be granted
without full knowledge of all the facts and could lead to bureaucratic and
legal complications that further interfere with competition between players
in the health care market.

Alternative Proposal
• Heal th care networks have been developing within the private marketplace for years .
The state should support the continued efforts of the market to meet consumer
demands , rather than create ways for competitors to circumvent the market .
• The state and federal governments are capable of adequately enforcing present
antitrust laws and regulations in a manner that promotes competition and
protects consumers .

IP5 -
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ANTI-TRUST

Proposal
"Anti - trust " legislation would provide exemption from state anti-trust laws and
immunity from federal anti - trust l aws to allow physicians and other hea lt h care
providers to establish networks for the purpose of negotia t ing with health plans.
Myths
Organized medicine contends that
oalthough federal anti - trust laws and policy do not prohibit the formation of
provider networks , they restrict the ways such networks can organize and
do not provide adequate guidance on the l awful operation of these networks
othis anti-trust legislation would promote competition
The Facts
Do physicians need anti - trust law exemptions to be ab l e to form effective provider
networks?
-No.

Look around: physicians can and are forming provider networks!
In addition ,
new ventures can receive timely guidance on whether proposed networks meet
the requirements of a competitive market :

·The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued statements and
revisions in 1993 and 1994 that set forth " safety zones " - - acceptable
collaborative activities which the federal government will not
challenge -- and additional guidelines for other activities .
·These agencies will address any matter in these policy statements within 90 days ,
and respond to any other non - merger matter within 1 20 days .
Will exemption from anti - trust laws improve competition i n Florida ' s health care
system?
-No,

this would effectively exempt physicians from any competition.
Existing
federal guidelines allow for provider - organized networks to represent either
20 % of physicians ( for exclusive networks) or 30 % o f physicians ( for
non - exclusive networks) in an area ;
the proposed legislation would allow
100% of physicians in non-exclusive networks.

Action Recommended
None.

Anti - trust laws exist to support competition by prohibiting price - £ ixing , boycotts ,
and similar agreements among competitors which would have an anti - competitive
effect, as well as mergers or acquisitions which would decrease competition or create
monopolies . The proposed legislation would effectively allow all the physicians
in an area to join together to fix prices , boycott heal th plans , or engage in other

anti-competitive activities --- and Floridians would again see health care costs
rising rapidly.

As of 03/16/95 , anti - trust legislation appears in HB 841 (Goode) , HB 771 (Warner) ,
and SB 926 (Grant) .

IPS . l
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ANY WILLING PROVIDER

Issue
Recently , a bill was introduced in Florida that would require Accountable Health
Partnerships (AHPs) to accept any health care provider who agrees to the payment
rates the AHP has negotiated with other providers offering the same services.
These kinds of bills are commonly called " any willing provider " bills . They require
managed care o rganizati ons (MCOs) to include in their network any provider willing
to accept the terms and conditions of the MCO ' s contract .
These bills would destroy managed care systems and the value they bring to the heal th
care market.

Effects
• This is a special interes t legislation that hurts the consumers and the payers
of health care services . Major payors are employers , the government (both
as an employer and Medi caid payor) , and of course , individuals .
• The ability to contract selectively with providers is the central concept of managed
care .
"Any willing provider " restrictions would destroy managed care and
reverse the progress that employers have made in recent years in controlling
their health care costs .
•Supporters of market-based health care reform and enrollees of managed care plans
would be disturbed by the state ' s contradiction o f its own managed competition
reforms .
"Any willing provider " statutes are fundamentally inconsi stent with
managed competition .

• The state would be acting contrary to the Federal Trade Commissions ' s (FTC)
recommendations , based on economic studies , that selective contracting
arrangements should be supported.
The FTC ' s findings show that compet ition
from selective contracting arrangements controls costs , produces broader
product coverage , and lowers out - of - pocket payments .
•Businesses and enrollees of managed care plans ( the payers and consumers of heal th
care) would be upset to find that providers would be substantially less willing
to offer lower prices , more services , or allow greater review of the quality
of care they provide because the portion of subscriber business each provider
would receive from an MCO is diluted by the uncontrolled number of providers
that can join the MCO ' s network.

• Reduced competition among providers would lead to higher prices for provider
services and increased administrative costs to credential and monitor the
performance of more providers , and administer more contracts . Businesses
and enrollees of managed care plans would be concerned by the increased costs
they would face.
•"Any willing provider " restrictions would raise prices for everybody,

not just

employers and individuals enrolled in managed care plans . Traditional plans
that don ' t use selective contracting wou l d no longer face the competition
from lower priced MCOs and , therefore , could raise their prices .

IP6 -
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•Taxpayers would be displeased as their taxes rise to pay for the increased cost
of city , county , and state government employee health benefits , since these
entities would no longer enjoy the efficiencies associated with an MCO ' s
selective contracting arrangements .
•Supporters of market-based heal th care reform and citizens concerned about
intrusive government practices wou l d be dis t urbed by the state ' s interference
in the business decisions of MCOs to develop products (health plans) that
meet consumer needs (for cost , access , and convenience) . They would further
be disturbed that these actions stifle competition and destroy the value
of MCO products (health plans) .
•Many providers would lose the benefits they now enjoy from exclusive or limited
contracts with restricted networks .
These benefits include higher ,
predictab l e patient volumes which facilitate planning and budgeting
decisions , and a clear understanding of the network ' s terms and conditions
which reduces confusion for providers and patients.

• The " any willing provider " concept is appealing to individuals because it gives
them access to all the providers in their area . But , " any willing provider "
increases costs to employers which lead to higher premiums , deductibles ,
and copayrnents for individua l s .
Under an " any wi lling p r ov i der " sys t em ,
individuals would spend $500 to $1 , 500 in deductib l es before they would get
payment for any provider .

Alternative Pr oposal
The state should not pass legislation which hinders the operation of MCOs.

A we l l - designed and developed managed care network requires a balance in the
participation or "mix " of providers , because the strength of a managed care network
lies i n i ts ability to mee t its cus t omer ' s needs (fo r cost , access , convenience ,
qua l ity , etc . ) .
It i s through network " design " that consumer needs are met by
blending various provider characteristics . Unlimited or forced part i cipat i on skews
the blend .
Requ ir ing MCOs to accept " any willing providers " will compromise t he ability of
the network to choose its inputs and will discourage competition among providers ,
in turn raising prices to consumers without providing public benefit .
The state should require CHPAs to offer traditional plans if they are available
in the area.
This would provide , for consumers who wan t it , access to every health
care provider in the area.
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ANY WILLING PROVIDER

Proposal
"Any willing provider " (AWP) legislation forces network - based health plans to allow any physician
to become a network member if the physician accepts the plan ' s payment level and agrees to abide
by the plan ' s rules .
Myths
Organized medicine believes that AWP

oensures that patients have a broader choice of physicians than they do now
owill not affect the cost or quality of network - based plans
ois strongly supported by all Florida physicians
The Facts
Do patients need a broader choice of physicians than they have now?
-Nearly all --- 99% --- of the 11.2 million Floridians with health care coverage have a choice
of providers or types of health care plans.
The number who choose HMOs --- the type of
health plan in which members agree to use only network providers --- is growing . Less
than 1 % of insured Floridians are enrolled in HMOs by their employers without a choice
of another type of plan . Those enrolled in HMOs choose their primary care physician from
the HMO ' s panel.

Will AWP really have little or no effect on the cost and quality of network - based plans?
-Independent actuarial analyses indicate that AWP legislation will significantly increase the
costs of network-based plans, both by eroding the incentives for network physicians to
agree to lower rates and by increasing the administrative costs related to managing a
network.
Conservative estimates of the resulting premium increases are at least 4 % to
22 % for HMOs , PPOs , and other network- based plans (The Wyatt Company , Atkinson & Company ,
The Congressional Budget Office) .

If heal th plans
- Quality management becomes more difficu l t and costly as a network gets larger .
have no control over the providers who join their networks they lose a major quality tool
--- ability to select (or de - select) the right provider . Members of network-based plans
are satisfied with the quality of care their physicians provide --- according to a recent
study, more satisfied than people with traditional health care coverage (Sachs Group ,
Inc . /Scarborough Research Corp . ).
Members are rightly concerned that if any physician
is allowed to join a network , quality wi l l decrease .
Are Florida physicians unanimously demanding AWP legislation?
-The answer is no.
Many physicians believe that the changes brought by network- based plans
have been good for patients and good for the practice of medicine.
They stress that AWP
wou l d erode these positive changes .
For example , HMOs have long been recogn i zed for
emphasizing preventive and primary care .
These physicians , like their patients , point
out that patients receive good value in network- based plans , with a choice among physicians
in various specialties , lower premium prices , and quality care .

Action Recommended
None.

Network- based plans , including standard HMOs , are valuable options for the citizens of Florida .

Floridians choose these plans from the many
today .
For many , network - based plans have
affordable . AWP takes Florida back in time to
coverage .
Follow the advice of network-based
for something to fix."

health insurance products ava ilable in Florida
made , and kept , quality health care coverage
high cost , traditional fee - for - service insurance
"nothing's broken, so don't look
plan members:

HB 841 (Goode) contains
As of 03/16/95 , AWP language appears in HB 541 (Kelly) and SB 828 (Myers) .
language which would cripple network - based plans ' ability to select providers and thus has results
very similar to AWP .
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ANY WILLING PROVIDER

Proposal
"Any willing provider " (AWP) legislation forces network - based heal th plans to allow any physician
to become a network member if the physician accepts the plan ' s payment level and agrees to abide
by the plan ' s rules.
Myths
Organized medicine believes that AWP

oensures that patients have a broader choice of physicians than they do now
owill not affect the cost or quality of network - based plans
ois strongly supported by all Florida physicians
The Facts
Do patients need a broader choice of physicians than they have now?
-Nearly all --- 99% --- of the 11.2 million Floridians with health care coverage have a choice
of providers or types of health care plans.
The number who choose HMOs --- the type of
health plan in which members agree to use only network providers - -- is growing . Less
than 1 % of insured Floridians are enrolled in HMOs by their employers without a choice
of another type of plan .
Those enrolled in HMOs choose their primary care physician from
the HMO ' s panel .

Will AWP really have little or no effect on the cost and quality of network- based plans?
-Independent actuarial analyses indicate that AWP legislation will significantly increase the
costs of network-based plans, both by eroding the incentives for network physicians to
agree to lower rates and by increasing the administrative costs related to managing a
network.
Conservative estimates of the resulting premium increases are at least 4 % to
22 % for HMOs , PPOs , and other network- based plans (The Wyatt Company , Atkinson & Company ,
The Congressional Budget Office) .

- Quality management becomes more difficult and costly as a network gets larger .
If heal th plans
have no control over the providers who join their networks they lose a major quality tool
--- ability to select (or de - select) the right provider . Members of network-based plans
are satisfied with the quality of care their physicians provide --- according to a recent
study, more satisfied than people with traditional health care coverage (Sachs Group ,
Inc./Scarborough Research Corp . ) . Members are rightly concerned that if any physician
is allowed to join a network , quality will decrease.
Are Florida physicians unanimously demanding AWP legislation?
-The answer is no.
Many physicians believe that the changes brought by network- based plans
have been good for patients and good for the practice of medicine .
They stress that AWP
would erode these positive changes .
For example , HMOs have long been recognized for
emphasizing preventive and primary care . These physicians , like their patients , point
out that patients receive good value in network- based plans , with a choice among physicians
in various specialties , lower premium prices , and quality care .

Action Recommended
None.

Network- based plans , including standard HMOs , are valuable options for the citizens of Florida .

Floridians choose these plans from the many
today .
For many , network - based plans have
affordable . AWP takes Florida back in time to
coverage .
Follow the advice of network-based
for something to fix."

health insurance products available in Florida
made , and kept , quality heal th care coverage
high cost , traditional fee - for - service insurance
"nothing's broken, so don't look
plan members:

HB 841 (Goode) contains
As of 03/16/95 , AWP language appears in HB 541 (Kelly) and SB 828 (Myers) .
language which would cripple network - based plans ' ability to select providers and thus has results
very similar to AWP .
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ASSURING GOOD INFORMATION FOR PURCHASERS

Background
Competition among managed care companies holds the greatest potential to control
costs in the health care marketplace . Managed care companies need data to secure
the best quality of care at the most reasonable cost for their customers .
Information is a l so needed to ensure that health care services lead to outcomes
that improve the quality of life for consumers.

Recommendations
The state needs to take an active role in encouraging the appropriate use of
information to foster competition among managed care companies . Such a role would
include :
• expanding the state ' s capability to collect and communicate provider licensure
and other basic credentialling information
•monitoring the research sponsored by the Agency for Heal th Care Policy and Research
on quality measures , efficacy and safety , in order to disseminate and promote
this information to purchasers in Florida
• establishing and enforcing the rules of disclosure on cost and quality information
to ensure that customers have appropriate information for valid comparisons
of competing managed care companies
• updating regular l y the information from the AHCPR and other sources on quality ,
efficacy and safety to make sure that Florida purchasers have the most
up - to - date tools for assessing the value they receive for their health care
dollar
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BACKGROUND ON PURCHASING GROUPS

Purchasing Groups and Managed Competition
Under the theoretical model of managed competition , created by the Jackson Hole
Group , purchasing groups called Health Plan Purchasing Cooperatives (HPPCs) were
created to help small employers and individuals influence the health care market
more effectively .
HPPCs would pool the purchasing power of the small groups ,
improve the availability of i nformation , and act as buying agents and administrators .
In the initial HPPC concept , HPPCs were government - sponsored , non - profit
organizations serving exclusive geographic regions .
HPPCs would have the power
to negotiate with health plans .
Small groups were mandated to enroll in HPPCs .
Over time , the Jackson Hole Group modified its original HPPC concept somewhat ,
acknowledging that geographic regions need not be exclusive (competing HPPCs would
be an option) , and giving states more leeway to define the structure/role of HPPCs .
In sum , HPPCs under managed competition are basically a mandatory monopsony , and
are dependent on a whole new set of bureaucratic structures , (national health boards ,
for example) in order to function .
As originally designed , managed competition
HPPCs do not fit well with private market concepts .
General Conclusions on Purchasing Groups
BCBSF believes in the ability of the private sector to meet the needs of consumers .
We support health care reform that takes advantage of managed care and private
markets to address health care cost , access , and quality issues .
There is nothing wrong with , or even unusual about , group purchasing through buying
cooperatives .
If there are no regulations preventing them , purchasing groups will
form spontaneously in the market .
Purchasing groups that compete in the private
market must meet the needs of their members to be successful .
If they do not , they
will not survive and other efforts , that better mee t the needs of their members ,
will take their place .
Therefore , it does not seem necessary for the government to establish purchasing
groups for the health care market.
However , if a state or federal government does
decide to set up government - sponsored purchasing groups , BCBSF identified several
key components essential for their success :
oThe

purpose of
competition
price .
The
the ability

government - sponsored purchasing groups should be to promote
among insurers and managed care companies based on quality and
purchasing group should not be a purchaser ; it should improve
of its members to purchase for themselves .

oA purchasing group ' s membership and governing board should be confined to persons
who actually purchase health benefits through the organization -- those with
a direct interest in its success .
oMost important , individuals , not employers , should choose among the health plans
competing for business among purchasing group members .
Individual choice
is the central concept of managed competition ; it promotes personal
responsibility while allowing individuals to select a health care plan of
their choice .

Florida ' s Community Health Purchasing Alliances

(CHPAs)

With the passage o f the Heal th Care and In surance Reform Act of 1993 , Florida embraced
the managed competition approach .
The law authorized establishment of
government - sponsored , non - profit purchasing groups called CHPAs to serve small
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employers ( 1 - 50 employees )
Eleven geographically- exclusive CHPAs were specified ,
with start - up funding from the state.
Some of the positive characteristics of CHPAs
are that they are
- voluntary
- confined to small groups
- have no regulatory authority or negotiating power
- cannot contract directly with providers
- required to financially support their o wn operations after the start - up period
Several negative characteristics are that
- CHPAs are not run by their members , but rather by boards of 17 political appointees
- each CHPA board can re - structure the types of products health plans must of fer
to members
The main danger in CHPAs lies in their potential to change from a voluntary system
to a mandatory , bureaucratic monopsony covering all o r most Floridians .
Moving
Medicaid beneficiaries and state employees int o CHPAs is a shift in this direction ;
with state monies supporting CHPA operations , CHPAs have less need to provide value
to the private market customers -- small employers -- for which they were originally
designed .
In a monopsony role CHPAs will fundamentally harm the private market
system .
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BASIC BENEFIT STANDARD

Issue
The 1993 Florida Health Plan directed the AHCA to recommend to the legislature a
basic hea l th care benefit package that provides basic health services .

Flor i da Health Security Pl an Proposes
• Establishing the AHCA ' s benefit standard as the floor for all non - self - insured
plans contingent on passage of Florida Health Security Program .
• Requiring that insurers offer the benefit standard if the Florida Health Security
Program is not enacted and implemented .

Effects
•Some small employers and lower-income individuals will be priced out of the market
(causing an increase in the uninsured) if the basic benefit standard
recommended by AHCA is adopted as the benefit floor for all non - self - insured
plans .
•Insurers in the competitive marketplace will be denied the flexibility to provide
lower cost plans (i . e., catastrophic policies) .

• Establishing the basic benefit standard as the floor for a l l non - self - insured plans
wil l provide another incentive for even smaller businesses to become
self - insured . As a result ,
- fewer companies and their employers will be subject to Florida insurance regulatory
protection , and
- the burden of the state ' s insurance premium tax will be placed on fewer small
businesses who couldn ' t self - insure.

Alternative Proposal
The basic benefit standard should serve as a benchmark , to be used to promote
comparability between health plans .
It should not be the " floor " benefit , limiting
flexibility of plans and products offered in the market .
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BCBSF'S POSITION ON THE CLINTON HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSAL

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports the need for reform to make the heal th
care system more efficient and less costly and to assure access to high quality
services for all Americans . We particularly applaud the Clinton Administration ' s
intent to achieve reform primarily through reliance on the private marketplace .
The Clinton proposal would promote a competitive health care system by making
comparison between plans easier , by making consumers more cost - conscious through
limiting the tax deductibility of insurance coverage , by publicizing information
on the value of competing heal th plans , and by reforming the heal th insurance market
to reduce paperwork .
However , some parts of the proposal cause serious concern about their effects on
the U. S. economy and on Clinton ' s basic approach to reform . Three such elements
are the mandate that all employers pay for health benefit plans for their employee ,
the price controls on hea l th insurance , and the command and control role of health
alliances .
While an employer mandate to purchase insurance is intended to help the employees
of small businesses , it would actually hurt many of them.
Employers with thin profit
margins would be forced to reduce other forms of compensation , cut their work forces ,
or in the worst cases , go out of business .
The impact on employees would be
especially devastating in Florida because we have so many small businesses and low
wage jobs .
The Clinton proposal also would impose price controls through premium caps and global
budgets .
Price controls do not work .
In health care , they lead to rationing ,
reduced services , the erosion of quality and , often , to higher prices than would
be achieved through competitive markets . Also , administrative costs would increase
from the expenses necessary to run a large bureaucratic monitoring and enforcement
system.
Perhaps worst of all , reliance on price controls would undermine the rest
of the President ' s proposal which attempts to use private markets to improve the
efficiency of the system.
Another threat to the proposal ' s success is the role of the purchasing groups (Health
Alliances) .
In the Clinton plan , Health Alliances are micro - managers and
monopsonistic purchasers , not market facilitators . Alliances negotiate fees with
providers , organize them into heal th plans , and enforce global budgets . Enrollment
in a Health Alliance is compulsory for most people . Enrollment is mandatory for
businesses wi th fewer than 5 , 000 employees , government employees , Medicaid
beneficiaries , the self - employed , and the currently uninsured . These individuals
will have nowhere else to turn for health care if the Alliances do not meet their
needs . Heal th Alliances would dominate the heal th care market , especially in states
like Florida where there are very few businesses with more than 5 , 000 employees ,
and would virtually control the financing , organization , and delivery of health
care.
In designing its Cornrnuni ty Heal th Purchasing Al liances (CHPAs) , Florida has avoided
many of the flaws in Clinton ' s Heal th Alliances .
Florida ' s CHPAs promote
competition by facilitating price comparisons of plans and by keeping enrollment
voluntary.
To be successful , CHPAs must convince their members that their products
offer more value per dollar than the alternatives available outside the CHPA . Unlike

Health Alliances , CHPAs allow the consumer to decide whether group purchasing is
a good idea .
A final concern about Clinton ' s proposal is how it will be financed . The proposal
relies on employers ' " contributions ," cuts in Medicare and Medicaid , and
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unspecified federal funds to pay for new coverage , implementation and maintenance
of the Health Alliances and other admin i strative bodies that will be created to
support the new system . In light of the federal government ' s financial woes , it
appears that most of the cost will eventually fall to the private sector which could
negatively affect employment and the price of goods and services . A careful and
thorough analysis should be conducted to confirm that adequate financing will be
available for Clinton ' s reform proposal .
The heal th care system needs reform that improves competitive markets . Competition
among managed care plan s has already produced innovative methods to control costs .
Through managed care , BCBSF has successfully held health care cost increases to
less than overall inflation for many of its customers .
These successes in cost
containment have been achieved while ensuring the delivery of high quality care .
What is needed from heal th care reform is a more competitive system that will b r ing
the benefits of managed care to many more Americans .
Elements of the Clinton
proposal that promote value - based competition shou l d be implemented , and those
elements of the plan that stifle the private market should be discouraged .

BCBSF ' S VISION OF THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND FINANCING SYSTEM

Health Care expenditures represent an increasing portion of government , employer ,
and personal budgets. At the same time , many Floridians lack even basic coverage
for health care expenses . These problems have produced many proposals to reform
the system , especially through government action .
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida agrees that some reform is needed . We also
believe that a sound reform proposal should be shaped by a vision of the ideal heal th
system . Our vision extends and amplifies what we see as the positive features of
the current system while eliminating the dysfunctional elements .
l . Access to most of health care is provided through managed care companies (MCCs)
which are accountable for both the financing and delivery of care . Managed
care companies compete based on their products' total value - - the efficiency
and effectiveness of the health care delivered through benefit programs and
the products ' prices . MCCs control total price by achieving efficiency in
administration and health care delivery .
2 . Buyers in any geographic area face a market consisting of two to ten MCCs .
Competitive conditions drive out those companies that compete solely by
serving low- risk customers . A few large companies are able to spread the
costs of sophisticated information systems , administrative technologies ,
research and development , and management talent necessary to manage care
effectively .
They also have sufficient enrollment to exert pressure on
providers to compete for their business . And as the industry evolves toward
closer partnerships between MCCs and providers , a market characterized by
a few large companies offers clearer choices . In buying a managed care benefit
package , the consumer is buying access to a distinct network of providers .
(a)
3 . Competing MCCs achieve greater efficiency in the allocation of resources :
among primary , secondary , and tertiary care ; (b) among types of providers
specialists , generalists , physician extenders , nurses,
and other
professionals; (c) across locations of service
physician ' s offices ,
emergency rooms, outpatient clinics , hospital beds ; and ( d) across particular
diagnostic and therapeutic modalities .
These efficiencies are achieved
because (1) MCCs and the providers in their networks have the incentives
to search for and take advantage of efficiencies ; (2) good information is
available on the costs and benefits of alternative ways of providing care ;
and (3) regulatory and benefit restrictions (e.g ., mandates to use certain
providers) on efficient allocations have been removed .
4 . Competition among MCCs translates to competition among heal th care providers based
on the value they can bring to a managed care program.
Heal th care
professionals and institutions that provide care efficiently and effectively
compete successfully for the managed care dollar .
Competition based on
treating the more profitable cases and avoiding less profitable cases is
eliminated as providers ' economic incentives are more closely a l igned with
the MCC ' s .
Competition based on needless amenities is also eliminated as
providers are judged on their results . These judgments are possible because
there is valid , reliable information on the quality and cost of care that
each provider achieves .

5 . The

system encourages flexibility and experimentation in benefit packages ,
delivery arrangements , payment methods and amounts from MCCs to providers ,
payment methods among providers, and provider network structures . Since no
one knows a best way for a heal th care system to work and since it will always
be changing , it is better to reward results than to prescribe structures
and processes .
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6 . The system benefits from administrative effic i encies such as standardization of
payment forms ; automation of financial and clinical data transmission;
innovation in payment arrangements ; and development of sophisticated
management information systems.
These efficiencies reduce the unit operating
costs of both MCCs and providers .
7.All citizens are enrolled in either a health benefit program sold by an MCC or
in a public program . Universal coverage assures access to primary care and
thereby eliminates the inefficiency and ineffectiveness that resu l ts from
the uninsured receiving care only when seriously ill .
It also eliminates
the implicit subsidization of the uninsured by the insured .
8 . Public programs use managed care systems to serve the poor and medically indigent.
Some public program beneficiaries are enrolled directly in products offered
by MCCs .
This reduces government bureaucracy needed to operate a public
program and it assures the poor the same access to care as the rest of the
population .
To the extent there is still a need for government operated
programs , those programs exploit the technologies of selective contracting ,
and quality and utilization management developed by MCCs .
9 . The system promotes individual responsibility for health and health care cost .
MCCs recognize and reward patient education as an essential component of
health care delivery .
The avoidance of unhealthy behavior is rewarded in
lower premium costs . Hea l th benefit programs include copayments at the point
of service and individuals pay at least a portion of the premium .
10 . Government finances : (a) research on the efficacy , safety , and costs/benefits
of medical procedures ; (b) development of measures of patient conditions
to allow adequate assessment and comparison of outcomes ; and (c) development
of medical practice guidelines based on scientific research.
The system
provides the incentives and flexibility for competing MCCs to use this
information and these tools to select and reward providers and to design
optimal benefit programs .
11 . Government establishes and enforces the rules by which both MCCs and providers
compete . Government assures that competition is fair , that successful MCCs
and providers are the ones that most effectively deliver value to the
individual and society .
12 . Government detects and punishes fraudulent behavior on the part of patients ,
insured groups and individuals , individual and institutional providers ,
insurance companies , and managed care companies .
13 . The malpractice system assures that patients who are harmed by negligent or
wrongful medical care are compensated by the providers of that care . The

malpractice system does not have a punishment function ; providers who
consistently deliver low- quality care find i t difficult to survive when
quality is an important basis of competit i on . The malpractice system also
does not serve a purpose of enriching patients or their attorneys .
14 . The health care delivery and financing system is not expected to be the sole
source of improved health nor the sole object of attempts to control health
care expenditures .
Improving the health of ou r population requires
addressing major causes of illness such as drug and alcohol abuse , violence ,
nutrition , and accidents . Public and private action that affects these and
othe r factors external to the health system are essential to a comprehensive
strategy for reducing health care costs .
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CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE
Issue
Current law calls for the AHCA to redesign and modernize its regulatory programs and to limit
programs that are barriers to market entry.
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
• Use CON regulation to control the development of Centers of Excellence and force AHPs to accept
them .
•Authorize the AHCA to establish uniform standards for the certification of Centers of Excellence .
• Use the CON program to establish quality standards that the AHCA ' s Division of Health Quality
Assurance will monitor and enforce.
Effects
• Creating a set of " state authorized " providers limits competitive forces and choice in the
health care market . Consumers would not make choices about health care providers , the
government would .
• It could potentially result in monopolies and higher costs to consumers.
•Floridians would see overall heal th care costs rise if providers have incentives for unnecessary

services because they want to obtain Center of Excellence designation from the state .
•AHP customers would see their premiums rise because requiring AHPs

to include Centers of
Excellence as in - network referrals would reduce the ability of AHPs to negotiate with
facilities for tertiary care .

Alternative Proposal
• The Agency already has authority to monitor and delicense facilities for quality of care issues .
There is no need for additional regulatory controls for quality assurance.
The
competitive marketplace will drive improvements in quality of care with the release of
certain quality- related information by AHPs to consumers .
• The AHCA is attempting to use CON requirements to limit market entry , in direct contradiction
of existing law .
Centers of Excellence are an innovative market response to the need
for high- quality but cost - effective care for high- cost services . Consumers , armed with
applicable utilization and quality information should determine the success of these
Centers , not the government .
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CERTIFICATE OF NEED

Issue
Florida , through S . B . 1914 , chose the managed competition approach to health care
reform .
The state needs to determine whether and how CON , which is part of a
regulatory approach to cost containment , fits with the reliance on competition .
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
• Maintain CON r eview for all tertiary health care services , including open heart
surgery , neonatal intensive care services , comprehensive rehabilitation
services , burn units , and organ transplantation programs .
• Maintain CON review for services that are exempt from DRG reimbursement , including
psychiatric services and long -t e r m ca r e hospital services .
• Expand CON review to outpatient capita l expenditures in excess of $ 1 million .
• Require CON review for the acquisition and replacement of all major medical
equipment that costs in excess of $1 million regardless of setting .
• Modify the health faci l ity l i censure process to allow the delicensure of facility
servi ces that do not meet CON qua l ity and volume standards .
• Expand AHCA ' s assessment of new technologies to a i d it in its management of health
care markets and to assist purchasers and consumers .
• Use CON regulation to promote the development of centers of excellence .
• Eliminate the statutory requirement that CON applicants
long - range plan with the i r CON app l ication .

submit

a

facility

• Elimi nate the statutory requirement that CON applicants assess the impact of their
proposed project on the cost of other services provided by the applicant .
• Ensure that any provider in a tertiary planning services area has standing in CON
legal proceedi ngs .
• Extend the CON validity period for construction projects from one year to 18 months .
Effects
• Expanding CON review to all out - patient capital expenditures over $1 million places
another segment of the health care system under regulatory control .
This
is contrary to the state ' s adoption of managed competition
as the mechanism that would drive the marketp l ace .
The result would limit the
ability of all players in the heal th care market to respond to consumer needs
in a competitive fashion .
• Requiring CON review for the acquisition and replacement of all major medical
equipment regardless of setting stifles the market ' s ability to respond cost

effectively and creatively to consumer needs for convenience and efficiency .
Patients and providers would be ill - served by the state dictating where
services requiring major medical equipment may be offered .
They would be
better served by removing CON regulations rather than expanding them to
additional providers .
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•Consumers would not appreciate the AHCA assessing new technologies wi th the aim
of further controlling the hea l th care market .
This would undermine the
ability of the medical community and patients to determine the technologies
that can best serve their needs.

Alternative Proposals
• CON is compatible with a managed competition approach to health care reform . The
Legislature should direct the AHCA to develop a plan for a careful and selective
phasing out of CON as competit i ve markets mature .
The Plan must consider
the competitiveness and needed changes in payment mechanisms (e.g . , Medicaid
payment for nursing home services) for each type of service to assure that
CON ' s removal is scheduled appropriately .
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COMBINING STATE EMPLOYER GROUP AND MEDICAID

There has been some discussion of combining the State Employee Group and the
program . Although the objec ti ves of this proposal are not clear , there
hope that it would provide the State greater bargaining power in purchasing
or that there would be some administrative savings . We believe it is not
proposal for the f ol l owing reasons :

Medicaid
may be a
services
a viable

oThe two programs have very different objectives , benefits , processes , procedures ,
and service requirements .
The State Employee health benefit is part of a
compensation package intended to attract and retain qualified public servants .
Medicaid is part of a safety net that assures the availability of some care
for the poor and medically indigent .
oThe State Employee program demands broad access to the State ' s hospitals and
physicians ; Medicaid beneficiaries , in reality , have access to only a small
minority of the State's providers .
oThe Medicaid program does not call for cost sharing from the beneficiary and requires
financial transactions only between the provider and the payer . The State
Employee program includes some payment responsibility from the enrollee and ,
therefore , entails considerably more complex administration and service
requirements .
oConfining State employees to what is effectively a Medicaid network (e . g .,
approximately 2000 physicians, most of whom practice at a few teaching
hospitals) would not be acceptable .
In contrast to the current program which
satisfies over 95 percent of employees and thus partially compensates for
low salaries , the State would find itself with a demoralized , demotivated
work force.
oTo

try to broaden the Medicaid " network " to satisfy State employees would
significantly increase Medicaid expenditures .
It would require increasing
the fees Medicaid pays and development of a provider service function that
is not part of the current Medicaid program at all .
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COMMUNITY RATING
Background

As the debate on health care reform has escalated, community rating
increasingly has appeared as a component of state and national reform
packages. A number of states have already started to experiment with
community rating.
By 1994, forty-five states required some form of
community rating to be used in setting heal th care insurance premiums
for individuals and small groups.
Many supporters of community rating
are seeking to expand this pricing system to all purchasers of heal th
insurance.
There are two types of community rating, "pure" community rating and
"modified" community rating, which is also known as community rating
by class (CRC) . According to the American Academy of Actuaries (AAA),
under "pure" community rating everyone is charged the same premium.
The only variation in premium occurs because of family status,
geographical area, or plan design.
The AAA recognizes two additional
premium modifiers under CRC; age and gender.
Some states have
introduced additional premium modifiers such as occupation and
wellness habits (e.g., smoking status).
In Florida, 1993 health care legislation required insurers to begin
using modified community rating to set premiums for small groups.
Legislative attempts to move toward "pure" community rating and to
expand the use of community rating to individuals and groups not
currently included under the law are expected.
Clearly, community rating is being seen by some as an approach to
solve certain perceived problems with the health care market.
As
interest and experience grows in the use of community rating, so must
our understanding of its appeal to supporters and its effect on the
heal th care market.
This paper presents information that is currently
available on community rating.
Historical Perspective
•During the 1930's, prepaid arrangements for hospital coverage were
introduced.
These plans eventually evolved into the Blue Cross
system.
Blue Cross plans were attractive to subscribers in part
because they were community rated - everyone was charged the
same premium for the same set of benefits regardless of the
subscriber's potential risk.
Risk for economic loss due to
hospitalization was spread across the community.
•During the late 1930's/early 1940's, medical benefits became a way
for employers to provide workers with additional compensation
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during wage freezes.
Heal th insurance flourished and commercial
insurers began offering health insurance plans. As commercial
insurers entered the market, they used the underwriting methods
of property/ casualty coverage to determine heal th care prerni urns.
Underwriting through experience rating enabled commercial
insurers rate premiums based on the estimated risk of a potential
subscriber.
Lower-risk indi victuals and groups could be charged
lower premiums than through community rating.
Individuals and groups that remained in community-rated pools tended
to be higher-risk indi victuals.
This caused community rated
premiums to rise.
Eventually, Blue Cross plans stopped
community rating large groups and began experience rating them
in order to offer more competitive rates.
•In the 1950's, as insurers added major medical coverage to insure
individuals against catastrophic risk, it became customary for
policy holders to pay deductibles and coinsurance.
Heal th
insurance
coverage
continued
to
expand
throughout
the
population.
•As health insurance coverage continued to be associated primarily
with
full-time
employment,
the
elderly
and
the
poor
disproportionately represented the uninsured.
Individual
policies for these groups were often too expensive for them to
purchase.
The elderly tended to have high premiums because of
their increased risk for using medical services.
During the
1960's, Medicare and Medicaid were created to provide health
insurance coverage to the elderly and certain segments of the
poor.
•Additional changes in health insurance occurred during the 1970's.
Large employers noticed little variation in their premiums from
year to year and many began to self-insure. As self-insurance
grew, contractual arrangements known as "administrative services
only"
(ASO)
also
grew.
ASO
contracts
provided
the
administrative processes needed to administer the self-insured
plans.
With the continued proliferation of experience rating
and self-insured plans, community rating became an even less
competitive underwriting practice than before.
•Prior to the passage of the HMO law in 1973, most HMOs operated as
prepaid group practices (like Kaiser Permanente) and based their
premiums on a variation of community rating.
-Although generally mandating community rating, the HMO law exempted
certain groups from the community rating requirements.
HMO products for state and local government employees as
well as Medicare/Medicaid eligibles were permitted to be
based on experience rating or negotiated rates instead.
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-In response to petitioning from several medical groups, including
the AMA, fee-for-service medicine was incorporated into
the HMO law through the independent practice association
(IPA) model.
IPAs adopted payment mechanisms similar to
indemnity plans.
With the emergence of new types of HMOs, came the need for different
types of rating systems (eg., composite rating, rating bands).
Increased tension has been experienced around how premiums are
set.
Federally qualified health maintenance organizations generally
continued to practice community rating after passage of the HMO
law.
Recent Legislative Action
•In July 1992, New York became the first state to implement "pure"
community rating for individual and small group policies.
In
addition, insurers for these markets must offer policies on a
guaranteed issue, continuous open enrollment basis.
•By 1994, forty-five states had enacted laws requiring some form of
community rating of the individual or small group markets.
•In 1993, Florida passed a law requiring insurers to use modified
community rating to price products for small groups (1-50).
Allowable modifiers include gender, age, family composition,
tobacco use, and geographic area.
Standard and basic health
plans must be offered on a guarantee issue basis.
Why Community Rating has become an Issue
During the past few years, the health insurance industry has become
a focus for increased national attention.
In part, this is out
of public concern for the number of people believed to be
under-served by the current insurance system.
These people
include the uninsured and the "job-locked." The "job-locked"
are individuals who feel restrained from changing jobs for fear
of losing their employer-based heal th insurance coverage or from
fear of being denied coverage temporarily or permanently due
to preexisting health conditions.
Community rating ( "pure" or modified) has been proposed by some people
as a solution.
It is believed that community rating will reduce
the number of uninsured and make insurance more affordable for
a greater number of people.
The belief is that including
everyone in one large pool will spread the risk and cost across
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many people so that the impact to individuals is minimized.
Additionally, some people believe that community rating will eliminate
certain health insurance practices they view as undesirable.
One such practice is "predatory rating", where individuals and
groups are offered low introductory rates which are sharply
raised as the group begins to submit medical claims. Another
is "red-lining" where policies are sold only
in certain
geographic areas.
Such practices would be eliminated by
spreading the risk (through community rating) among a large group
of people.
Proponents of Community Rating and their Arguments
Proponents of community rating include professional and trade
associations such as the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, Health
Insurance Association of America, Group Heal th Association of America,
the Alliance for Managed Competition and the American College of
Physician Executives.
A special committee of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) endorsed community
rating.
A number of small business associations and some heal th
policy analysts also endorse the use of community rating.
•The Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) supports modified

community rating.
They do not support "pure" community rating
which they believe would lead to an enormous cost shift from
older to younger Americans.
This would occur since the elderly
tend to have higher costs which would be spread over the entire
population.
"Pure" community rating without an adjustment for
age would cause premiums to increase dramatically resulting in
"sticker shock" for younger consumers.
In addition, individuals
who are now uninsurable would enter the market.
These expensive
high-risk individuals
are
currently excluded from many
private-sector pools in which young consumers now participate.
•Some insurance commissioners favor community rating because they
believe it will bring price stability to a volatile market.
Over time, experience rating results in continued price
increases.
This is reflective of the greater risk for illness
that occurs as one ages.
These price increases are steeper for
certain age groups.
When medical inflation is added to the
initial price increases, the rate of increase is magnified.
For some, premiums become too expensive and they drop coverage.
A special committee on health care reform of the NAIC recommends that
businesses with up to 500 employees be community rated.
Businesses with 500 or fewer employees should not be allowed
to self-insure or otherwise exit the community-rated pool.
•Many proponents of community rating believe that society should
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spread the risk and costs of health care services throughout
the population so that individuals are shielded from the full
economic impact of illness.
Charging everyone the same rate
for health insurance premiums would be one way to do this.
•Others believe that private health insurance is unique.
Charging
higher prices to riskier customers is less acceptable when it
comes to health. They argue against experience rating, claiming
that it is "morally questionable" to experience rate if the risk
is not controllable, as is often the case with health.
Those who adopt this philosophy maintain that in health care, risk
is not assumed the way it can be in other areas of life.
For
example, the risk of a house being hit by a hurricane is
proportional to where it is located.
A greater risk is
voluntarily assumed by living along the east coast.
The risk
of getting cancer is usually more elusive and is not a risk
voluntarily assumed by many of the people who get it.
People
cannot can respond to health matters the way they do to other
risks. A cancer patient will still require treatment and cannot
choose to move away from the disease.
Susceptibility to some risk factors is hereditary as well as
environmental. Much is unknown about these types of risks and
often little can be done to mitigate them.
In addition, some "victims" of risk are helpless to effect a change
in their status even when it is humanely possible to do so.
For example, people in the inner city are more likely to be shot,
whether or not they themselves are violent.
However, most people
living under these conditions do not have the economic means
to move to a safer environment.
Finally, many people cannot be counted on to tell insurers about
behaviors that would raise their rates.
For example, smokers
may not report their consumption and the insurance system cannot
be expected to measure it.
•Another view is that community rating can improve an insurance system
that allows some insurers to reap large profits by selecting
the best insurance risks while insurers of last resort accept
everyone and struggle to stay financially afloat.
•Many supporters believe that community rating is central to any
serious market reform effort and that it must be included as
part of incremental insurance reform.
•Some people view experience rating as a gamble, particularly for
small group employers.
One supporter of community rating notes,
"it does not take much for a heal thy, low-cost employer to become
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a high-risk, high-cost group."
Community rating acts as a
"guarantee" to individuals and small groups that their health
insurance will not be cancelled or suddenly priced beyond reach
solely because of the individual or group's catastrophic medical
claims.
Large employers are expected to accept community rating
as their contribution to the community to help maintain
affordable health care coverage for everyone.
•Another view is that since people generally save or borrow for most
large expenses, insurance is a way to save together as a community
by pooling funds so that whomever needs them, uses them.
This
view maintains that there are many ways to save as a community.
One is through traditional insurance.
Another is through
government funding, a third is through employer self-insurance.
Of these, the preferred form is community rating.
•While some opponents to community rating claim that the heal thy will
subsidize the sick, spreading expenses over a large group of
people is one of the fundamental principles of insurance.
Community rating has been successfully employed in Rochester,
New York.
Since the implementation of community rating, the
community has sponsored a number of studies showing that there
would be significant increases in the cost of health care for
the community if community rating were repealed.
• Some

supporters of community rating believe that the price of
insurance should depend on average costs in the community.
Premiums should be based on the "community rate" rather than
on insurance companies' attempts to assess risk.
The premium
should reflect the amount necessary to pay average medical costs
in the community.
This would provide subsidies from some people
to others.
Subsidies to the elderly for health insurance are
viewed as a form of saving for society's own future expense.
A current example of this according to these proponents is social
security and Medicare.

•Many supporters as well as critics of community rating believe that
community rating should not be required without other measures
to make it work.
Some suggested measures are:
-Universal coverage.
Younger, healthier, lower risk individuals must
participate in a community pool to balance the higher costs
associated with high risk subscribers.
-Guarantee issue.
For risk to be spread and universal coverage
achieved, insurers must accept any applicant.
-Standard benefits.
If insurers guarantee everyone the same price,
but can offer different packages, there is an opportunity
to segregate risk by benefit package.
The guarantee of
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equal prices becomes meaningless.
Insurers will assess
risk and sell much less adequate coverage to those who are
more likely to need care. A standard benefits package would
require insurers to sell the same basic package so that
none can design a package to discourage expensive
beneficiaries.
-Tying premium contributions to income.
Community rating, mandatory
acceptance of applicants, and compulsory participation may
not be enough to make health insurance affordable to all
because U.S. health care costs are higher than most other
countries.
Since Americans' incomes vary widely, health
insurance financing must include subsidies by income and
must not discriminate by risk.
The United States is the
only advanced country other than Switzerland where most
people are insured at rates that are not in proportion to
their income.

Opponents of Community Rating and their Arguments
Opponents of community rating include the Council for Affordable
Health Insurance, many insurance companies and various policy analyst
groups (e.g., The Heritage Foundation).
•Community rating is a hidden tax on the young.
It forces younger,
generally healthy people to pay higher premiums to subsidize
older, generally sicker individuals. Most of these older people
earn more than the younger people or have savings from which
they can draw.
-Because everyone is charged the same premium under "pure" community
rating, sick people are charged less than under other rating
systems. As more sick people enter the market, the cost
of premiums rises.
The young and heal thy flee the insurance
market creating a spiral of higher costs and lower
enrollment.
Although community rating at first glance might appear to be a good
idea because risk is spread among the general population, in
the end those who were initially helped by community rating will
tend to be worse off than before community rating was implemented.

•A few opponents of community rating believe that in some states
community rating laws were passed to prop-up mismanaged
companies.
For example, in New York, Empire Blue Cross Blue
Shield lied to the state legislature and the New York Insurance
Department about its financial condition presumably to get the
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community rating law passed.
•An analogy used by one opponent of community rating is that an
insurance contract is like a credit card or bond issue used to
finance certain goods and services. The price of the insurance
contract includes the risk that is assumed for potential losses.
Interest rates for credit cards reflect the amount of risk that a
bank assumes in providing credit to an individual
card-holder.
Banks charge interest rates that can vary
greatly as they determine what kind of risks they are willing
to take on.
A bank can offer different types of credit
cards with different restrictions, again reflecting the
type of risk a bank is willing to assume.
Americans would never agree that the government should make banks
charge one interest rate for all credit card holders.
If
the rate were set too low then bad risks would take advantage
of it and the bank would go broke as a result of improper
underwriting.
Similarly, community rating is not a good
idea.
• Losses are being experienced
in assigned risk pools
for auto
insurance, workers' compensation, and health insurance.
These
losses are due to government imposed community rated underwriting
for these products.
Establishing a government imposed
community-rated risk pool for everyone would have similar
disastrous effects on the health insurance market as a whole.
II

II

•Competition should determine the fair price for assuming various
types of risk.
Only the consumer, the agent, and the insurance
company can decide what is best for each party.
An external
observer cannot determine for each participant the best mix of
benefits that should appear in an individual's insurance
contract.
-The role of government should be to allow insurance companies to
pursue profits within guidelines that would
ensure
sufficient reserves.
Government should also address
unfair claims practices.
•Medicare, a program which engages in community rating for physician
services, has not been successful in it's financial operations.
Some believe that this is because the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) underwrites using a community rating
method that cannot address the problem of over-utilization.
The nation does not see HCFA's failures because there are no annual
statements, agents are not employed, reserves are not
posted, and regulatory authorities do not have sufficient
oversight controls.
The results are higher taxes coupled
with a reduction in benefits.
If HCFA's community rating
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policy works why would they be shifting primary c are for
employees age 65 or older to private carriers (through
HMOs)?
•A favorable point about pricing health insurance contracts along
underwriting principles, is that there is an incentive for
policyholders to seek to get into a better underwriting category.

Evidence

Studies of community rating are scant.
Few states have implemented
community rating long enough t o allow for an appropriate evaluation
of its effects and the findings of some studies contradict that of
other studies.
This is not surprising since states experience with
community
rating
is
limited,
implementation
differs
from
state-to-state, and research methodologies vary.
Community Rating: States' Experience (The Commonwealth Fund)
•A study based on an analysis of data from 5 states that have had
a year of experience with full or partial community rating was
recently released by the Commonwealth Fund.
The study suggests
that while community rating may offer marginal market
improvements, it must be part of a broader effort if health
insurance reform is to have a significant impact in covering
the uninsured and improving access to care.
The report is based
on interviews with state officials in Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, and Vermont.
-The impact on coverage appears to depend on how the program is designed
and implemented.
Vermont and New Jersey experienced net
gains in coverage while New York experienced a loss in
coverage during the first year of implementation.
-Community rating appears to do little for those who cannot afford
average premiums before implementation of community
rating.
-According to the report, the true impact on overall coverage is
unknown because all the state estimates are
based on the number of policies sold, not the number of people covered.
-The

New

York experience indicates that in a voluntary system,
community rating may not work well.
Healthier small groups
and i ndi vi duals may go without insurance, or may form
voluntary pools that self-insure leaving only sicker groups
in the community pools.
The report notes that the long-term
impact o f community rating without mandatory participation
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is unclear.
-Researchers found similarities and differences in state experience
depending on factors such as legal requirements and phase-in
schedules.
The following general observations were made:
oOverall, health insurance premium rate increases were smaller than
anticipated except in New York where community rating
was implemented without a phase-in period.
Several
state insurance officials reported that initial rate
filings by insurers were higher than necessary.
Carriers
later
reduced
premiums
to
remain
competitive.
oPremium

rates

were compressed,
premiums rose.

oPreviously

insured healthier
increases.

oThe

of

oSome

number

of

the

higher
small

premiums
groups

fell

and

incurred

lower

premium

insurers leaving the market was minimal.
Most
companies with a significant presence stayed in the
market.

exit by consumers from individual and small group
insurance markets may have been to larger groups
through family coverage or to HMOs.
HMO access was
expanded as a result of requirements to sell to small
group and individual markets.
Enrollment in HMOs
rose.

The report concludes that longer term analysis will be needed to
determine whether community rating has succeeded in lowering
barriers to insurance for those who can afford to pay.
Other Findings
•A study conducted by Lewin-VHI, Inc., analyzed the distribution of
cross-subsidies among various income levels, health statuses,
and age groups that would occur under the Health Security Act.
The study then compared how the cross-subsidies would change
if age were introduced as a rate modifier.
Government subsidies
and employer contributions are not reflected in this study.
-The Health Security Act requires that premiums be community-rated.
Modifiers would be permitted only for family composition
and geographical differences.
-Their conclusions were that without age modifiers,:
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•the average family headed by persons under 25 years of age would
subsidize families with older head of households by
approximately $870 per year.
Similarly, families
headed by individuals aged 25 to 44 would subsidize
families headed by older individuals by approximately
$720 per year.
As recipients of these subsidies, families with head of households
aged 45 to 54 would benefit by more than $1,100 a year.
Families with head of households over age 55 could
benefit by as much as $1,900 per year.
Community rating cross-subsidies would tend to flow from younger
families to older families.
•but within age cohorts, community rating cross-subsidies under the
Health Security Act would flow from higher income
families to lower income families (earning less than
$20,000 per year or less than 200 % of FPL).
On
average, families with annual incomes under $10,000
would benefit from a net cross-subsidy of $1,870.
Families with annual incomes between $50,000 and
$75,000 would cross-subsidize lower-income families
by approximately $1,000 per year.
•The greatest cross-subsidy would occur between families reporting
"excellent" or "good" health status and those
reporting "fair" or "poor" heal th status.
Families
in good heal th would cross-subsidize families in poor
health by about $1,900 annually.
Families in poor
heal th would effectively benefit from cross-subsidies
of more than $12,000 annually.
-Their conclusions were that with age modifiers,:

•cross-subsidies between age groups would be eliminated. Within age
groups, cross-subsidies would continue to benefit
lower-income families at the expense of higher-income
families.
•the difference in cross-subsidies between income groups for community
rating and community rating by age is minimal.
While age-rated premiums are closer to actual
household costs, that difference at most is less than

4 90

•

•families with "excellent" health would have premium costs move closer
to actual costs by almost 14 %.
Families in other
health status categories would realize a smaller
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change in premium.
•retired families would see the largest impact to their premiums.
Premiums for this group would increase by about $1,600
a year.
Even so, they would continue to benefit from
cross-subsidies of approximately $1,200 a year under
an age rated system.
•Statistics from the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA)
support assertions that "pure" community rating coupled with
universal coverage results in a regressive distribution of
income.
Younger people who make less money would be forced to
pay more than the "real cost" of their policy in order to subsidize
sicker, generally older people.
This essentially becomes a
transfer of income from people in their 20's and 30's to those
in their 50's and 60's.
HIAA figures show that the median household income in 1991 for someone
under 25 years of age was 42 % of that for someone aged 45 to
54.
For individuals between the age of 25 and 34, the median
income was 70 % of those aged 45 to 54.
Young, healthy people
will pay more under community rating although they generally
use less medical care.
HIAA estimates that 19 to 24 year-olds
spend 66 % as much on medical care as 55 to 64 year-olds.
Those
aged 25 to 54 spend half as much.
•Implementation of "pure" community rating in New Jersey resulted
in 1) huge premium increases for young people; 2) premium
increases for the large majority of people; and 3) a dramatic
increase in uninsured young people.
• HMOs have generally not experienced a drop in coverage by the younger
and healthier due to community rating laws.
This is probably
because HMO risk pools are stable and broad-based.
In New York,
the state's largest HMO, Health Insurance Plan of Greater New
York (HIP) experienced a slightly lower than average age in it's
pool since the community rating law took effect there.
•According to a report released by the Blue Cross Blue Shield
Association, a "significant percentage of employers" would
realize premium increases under a "pure" community rating system.
Their findings show that little, if any, rate reductions would
be experienced by small employers.
Although the Association
is a proponent of modified community rating, it cautions the
government to be careful in how modified community rating is
implemented.
•Other findings by the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association indicate
that some Blues plans would be able to offset the risk of community
rating with other advantages.
Regardless, since most plans
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currently have worse risk pools than their competitors, modified
community rating would benefit a majority of plans.
Competitors
would lose their ability to attract heal thy risks through pricing
flexibility.
The use of risk adjustors would further strengthen
plan positions.
The Pennsylvania Blue Cross Blue Shield Experience
In Pennsylvania, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield system community rates
programs for individuals and small businesses.
These programs
include an "open enrollment" policy which allow applicants to
purchase coverage regardless of personal medical history.
A
one-year preexisting condition waiting period is imposed.
Provider discounts of up to 35 % help the community-rated Blue Cross
and Blue Shield programs in Pennsylvania remain solvent.
In
1990, a quarter-million Pennsylvanians with individual Blue
Cross and Blue Shield policies paid $260 million in premiums,
but received nearly $300 million in benefits.
Pennsylvania Blue Cross Blue Shield community rated products have
been nationally recognized for giving value for premium dollars
spent.
In August 1990, Consumer Report ranked the hospital
surgical policies sold by Capital Blue Cross and Pennsylvania
Blue Shield first among more than fifty policies reviewed.
Pennsylvania's Blue Cross and Blue Shield system includes Blue Cross
of
Northeastern
Pennsylvania,
Blue
Cross
of
Western
Pennsylvania, Capital Blue Cross, Independence Blue Cross, and
Pennsylvania Blue Shield.
Pennsylvania's uninsured rate is the fourth lowest in the nation.
Community rating is not currently mandated in Pennsylvania.
The Rochester, New York Experience
In Rochester, New York, community rating has been successful. Over
90 % of insurance policies in Rochester are community rated.
In 1991, Rochester premium costs averaged less than $2,400.00
per employee.
The national average at that time was almost
$3,600.00 and the New York state average was more than $4,300.00.
Insurance rate increases in Rochester were less than half the
national average from 1980 through 1991.
A study conducted by Louis Harris and Associates found that the
uninsured rate in Rochester was approximately 6 % compared to
a national rate of 14 %.
Customer satisfaction with health
insurance coverage high.
Insurance is available year-round through open enrollment.
Community
rating in Rochester was adopted voluntarily in response to cost
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concerns expressed by business groups.
According to studies sponsored by the community, if community rating
were repealed and replaced with experience rating; 1) health
insurance would become unaffordable for high risk groups and
individuals; 2) the number of uninsured would increase; and,
3) providers and hospitals would experience increased bad debt
which would be passed back to the community through higher rates.
The Rochester experience is unique.
It is unclear whether its success
can be replicated throughout the country.
Universal insurance
coverage is nearly achieved through a few large employers.
One
insurer controls the market.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of the
Rochester Area has more than 70 % of the marketshare.
NEW YORK'S COMMUNITY RATING EXPERIENCE
•On April 1, 1993, New York became the first state to implement
community rating with guaranteed issue for small groups and
individuals.
•The New York Insurance Superintendent Salvatore Curiale claims the
reason for passage of the law was because the state's individual
and small group markets were "falling apart".
Mr. Curiale
believes this was occurring because commercial insurers could
select the best risks, experience rate them and offer lower
premiums compared to Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield and other
non-profit plans which accepted and community-rated everyone.
This was causing the community rated premiums to rise
dramatically as the pool became older and sicker.
•Because 1993 was an election year for state legislators, some
legislators believed it was politically unpopular to allow Empire
to raise its rates.
Some law makers also believed that the
state's Medicaid costs would rise if individual policies from
the Blues became unaffordable.
•New York's community rating system is considered "pure" because
there are no variations in price for age, gender, or other
factors.
The law includes open enrollment provisions which
require insurers and HMOs in the individual and small group market
( 50 members or less) to accept all applicants regardless of heal th
status.
In an attempt to discourage people from waiting until they get sick
to purchase insurance, insurers and HMOs can impose a one-year
waiting period for preexisting conditions.
The law requires
portability of policies so that people can switch jobs without
jeopardizing their coverage.
A final and controversial
IP14 . l - November 1994

14

component of the law establishes risk adjustment pools to help
insurers who have a disproportionate share of sick and elderly
customers.
This component has been struck down by a U. S.
District Court and is on appeal.
Unlike other states that have instituted community rating, New York
did not establish a transition period during which the new rates
would be phased-in.
•According to the New York Department of Insurance, during the first
year of community rating approximately 30 % of the insured
received increases in their premiums ranging from 20 % to 59 %.
Rates
for
30
year
old
single males
increased
170 %.
Approximately 30 % of New York's young men cancelled their heal th
care coverage.
•The New York Insurance Company reported 43,666 cancelled individual
policies after one year of community rating.
The average age
of their New York policyholders increased by 3. 5 % as the majority
of people opting out of the system were younger, healthier
individuals.
•In the months following enactment of the community rating law, many
New Yorkers switched to managed care plans.
The number of people
in HMOs rose by 22 % to 296,000 subscribers in the small group
market.
In the individual market, the number increased by 26 %
to 34,000 subscribers.
According to the New York State Heal th Maintenance Organization
Conference, the community rating law had little impact on the
HMOs because they were already community rating.
The open
enrollment requirements for HMOs in the individual and small
group market had the greatest impact.
They facilitated
enrollment by people in these groups.
Individual contracts at
HMOs almost doubled, particularly for HMOs in New York City.
•According to the New York Department of Insurance, the range of rate
increases and decreases after passage of the community rating
law has varied dramatically by age.
In the small group market,
a group with an average age of 50 to 60 experienced rate declines
of 50 % while a group with an average age in the 20's experienced
rate increases of 120 %.
•Before community rating was instituted, Mutual of Omaha in New York
charged a 25 year old male in Albany $64.45 a month for health
insurance.
A 55 year old male paid $141.79. After community
rating, that same 25 year old male received a 67 % increase in
his premium, now paying $107.33 while the 55 year old received
a 24 % decrease, also paying $107.33.
In 1994, both will pay
$145.10 because of higher costs.
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•Recent statistics from the New York State Insurance Department
indicate that the number of New Yorkers with health insurance
declined by appro x imately 1.2 % (25,477 people ) in the first nine
months after community rating to o k effect. After more than a
year, the number of people insured in the individual market
declined by 12 % (43,666 people).
It is estimated that the number
of insured with Medicare supplemental coverage increased by 1. 7 %
(13,903 individuals).
•Eighteen percent of individual and small group commercial insurance
policyholders experienced changes in their premiums after
enactment of the community rating law.
Of those who experienced
a change in premium in the individual market, about 62 % faced
increases.
In the small group market, about 66 % of policyholders
experiencing a change in premium faced increases.
•Health insurance coverage was impacted more in the individual market
than in the small group market as a result of the community rating
law.
The small group market experienced a O. 4 6% loss in policies
between 3/31/93 and 1/1/94. Although the loss of policies was
slight in t h e small group market, there was a noticeable shift
in coverage from the nonprofit insurers to the HMOs.
Some
policyholders migrated to the commercial insurers.
•According to a spokesperson of the National Federation of Independent
Businesses, it is too early to tell what the overall impact of
the New York community rating law will be on small businesses.
Small businesses favored passage of a modified community rating
bill.
An annual survey of NFIB members found that about 64 %
have experienced an increase in health insurance costs of 10 %
to 20 % from 1993 to 1994. Another 24 % experienced an increase
of 20 % to 30 %.
According to the routine survey, 68 % of
respondents were providing health insurance coverage to their
employees in 1994.
So far, members have expressed neither
outrage nor praise for the community rating law.
•Supporters of New York's community rating law note that the most
significant loss of coverage occurred among non-profit insurers,
including Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield.
The non-profits
lost about 30,000 subscribers or 70 % of the individual market.
Non-profits also lost about 60,000 subscribers in the small
group market.
The sharp declines cannot be attributed to the
community rating law, however, because the non-profits have been
community rating for years.
Instead, these losses are believed to be due to a 25 % rate increase
at Empire which had 8 million customers.
Excluding the
non-profit losses, the first year of community rating showed
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an increase in new subscribers of 70,000 policies in the
individual market or an 8.8 % increase.
In addition, 13,000 new
subscribers purchased Medicare supplemental coverage.
•According to the Coalition of Voluntary Health Organizations which
supported the community rating bill, the law helped moderate
rate increases for thousands of Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield
customers who would otherwise have faced a 50 % rate increase.
Under the previous system for small groups,
a single
catastrophic illness in a small group would cause rates to jump
for everyone in that group.
Over the long term, it is believed
that the law will provide greater equity and stability in the
market.
•New York Insurance Superintendent Curiale, emphasizes that 60 % of
the insured experienced either a rate decrease or increase of
less than 20 %.
These rate adjustments are expected to be
one-time modifications.
Future increases are expected to be
based on the experience of the community pool and projected
medical costs.
•

Superintendent Curiale acknowledges that the community rated
policies young people are buying are more expensive than they
were under experience rating.
He maintains, however, that they
are of a higher quality.
Policies offered before community
rating was passed were inexpensive because there was little
likelihood of anyone collecting on them and there was no assurance
that the policies would be there if the policyholder or a
co-worker got sick.
Under open enrollment/community rating
young people can be assured coverage will be in place when they
need it most, and with portability provisions they can change
jobs even after a serious illness.

•In 1994, the New York insurance department created Regulation 146
which establishes two pooling mechanisms intended to offset any
potential effects from adverse selection. Commercial insurers,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield indemnity companies, and HMOs are
required to participate in the pools.
The first pool creates
an age/gender morbidity table that compares the demographic
characteristics of individuals covered by an HMO or insurer to
a regional average.
HMOs and insurers with a relative
demographic factor greater than average would receive money from
the pool.
HMOs and insurers with a relative demographic factor
below average would pay into the pool.
Payments out of the pool
would be equally divided among the commercial insurers and HMOs.
The second pool is based on a list of high cost medical conditions.
All HMOs and insurers are supposed to contribute a fixed amount
to the pool.
The amount would be determined by the insurance
commissioner.
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The creation and implementation of these risk pools has been challenged
in court.
Neither pool is being used presently although money
is being held in escrow by the New York Department of Insurance.
-The state's HMOs and health insurance companies have challenged
implementation of the law's risk adjustment pools in federal
and state courts.
The purpose of the pools were to
stabilize the risk that would be shared within the small
group and individual markets.
The rules are being
challenged on the grounds that they are preempted by ERISA.
In February, 1994, they were struck down by a U.S. District
Court.
The case is now on appeal to a U.S. Court of Appeals.
-The superintendent of the Department of Insurance claims that he
will seek an ERISA exemption if the court appeals prove
unsuccessful.

•Health Insurance Association of America has brought suit against
New York concerning Regulation 14 6 on ERISA grounds.
HIAA
contends that implementation of Regulation 146 will increase
the cost of employee benefit plans that obtain coverage under
commercial insurers, force employee benefit plans to reduce
coverage provided to their members, or force these plans to choose
other means of funding.
These actions would have to be taken
due to the interference of the regulation in the administration
of ERISA plans in the small group market.
•Currently, the New York Department of Insurance considers the small
group market to be stable and to offer consumers a variety of
commercial insurers.
Additional legislative efforts by
supporters of the community rating law are therefore centering
around the individual market.
In this market, prices remain
high and only one insurer is participating.
•A great deal of controversy surrounds a study released by the
actuarial firm Milliman and Robertson (M & R) about the effects
of community rating in New York.
The report concludes that the
number of people with individual coverage in the state fell from
more than 1.2 million on March 1, 1993 (one month before the
community rating law took effect), to 493,000 on January 1, 1994.
Combined with losses in the small group market, this produced
a net decrease of approximately 500,000 insured according to
the report.
In

response to complaints raised by the New York Department of
Insurance, M & R acknowledged an over-count of 265,000 people
in the study' s pre-reform estimate of insured individuals.
Estimates of the population prior to passage of the reform law
were based on the Employee Benefits Research Institute' s analysis
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of the March 1993 census bureau report. After passage of the
law, the number of insured was estimated from sample data
collected from carriers in the New York individual and small
group markets.
Samples were adjusted to account for all
carriers.
•The Milliman and Robertson report found that the average premium
for small group and individual policies combined fell $100.00
from $3,400 to $3,300.
-The report concludes that insurance companies in general are not
meeting their target loss ratios.
Rate increases above
trend levels will probably be needed in the future.
Adjunct Issues to Community Rating

Supporters and critics of community rating often agree that
implementation of community rating without other reforms will further
distort the market rather than stabilize or improve it.
There are
several reforms that are being introduced or considered in conj unction
with community rating.
•Employer Contributions/Mandates
For community rating to remain affordable, there must be sufficient
numbers of healthy people in the risk pool to offset the costs
of those who will be submitting claims.
In a "voluntary" system,
employer contributions to health plans would make coverage more
affordable for many employees.
This might encourage healthy
people to purchase coverage rather than go uninsured.
•Risk Adjustment
Risk adjustments are a way of equalizing payments and restraining
attempts by some insurers to come out ahead by attracting
favorable risks.
The calculation of risk adjustments is complex
and still largely experimental.
It has to distinguish the part
of the plan's losses or profits that are due to the risk profile
of its subscribers rather than the plan's efficiency.
•Mandatory versus voluntary participation
Similar issue to that of employer contributions/mandates.
The
purpose is to get healthy people to participate in the system.
•Guarantee Issue
This is viewed by some as a necessary component of reform that should
be implemented with community rating.
The purpose of requiring
guarantee issue of policies would be to prevent insurers from
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rejecting poor risks.
•Guarantee Renewability
Guaranteed renewabili ty would prohibit insurers from cancelling
coverage or raising rates after a policyholder gets sick.
It
would require insurers to renew coverage and charge everyone
with the same policy the same rate.
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The Future for Florida

•CHPAs/small group
It is expected that efforts to repeal the gender modifier for CHPA
policies may be pursued during the next legislative session.
Federal regulations do not permit gender discrimination for
pricing of products.
It is possible that the gender modifier
could be construed to be a form of gender discrimination.
•It is possible that community rating of individual policies will
arise during the next legislative session.
Alternative Approaches

•State risk pools for the uninsurable are being considered by some
as an alternative to community rating.
However, risk pools have
the potential to increase the problem of adverse selection
because there is less incentive for individuals to enroll in
a plan on the open market.
•The Council for Affordable Health Insurance supports an 8-point
program to lower the cost of health insurance, ensure access
to coverage for all Americans, preserve the freedom of choice
and market competition in heal th care.
Their eight points
include reforms in taxes, tort law and small group regulations;
establishment of medical savings accounts, universal access to
heal th insurance through separate risk pools for the uninsurable,
advance disclosure of treatment costs and various forms of
patient education.
• Risk purchasing groups could be formed by small employers to negotiate
large group rates with providers.
This would provide more heal th
insurance coverage for small group policyholders.
Carriers
could off er standard group policies but allow employees to select
customized features that would better serve their individual
needs.
The standard group policy could be experience rated with
small premium variations depending on the customized features
added or subtracted from the policy.
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CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
Background
Increased administrative costs affect both insurers and providers .
In o rder to
lower administrative costs , efforts should focus on streamlining operating
procedures and improving efficiency , but not at the expense of medical cost savings
from managed care interventions .
Recommendations
oThe state , cooperating with providers and purchasers , should encourage industry
standards for design of forms , definition of terms , coding of entries ,
inquiries regarding benefit entitlement , submission and payment of claims ,
and paid benefits summary statements .
oThe state should cooperate with other entit i es (providers , insurers , employers)
in automating the exchange of data among all parties .
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COST CONTAINMENT

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida recognizes the tremendous positive changes
made in the financing and deli very of care over the past several decades and supports
building on that current system to improve the functioning of the heal th care market
to reduce costs . We advocate reform that 1) provides enough and the right type
of information so that purchasers can make informed value - based decisions ; 2) revises
the tax system to improve purchaser ' s incentives to shop for value in health plans ;
3) removes legal and regulatory barriers obstructing a competitive market ; and 4)
continues the development of managed care programs .
We believe that a health care system built on the private market will provide the
competition needed to reduce costs , by increasing efficiency , while improving
quality and expanding access . People will choose plans that offer the best value
for their heal th care dollar ; inefficient plans will be more costly , and will either
improve or leave the market . Through private market competition , the health care
industry can control costs while maintaining quality standards and developing
innovative new programs to meet the people ' s needs .
We believe that efforts in the health care industry to reduce administrative costs
are also important .
The best way to address administrative costs is to support
specific measures that will increase efficiencies and add value to the system
overall , but do not disturb the competitive forces of the marketplace .
Some
suggested reforms would be standardizing and automating data and streamlining
paperwork.
We are strongly opposed to government - imposed price controls as an approach to
reducing overall health care costs -- they simply do not work .
In the health care
system , price controls lead to rationing , reduced services , the erosion of quality
and , often , to higher prices than would be achieved through maintaining competitive
markets . Administrative costs would also increase from the expenses necessary to
run the large bureaucratic monitoring and enforcement system that would be needed .
Perhaps worst of all , government - imposed pricing distorts market incentives , and
therefore the decisions people make , resulting in less efficient resource
allocations . Price controls cannot substitute for a competitive market , nor are
they compatible with the market .
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DIRECT ACCESS
Proposal
In network - based plans whose design calls for patients ' care to be coordinated
through their personal physicians , direct access (DA) legislation would prohibit
this important quality of care and cost saving design feature .

The Myths
Special interests say that

oDA does not affect the cost of network - based plans since the specialists are
in the network
oDA does not harm the quality of care for plan members
oDA improves choice for Floridians

The Facts
Does DA have any effect on the cost of network - based plans which rely on personal
physicians to coordinate patients ' care?
According to an independent
actuarial analysis (The Wyatt Company) , DA would increase the cost of
network - based plans between 4 and 14 %.
Personal physicians are trained
to provide many basic services , and refer patients to more expensive
specialists for specialized services .
Personal physicians coordinate and
manage the hea l th care of patients , ensuring that patients 1) obtain routine
preventive care , 2) receive the care needed from specialists , and 3) do
not receive duplicate , contradictory , or unnecessary care.
Removing the
personal physician from this role will increase costs .

-Yes --- it will raise the cost of network-based plans.

Does DA affect the quality of care members receive?
There is no medical reason for by- passing
the personal physician .
DA moves people back to the old system of care ,
where people self - diagnose and then guess at what type of spec i alist they
need to see . The y will receive care for specific medical problems , but
this care will not be coordinated in relation to their overall heal th status .

-Yes --- DA harms quality of care.

Does DA improve choice for Floridians?
-No.

DA would effectively remove from the market plans
in which personal physicians coordinate care for members . This type of
plan should be available to Floridians ; it is an important part of the overall
product mix .

DA will reduce choice.

Action Recommended
None.

DA is an example of special interest legislation which will harm Floridians .
Health care reform should lower costs and increase quality . By eliminating a
cost effective , quality product from the market , DA will raise costs and decrease
qual i ty . It will also decrease access to care because rising prices mean fewer
peop l e will be able to afford coverage .

As of 03/13/95 , DA legislation appears in HB 723
IP 1 6 . l
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(Kelly) and SB 914

(Myers) .

THE COST OF "DIRECT ACCESS" LEGISLATION

The Florida legislature has emphasized health care system reforms to reduce health
care costs while maintaining quality care for Floridians and improving access to
care .
It has emphasized the benefits of managed care in achieving these goals.
Nevertheless , in 1994 the legislature has considered f or passage several pieces
of legislation which would destroy the effectiveness of managed care plans. One
type of " anti-managed care" legislation , called "dire ct access ," would keep
Floridians from purchasing a health plan in which patients agree to consult with
their primary care physician whenever they become sick .
In an HMO , a member selects a family (primary care) physician to oversee and
coordinate covered health care services .
The primary care physician provides
referrals to specialists as necessary . The primary care physician is key to the
cost effectiveness and quality of HMOs because he/she :
ocoordinates and manages the health care of patients -- bringing together and
captaining a team of other specialty providers as necessary to ensure a patient
receives the care needed ;
oprovides many basic services directly , rather than having basic services provided ,
inappropriately, by a specialist;
omonitors all the care a patient recei ves , so that duplicate , contradict ory , and
unnecessary care is not provided, and routine , preventative care is not
overlooked .
There is no medical rationale for by- passing the primary care physician in his/her
care manager role .
If the state passes a " direct access" law which initially allows
patients to bypass their family physician for on ly a few specialties, all other
specialists will cry " foul! " and demand direct access as well. Within a few years
of passing direct access legislation, this legislation will be broadened to apply
This will effectively do away with the primary care physician's
to all special ties.
role in HMOs as a care manager.
Loss of the care manager role will have several consequences :
o The cost of HMO coverage will increase.
In a recent report , the Wyatt Company
estimated that PPO costs (for PPOs which use a care manager) would increase
from 4 to nearly 14 %; the higher figure is for plans where members mainly
stay wi thin the network of PPO physicians for services . Therefore for HMOs,
where staying in- network is customary , we estimate the cost of coverage will
increase at least 14% .

HMO members will no longer automatically benefit
oQuality of care will decrease.
from the coordination and management of care provided by the care manager .
Many will instead be back in the old system of medical care : patients will
self-diagnose and then guess at the appropriate type of specialist (and guess
wrong at least some percentage of the time) .
They will receive care from
a medical specialist for specific medical problems, but in many cases there
wi ll be no care manager aware of other treatments that the patient may receive.
If direct access legislation passes :

o it will harm the Floridians who currently have heal th care coverage.
Many
Floridians depend on HMOs for lower - cost , quality coverage , but they will
no longer be able to buy the standard HMO product . Their HMO coverage choices
wi ll be limited to the " new , " higher cost " HMOs " dictated by state government .
As their cost of coverage rises , with no increase in value , some of these
Floridians will undoubtedly join the ranks of the uninsured .
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o it will harm state employees.
Many state emp l oyees have selected an HMO for their
health care coverage .
Under this legislation , their HMO coverage choices
will be limited to higher cost plans with fewer benefits (that is , no care
manager required) , and state employees will be forced to pay more for less
health care coverage .
o it will increase the state's costs for the Medicaid program.
The state plans to
achieve signif i cant savings in the Medicaid program by moving Medicaid
beneficiaries into HMOs .
As HMO costs i ncrease , the state ' s anticipated
savings will not materialize .
o it will harm uninsured Floridians.
The state is designing a subsidy program for
low- income uninsured Floridians to purchase private health care coverage .
Coverage for the program comes from Medicaid program savings achieved by
mov i ng Medicaid recip i ents into HMOs . Savings are estimated at 5 - 10 %. When
HMO costs increase 14 % or more as a resu l t of this leg i slation , there will
be no savings to fund a program for the uninsured .
Health care reform should lower costs, increase quality, and reduce the number of
uninsured Floridians.
Direct access legislation will increase costs, lower
quality, and boost the number of uninsured.
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EMPLOYER MANDATE TO PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE

Recognizing that a majority of the uninsured are employees and their dependents
has led some people to recommend a mandate that employers provide health insurance .
We do not support an employer mandate for the following reasons :
o There is no sound policy reason for requiring employers to provide a heal th benefit .
Most large employers find a heal th benefit to be an i mportant part of
compensation packages in their efforts to compete for the most qualified
workers . If an employer chooses not to use health benefits , despite existing
tax advantages , he must not believe that it improves his ability to attract
needed labor .
Inter£ erence in employers' use of resources only reduces their
competitiveness with businesses , such as out - of - state or foreign enterprises ,
that can escape the mandate.
oA mandate to provide health insurance would set a bad policy precedent .
If
businesses can be mandated to include health insurance in the compensat ion,
why not auto and property insurance?
Why not housing or entertainment
expenses? There is no reason to assign employers responsibility for health
insurance .
oFor small businesses , which represent nearly all of the employers not already
providing health insurance , a mandate would , of necessity , be borne by the
employees . To cope with the added expense , most small businesses would have
little choice but to reduce other labor expenses .
They would either have
to reduce the price of labor (other compensation , such as wages and salaries)
or reduce the amount of labor they purchase .
Workers would be reduced to
part - time , laid off , or not rep l aced .
oSome businesses that are on ly marginally viable today would find the added cost
imp ossible to absorb . Operating with less labo r would not permit production
of their goods or services and they would be forced out of business .
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ENCOURAGING PRUDENT PURCHASING

Background
The traditional health care system is really a cost - plus system which offers little
in the way of incentives for providers , consumers , or traditional insurance plans
to hold down costs .
Recommendations
The health care system in Florida should move toward providing strong incentives
for controlling costs while maintaining the quality of care .
oThe system must provide incentives for consumers to purchase managed care plans ,
based on both cost and quality
- if the Federal government doesn ' t reform national tax policy , Florida should develop
tax incentives to encourage
l)purchase of managed care plans , and
2)employers to contribute to the cost of health care benefits in an amount equal
to the basic value plan in a multi - choice situation

IP18 - November 1992

EXPENDITURE CAPS/RATE SETTING
One approach to containing health care costs would have government impose limits or caps
on total expenditures . The global caps would somehow be translated into price ceilings
for specific segments such as hospitals or physicians . Hospital and physician rate set ting
has also been suggested as an approach separate from the global expenditure caps . Some
proposals see these government price control schemes as an alternative to the competitive
market while others would add them as a supplement to reforms intended to encourage greater
competition.
We are convinced this is the wrong approach . Government imposed pricing cannot substitute
for a competitive market nor is it compatible with the market .
oA competitive market allocates resources based on the independent decisions of many
suppliers and purchasers.
Government imposed pricing distorts the incentives and
therefore the decisions people make resulting in less efficient allocations . The
supply of and demand for the various services diverges from what would occur under
a competitive market resulting in lower overall benefits per cost .
oGovernment imposed pricing rewards all providers equally . A competitive system makes
greater rewards to the more efficient and effective providers -- those who bring
greater value to patients .
oProviders respond to caps and price setting by providing more services per patient .
For example , during the mid- eighties when admission rates declined nationally , rate
setting states experienced substantial increases in admissions .
The result is
higher total costs.
oProviders also respond by shifting patients to other settings where prices are not as
stringent . Total heal th expenditures increase and quality suffers because of these
unintended , indirect effects .
oRate regulation performs poorly as a cost containment tool even if you consider only
its d i rect effects .
For the four year period , 1986 - 1989 , rate - setting states
had an average increase in hospital costs of 33 . 4 percent compared to 30.6 percent
for non rate - setting states . By contrast , the average increase in nine of the more
competitive states was 27 . 6 percent .
oConstraining prices does not effectively constrain the costs providers face . Stringent
price controls can drive out of business those hospitals that have high fixed costs
as they have in New York State . A competitive system can also drive providers out
of business but it more effectively discr i minates on the basis of efficiency ; those
providing the most value per cost are more likely to survive .
oGovernment imposed pricing inhibits innovation in payment and contracting that managed
care companies (MCCs) would otherwise use to give providers incentives to become
more efficient and effective .
Many MCCs , for example , are working to form
partnerships with physicians and hospitals in which the providers are at least
partially at risk for total costs . Such arrangements would be stifled by government
price setting .
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FINANCING

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida supports reform of the federal tax structure to
limit the amount of insurance premium which is deductible from income taxes .
Spending on health care coverage above a certain level (cap) would be taxable .
This tax deduction would apply uniformly to all Americans , regardless of their
employment status : employers and employees could deduct this amount from taxable
income , and so could individuals and the self - employed .
Most states , as well as the federal government, are struggling with budgets and
their ability to finance the health care needs of their poorer citizens .
In order
to achieve this goal , states must maximize potential federal revenues , and must
become very efficient at organizing programs for the needy .
There is a tremendous need for innovation in health care delivery systems for the
poor . Government should experiment with primary care programs, and other managed
care approaches as a way to improve services and contain costs.
However , government
at both the state and federal level should strive to avoid the expense of developing
government - run programs which duplicate programs already available in the private
market , and to avoid setting up a two - tiered system. We believe that where possible,
care should be provided through the private market , with low- income consumers making
the same kinds of value - based choices as consumers who are self - sufficient
purchasers . Thus , we support states enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries in private
managed care systems .

IP 20

FLORIDA HEALTH SECURITY PROGRAM

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports the concept of a subsidy program
for low- income Floridians to purchase private health insurance . The program must
be designed , however , so that it does not harm the 8 in 10 Floridians who already
have health care coverage ; and so that it achieves the desired result of decreasing
the number of uninsured Floridians .
A subsidy program should :
- Make government subsidies available for the poor and near - poor to purchase private
coverage
- Over time , put all Medicaid beneficiaries into HMOs or Medipass
- Establish a reserve fund using savings from moving Medicaid beneficiaries into
managed care , and use these monies to fund the program
- Direct AHCA to complete a study , working with the heal th care industry and consumers ,
on ways to obtain additional funds
- Not change the Medically Needy , Disproportionate Share , or County Public Health
Unit programs for now
- Ensure reevaluation of payment levels to HMOs for Medicaid enrollees prior to
program implementation so that commercial HMO enrollees will not pay a " hidden
tax " through their premiums to support the state ' s Medicaid program
- Ensure no health plan is forced to participate in Florida Health Security or to
enroll Medicaid beneficiaries . Statutory language should explicitly prevent
the agency from establishing participation in Florida Health Security of
Medicaid as a pre - co ndition for serving any other al li ance member .
- Make the program available in and out of CHPAs and ensure administration by TPAs
selected through a competitive bidding process
- Give the AHCA no power to change the program design without legislative approval
-Ensure an affordable benefit package with 80/20 cost - sharing provisions .
Therefore , the standard benefit plan developed by the Department of Insurance
Advisory Council should be adopted and remain in force for at least the next
24 months . A specific benefit package should not be included in statute .
- Require that all family members be uncovered for 12 months to be eligible for family
coverage ; make available spouse - dependent and dependent - only coverage
- Require all participants over 100 % o f poverty to pay a portion of the premium in
order to receive coverage
- Freeze enrollment in the program whenever 85 % of the dollars actually available
are cornmi tted for the balance of the fiscal year . This number may be modi£ ied
with experience .

- Establish enrollment caps for each subsidy (or income) level , to accurately estimate
costs
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THE FLORIDA PATIENT PROTECTION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE ACT
Proposal
The FMA ' s Florida Patient Protection and Quality Assurance Act would 1)
significantly restrict health care plans ' capability to design and develop
network - based products to meet consumers ' needs; and 2) give organized medicine
unwarranted and potentially harmful control over the structure and workings of
Florida ' s health care system .
Myths
Organized medicine contends that
ohealth care providers should be " protected " by making it difficult (costly and
time - consuming) for health care plans to exclude providers from their
networks
opatients need protection through more government control of the care management
practices of network - based health care plans
othis legislation would not affect the cost and quality of health care in Florida
oorganized medicine should have greater control of the heal th care system in Florida
The Facts
Should providers be " protected " by making it difficult for health plans to exclude
them from their networks?
-No.

For the good of all Floridians, physicians must compete for business just
like other players in the health industry .

. Health care plans must deve l op networks to meet the quality and access
needs o f their customers , at affordable prices . Meeting this set
of needs requires that health care plans be selective in signing up
physicians , and be able to make changes on occa si on , as customers '
needs change.
This proposal is another form of "any willing
provider."

Do Floridians who choose managed care need more government " protection " ?
-No.

Recent studies indicate that consumers in network-based plans are more
satisfied with their heal th care than people with traditional coverage (i.e. ,
unrestricted choice) (Sachs Group , Inc./Scarborough Research Corp) . Nearly

all --- 99 % --- Floridians have a choice of providers or types of health
plans , and an increasing number are choosing network - based plans .
In
choosing network - based plans , Floridians are making decisions based on their
own percept i ons of the value (cost and quality) these plans offer .
Do Floridians need more government control of the care management practices of
network - based plans?
IP21 . l
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-No.

National accrediting organizations have set standards for the certification
of network-based plans.
Florida law requires that all HMOs be certified
by an approved national accrediting organization by 1996.
The proposed

legislation would result in duplicate and overlapping certification
processes . Such duplication wou l d raise the cost of HMO coverage and add
no value for Floridians .
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Would this legislation have any effect on the cost and/or quality of health care
coverage in Florida?
-This legislation would significantly raise the cost of network-based heal th plan
coverage while decreasing quality.
Just like " any willing provider ," it

would dramatically increase network - based health plan costs . Costs would
also rise as health plans meet redundant , fragmented , and inconsistent
requirements regarding care management practices . At the same time ,
network - based plans would lose control of network design and therefore
quality .
Should organized medicine have greater control over Florida ' s health care system?
-No .

Through control of a new Department of Health, one set of players in the
health care system would have far too great a role in setting system policy
and regulation .
A state organization should represent the interests of

all Floridians.
It would be very difficult for this new Department to
make fair and unbiased decisions affecting all the players in the health
care system in Florida .

Action Recommended
None .
Through its many provisions it would
significantly raise the cost of network - based health care coverage , decrease
quality , and give greater control of the system to one set of actors in the health
care arena . This legislation would turn back the clock to the days when traditional
insurance coverage was the norm , along with out - of - control cost increases .
This legislation is "provider protection."

Floridians cannot afford this type of "protection . "
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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR MANDATE

Issue
Although Florida has avoided an employer mandate to provide health insurance , a
1992 law does require contractors who receive state business to provide insurance .
That law , which would take effect in mid 1994 , is somewhat vague about the types
of businesses covered ,
the definition of " full - time employees ," and the
responsibility for oversight of the law .
The Florida Health Security Act Proposes
• Extending the health insurance requirement to
construction contractors , and subcontractors .

out - of-state

contractors ,

• Defining a full - time employee as someone who works at least 17 . 5 hours .
•Assigning rule making authority to the Department of Management Services
Effects
• The mandate to purchase insurance would raise costs
therefore , to the State and Taxpayers.

to the contractors and ,

• Some potential contractors would not bid for State business because of the mandate ;
the mandate would reduce competition for state business and indirectly raise
costs to taxpayers.
• Some contractors would respond to the mandate by hiring fewer workers or using
more part - time workers , reducing or eliminating wages of their employees.
• This mandate threatens to become a mandate for all employers which would threaten
the jobs and i ncomes of many employees of small businesses .
Alternative Proposal
• Repea l the government contractor mandate .
• Encourage the purchase of health insurance through appropriate small group and
individual insurance reform and through reforms that make the health system
more effic i ent .
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GUARANTEE ISSUE

There was no paper found in the folder
for this topic

Melissa, what do we need to do about this?

GOVERNMENT AS A CUSTOMER

Introduction
Historically , government business has been an important and notable part of Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida ' s total business .
Data

Government business will become an even more important part of BCBSF ' s business
as the health care reform debate continues and changes are passed .
At the state level , for example , Governor Chiles ' s Florida Health Security program
that moves Medicaid recipients into private HMOs gained approval from the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) .
This will move Medicaid recipients into
private HMOs which could possibly increase private HMO enrollment by 2 million
individuals across the state , resulting in a signif i cant part of the Florida HMO
market .
At the federal level , new government business is flourishing even without reform
legislation.
The HCFA ' s revision of the Medicare program has made privately
administered HMOs available to many Medicare beneficiaries .
This provided private
HMOs an opportunity to seek government business in a market which has historically
not been available .
In addition to the increase of government business through legislative and regulatory
reforms , there are other factors that attribute to the government business becoming
a larger and more important part of private health care services .
First , over the
past decade , government employment at all levels has increased at
%.
That
is a
% growth rate compared to a
% growth rate for the private sector .
Second , one of the fastest growing segments of the population are people reaching
the age 65 and entering the Medicare program .
It is estimated that the Medicare
population will reach
% of the total population in
To help BCBSF better understand and manage government business , an assessment of
the risks and benefits is needed .
The purpose of this paper is to set out what
the risks and benefits are with having government as a customer and to explain the
company ' s position on evaluating that business .
Risks Associated With Government Business
The following identifies the general risks for BCBSF when it takes on government
as a customer .
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• Government business is likely to be open to the public , and therefore , competitors
will have access. Certain aspects of negotiations , transactions , or company
information normally considered private , may fall under disclosure laws or
reporting requirements and become public information .
• The media naturally has a greater interest in how government money is spent and
managed and , therefore , greater media attention and scrutiny is placed on
the company receiving public funding .
- For example , unfavorable reports about the management of and satisfaction with
government accounts tend to receive greater media coverage than
favorable reports .
If anything were to go " wrong " in the
administration or delivery of a product, even if it is due to government
regulations or mismanagement , it would reflect poorly on the private
business and could be played- out in the media.
• Government customers tend to have more bureaucratic
requirements than private customers .

reporting

and

deli very

• Conflict of interest
Benefits Associated with Government Business
The following identifies the general benefits a private company can achieve when
it takes on government as a customer .
percent of the insurance business in
• Government business represents about
Florida .
Pursuing government as a customer offers opportunities to
significantly increase market share .
•Managing large amounts of government business can provi de a private company with
valuable political capital in the market place and in the legislative
environment .
Such political capital can provide a private company
credibility that will be beneficial when facing private competitors and
influencing the legislative and regulatory process .
•When private business takes on government as a customer they ' re seen as being part
of the greater community and a good corporate citizen .
Specific Risks for BCBSF From Each Level of Government

Federal Government
• Criminalization of procurement process
The State Government
•May be viewed as a obstructionist

I P23 . l

2

• Highly politicized
Local Governments
• Highly politicized
Conclusion
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HEALTH CARE DATA

Issue
Consumers need adequate comparative information to decide which health plan to purchase .
The Florida Heal t h Security Plan Proposes
• Streamline and strengthen the AHCA ' s data collection authority .
• Develop performance indicators for Accountable Health Partnerships and hospitals .
• Refine clinical and other outcome measures .
Effects
• The federal government and several national organizations are devoting large resources to
developing national clinical guidelines and outcome measures based on medical research
f i ndings .
Implementing the vague proposals in the Florida Health Plan could :
- place the AHCA in a situation where they are contradicting physicians and other health care
groups that have already developed nationally accepted measures , and
-increase administrative costs for heal th plans and providers ( and therefore increase insurance
premiums) if health plans and providers are required to collect and send the
AHCA a lot of additional data .
•Floridians concerned with "big government" will not be convinced that the government can
design the best consumer - oriented reporting system , and wi ll certainly not like the
added bureaucracy necessary to manage all these data .
•Providers could be put financially at risk and their reputation in the community jeopardized
if misleading or incomplete information on their practices are released .
•All health care players could find their proprietary information collected and released by
the AHCA which would destroy their competitive advantage in the market .
•Patients and providers dislike the expansion of the AHCA ' s (a government agency) authority
to collect increasing amounts of personal information , and will view i t as an intrusion
into their confidential relationship .

Alternative Proposal
• Develop a private - sector , non - profit organization with representation from all the health
care players (including consumers) to conduct research , gain consensus , and develop
information policy and standards for consumers , health plans , and providers .
• The AHCA should accept outcome measures developed by the health care community rather than
develop or " refine " its own . Many med i cal specialties and health care players have
already devoted a l ot of resources to developing nationally accepted measures .
• The AHCA should rely on external groups to help determine how best to process the information

it already collects .
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HEALTH CARE FRAUD

Background
Fraud can be found in all segments of the health care industry . Though the effects are
similar -- wasteful spending and inappropriate patient care -- the nature of the fraud
is generally d i fferent for fee - for - service and prepaid health care providers .
Fraud in the fee - for - service reimbursement system includes overcharging for services
provided , charging for servi ces not rendered , accepting bribes or kickbacks for referring
patients , and rendering inappropria t e or unnecessary services .
In contrast , prepa i d health care provi der , typica ll y HMOs , fra u dulent pract i ces tend
to involve avo i ding expensive trea t ments , underfinancing health plan operations ,
disregard i ng member complaints , providing poor - qua l ity care , or using decep ti ve marketing
practices .
Regardless of the type of reimbursement method , fraud results in s i gnificant loss of
public and private health care dollars.
The National Health Care Anti - Fraud Association
and various federal agencies , such as the Government Accounting Office , estimate the
cost of fraud to be between 3 - 10 % of the nation ' s annual health care expend i tures . Using
this formula and the figures the Department of Commerce developed for 1994 , where it
is estimated that the U. S . wi l l spend $1 . 006 trillion for health care , the min i mum loss
to fraud is at least $30 billion .
In all likelihood it i s substan ti ally more , perhaps
as much as $100 bil l ion .
In Florida , this equates to $1 . 4 billion at the low- end , and
to $4 . 7 bi l lion at the h i gh - end .
Sixty- five percent of health care fraud cases involve health care providers -- with
physicians committing 56 percent o f these cases .
Consumers commit 35 % of the health
care fraud cases ; however , provider has , by far , the biggest economic i mpact .
Expec t ed Proposa l s
The Florida Health Security Pl an - Healthy Homes 1994 , contained thirteen (13) separate
and specific r ecommendations to combat fraud . An inventory of these with a BCBSF pos i tion
statement fo r each is attached (A) . Only one bill (SB/CS 1192 - Insurance - proposed
by Jennings) conta i ned language addressing fraud and no legislat i on addressing health
care fraud passed during the 1994 state legislature . Any of the thirteen recommendations
noted above could be introduced and promoted by the Governor or the Agency for Health
Care Administration (AHCA) during '95 .
Interpreting current health care reform information/materials , the following categorizes
components that may be contained in legis l ative proposals during the ' 95 state legis l ative
sess i on :
•Prevention:
Requiring hospitals and other health care providers to establish fraud
prevention programs to mi n i mize the risk of a violation of l aws ; educating health
professionals regarding legal and ethical responsibilities ; educating the general
public on the affects of fraud ; requiring on - going education for professionals
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as part of licensure ; maintaining the health care fraud task force to oversee
Florida ' s needs ; establishing financial solvency requirements for prepaid health
plans .

•Detection and Investigation: Affording specialized (investigative) training for staff
in hea l th care businesses ;
using computer - assisted detection of fraud ;
implementing a statewide/nationwide coding and claims system with electronic fraud
detection devices , used by all insurers and providers , both public and private ;
implementing a state " watch dog " law modeled after the federal False Claims Act.
•Prosecution:
Targeting "more teeth " legal mechanisms to prosecute after thorough
investigation ; applying administrative and civil remedies as more effective and
more timely deterrents as well as providing for greater financial recovery .

Rational for Proposals
The majority of debate on health care fraud and resultant proposals is driven primarily
by the following rationale :
1 . the excessive waste as the result of fraud allows for a great potential for cost savings
within the system by aggressively pursuing and combating fraud ,
2 . the lack of tolerance for " crime " within a system that is built on trust , honesty and
caring ; especially if quality of care is at stake ,
3 . al though insurers and the government may be the immediate targets of heal th care fraud ,
we are all victims -- as consumers and patients who pay heal th insurance premiums ,
co - payments and deductibles ; as employers who purchase heal th coverage and
employees ; and as taxpayers , where we are doubly victimized when pub l ic payment
programs are defrauded , and
4 . experience clearly shows that the health care provider who is defrauding Medicare ,
Medicaid , or other government programs is , in all likelihood , also defrauding
private payers and therefore a joint public/private solution sponsorship is
indicated .

Concerns for BCBSF
The main concern of BCBSF with most anti - fraud legislative proposals pertains to
heavy-handed government regulation and bureaucracy . BCBSF is aware of the tremendous
financial implications of this issue and its impact on Florida ' s health care consumers
( increase of insurance premiums for all) .
We believe the private sector and the
government should work together to develop programs and practices to curb the escalating
fraudulent practices .
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Another concern is our image. The perception by the general public is that as the Medicare
car rier it is our role to combat fraud regardless of HCFA guidelines .
(HCFA will not
sanction the carrier to do more than state level law and Florida lacks strong controls
or programs to combat fraud . ) It is a widely stated belief by the general public that
BCBSF should not " let the bad doctors in " and we are repeatedly asked " who are we still
paying bad doctors " ?
An easy approach would be to support heavy-handed government
involvement and controls to organize " getting the bad guys ." However , BCBSF ' s preferred
approach is consumer education and consumer activism .
BCBSF understands the need for large - volume/multiple - source data to identify and
effectively investigate aberrant billing patterns . However , mandating a state-wide or
nation-wide, single "data" source, is not cons isten t with private - sector , competitive
system advances to the detriment of all .

Recommended Position
BCBSF believes the role of government is to work with the private sect or to detect and
punish fraudulent behavior on the part of patients , insured groups and individuals ,
indi vidual and institutional providers , insurance companies and managed care companies .
specific examples include tightening provider enrollment procedures in managed care
organizations , focus more on suspension (if reliable evidence of fraud is available)
rather than " pay and chase ," increase the use of technology to detect fraud , educate
the consumer , and apply utilization standards to Medicare .
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HEALTH CARE PURCHASING GROUPS

Introducti on

The United States health care system is recognized to be among the best in the world .
During the past few years , however , there has been growing concern about the
increasing number of uninsured individuals and the rising cost of health care and
health insurance .
In the ensuing debate about how the American health care system can be improved ,
the use of purchasing groups has received a lot of attention.
Purchasing groups
are being introduced as a way to:
• pool purchasing power among small groups,
• improve the conduit of information, and in some cases,
• pool risk
Purchasing groups can be used to pool risk among small groups; however , they have
not been designed to do this in most private - sector groups or in most state and
federal proposals.
In most group purchasing arrangements , individuals are
encouraged to choose a health plan from among those offered within the purchasing
group.
This allows for the possibility that high risk and low risk individuals
may gravitate toward different plans, resulting in adverse selection for one or
more of these plans .
Additional benefits of purchasing groups are often cited as
• creating a more responsive insurance market ,
• reducing administrative costs for small groups ,
• creating incentives for more prudent purchasing by emphasizing the link between
health benefits and their costs .
Although there is little scientific evidence that purchasing arrangements save money
or achieve any of the benefits ascribed to them , those who participate in purchasing
arrangements tend to believe that they receive some or all of the benefits ascribed
to group purchasing .
Increasingly , health care reform proposals and state and
federal legislation aimed at increasing access and reducing health care costs ,
include government - run or government - sponsored purchasing groups.

Types of Purchasing Groups

Private - Sector Purchasing Groups
Private - sector purchasing groups currently exist throughout the United States.
They have been formed for different reasons .
Some were formed with the sole intent of assisting members to purchase health care
(e . g . , Florida Gulf Coast Heal th Coalition , Federal Employees Heal th Benefits
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Program) . Others developed from a need that a coalition or association had to assist
its members with the purchase of health care which then became one service among
several offered to group members (e . g ., the Council of Smaller Enterprises/Group
Services , Inc . in Cleveland) .
Some employers formed coalitions to exert pressure on providers and third party
payers to offer more information , better discounts , and more consistent quality
as part of an overall effort to refo r m the health care system from a grass roots
level (e.g ., the Business Health Care Action Group in Minneapolis).

Purchasing Groups Under the Heritage Foundation Proposal
In its proposal for health care reform , the Heritage Foundation requires everyone
to have health care coverage .
Yet , they recognize that individua l s and small
employer groups are in a relatively weak position to influence the health care market .
Therefore , they recommend that individuals and small employer groups band together
with other individuals or small groups that have similar needs , and purchase health
care as a large group .
These purchasing groups would be pr i vate - sector
organizations and could be formed around existing associations (e . g , churches or
professional associations) or around specific heal th care needs as they arise (e . g .,
cancer , heart disease) . In addition to pooling their purchasing power , these groups
could pool risk , and would provide their members with administrative assistance
and greater access to health care information .
Florida :

Community Health Purchasing Alliances

With the passage of the Health Care Reform Act of 1993 , Florida introduced
government - sponsored , government - designed Community Health Purchasing Alliances
(CHPAs) .
CHPAs are purchasing groups that will provide small businesses (1 - 50
employees) with comparative information on the cost , quality , usage , enro ll ee
satisfaction , and the medical outcomes experience of health plans .
They do not
pool risk . CHPAs may act as administrators in the future , but may not bear risk
or directly contract with providers . As with heal th plans offered outside of CHPAs ,
heal th plans must use modified community rating and must offer plans on a guaranteed
issue basis . Businesses have the choice of enrolling in a regional CHPA , finding
health care coverage independent of a CHPA , or not providing health care coverage
to their employees .
Medicaid beneficiaries and State Employees may be required
to purchase their health care through CHPAs .
Since membership is voluntary , CHPAs must prove their value to small businesses .
If they provide a valuable service at a reasonable price , they wil l succeed .
If
not , small businesses will be no worse off .
Purchasing Groups Under Managed Competition
Under the theoret i cal model of managed competition , created by the Jackson Hole
Group , purchasing groups called Health Plan Purchasing Cooperatives (HPPCs) were
created to help small employers and individuals influence the health care market
more effectively . HP PCs would pool the purchasing power of the small groups , improve
the conduit of information , and act as buying agents and administrators .
In these
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ways , HPPCs would allow small groups and individuals to influence the market on
an equal basis with large groups . Since first introducing the concept of managed
competition , however , the Jackson Hole Group has made some significant changes in
its proposal .
One HPPC per government - designated
Originally , HPPCs were well - defined entities.
region (state , MSA , other) would serve individuals and the small group population .
Individua l s and employees of small businesses would be required to enroll in
regional HPPCs . HPPCs would be government - sponsored non - profit organizations whose
board of d i rectors would be e l ected by its members .
Indi viduals would choose a
health plan from among those offered , and risk - adjustors would be used to equalize
the risk between plans .
In a December , 1993 communique , the Jackson Hole Group shows an important change
in direction . HPPCs are described as being " relatively exc l usive ." More than one
could exist within each government - defined region , but each should represent 30
to 50 percent of the purchasing population and should contain a sufficiently broad
risk pool to attract AHPs .
The state would determine how they would want HPPCs
to be structured (as state agencies , non - profit organizations , corporations , etc.)
although cooperatives are favored . Membership in the HPPCs is opened to Medicaid
and Medicare beneficiaries , government employees , the uninsured , and " other "
individuals . The government is responsible for ensuring universal coverage either
through an individual mandate , employer mandate, or other means . Risk adjustors
are retained .
Throughout the evolution of managed competition , HPPCs are dependent upon government
structures to run well . A new regulatory entity , the National Health Board (NHB) ,
would be created and charged with a wide range of responsibi l ities .
Included in
its duties would be the oversight for the development and update of standard benefits ,
the certification of health plans and HPPCs , and supporting the development and
dissemination of outcomes - based information .
President Clinton ' s Health Alliances
Health alliances in the Cli nton proposal are large , regulatory entities that have
the power to l imit competition . Individuals and all employers with fewer than 5 , 000
employees must enroll i n regional health alliances .
Onl y one regional health
alliance is permitted within a government - designated geographic area . Corporate
hea l th alliances can be formed by employers with more than 5 , 000 employees . All
health plans must use community rating .
The President ' s plan does not pool the purchasing power of small groups and
individuals , nor does it pool risk.
Rather , it ensures that everyone is enrol l ed
in
a
health
plan
which
meets
government - established
criteria
at
government - prescribed rates.
Clinton ' s heal th alliances are so inclusive and
powerful, that they will contro l the market rather than support it .
The President ' s hea l th alliances will also serve as a regulatory mechanism through
which to implement price controls on providers and health plans . Health al l iances
can refuse to contract with a heal th plan if the plan ' s bid is higher than a specified
amount .
A National Health Board would set the budget and would establish the
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standard benefits to be offered .
Health alliance members would be limited in their
cho i ce of health plans and benefit structure .
Some members might prefer to pay
more for health plans that offer more value or different benefits .
Under Clinton ' s plan , the federal government (through the National Health Board
and the heal th alliances) would essentially determine the future structure of heal th
care financing and delivery instead of the public who must use it.

The Role of Individuals in Health Purchasing Groups

The participation in purchasing groups of individuals (who do not receive health
care coverage through an employer or a government program) varies by state and by
health care reform proposal . Some states that have leg i slated the use of purchasing
groups , have not addressed individual participation (e . g ., Florida , California) .
Other states require individuals to enro l l in a purchasing group if they do not
obtain coverage through an employer or a government program (e . g ., Minnesota) .
Health care reform proposals also vary in their requirements toward individual
participation in purchasing groups .
The Jackson Hole Group would require al l
individuals to receive health care through purchasing groups , the Cooper - Grandy
bill would not .
Currently , there do not appear to be any private-sector purchasing groups that allow
individuals , who are not immediate family of their members , to join for the purpose
of purchasing health care coverage .

BCBSF's Position

BCBSF believes in the ability of the private sector to meet the needs of consumers .
Purchasing groups that compete in the private market must meet the needs of their
members to be successful .
If they do not , they will not survive and other efforts ,
that better meet the needs of their members , will take their place .
Large , mandatory purchasing groups , l ike President Clinton ' s heal th alliances , will
not allow their success to be determined by market forces . Such purchasing groups
force most people to enroll in them and then largely determine which health plans
may be offered .
If the purchasing groups fail to achieve the expected savings ,
become unresponsive bureaucracies , or unacceptably limit the public ' s choices , no
a l ternatives exist .
A large , cost l y regulatory system would have been created
displacing existing ( and future) financing and deli very systems in favor of a system
that may be unsatisfactory or inappropriate in the long run .
Private - sector purchasing groups already exist and are i ncreasing in number . These
organizations must meet the needs of their members in order to succeed.
The ref ore ,
they are we l l - suited to respond to the changing needs of their members .
The
government ' s role in a private - sector system should be to support the private market
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by ensuring that a competitive environment exists .
In Florida , the state legislature has made participation in the CHPAs voluntary .
New or existing private purchasing groups may compete with the CHPAs . Hea lt h care
coverage can cont i nue to be purchased outside of the CHPAs .
If the CHPAs work ,
the market wi ll be better served ; if they do not , many alternatives continue to
exist . Either way , the road is open for new arrangements to evolve .
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HEALTH CARE REFORM - GENERAL BCBSF POSITION

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida believes the United States ' health care system
has many strengths , and is among the best in the world . We also believe tha t reform
is needed to improve the current system .
We support health care reform that is
market - based and builds on the current employer - based system . We advocate reform
that 1) provides enough and the right type of information so that purchasers can
make informed value - based decisions ; 2) revises the tax system to improve purchasers '
incentives to shop for value in health plans ; 3) removes legal and regulatory barriers
obstructing a competitive market ; 4) encourages the continued development of managed
care programs ; and 5) promotes innovation through experimentation with new programs
and approaches .
A health care system built on the private market provides the competi t ion needed
to reduce costs by increasing efficiency , while improving quality and expanding
access . When market forces are at work , people choose health plans that offer the
best value for their heal th care dollar ; inefficient heal th plans will be more costly ,
and will either improve or leave the market .
In a competitive private market system ,
consumers direct reform through their purchasing behavior .
This has been occurring
in the health care industry over the past several decades with tremendous positive
changes taking place in the financing and delivery of care .
Further improvements
are needed and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida is cornrni tted to being an innovator
and leader in the improvement process.
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HEALTH CARE DATA AND INFORMATION RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC

Background
The Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1992 established funding for the State
Center for Heal th Statistics ( SCHS) and placed the Center under the Agency for Heal th
Care Administration . The Center is authorized to create a state - wide Comprehensive
Health Rela t ion Information System (CHRIS) that wil l require providers and insurers
to report financial and clinical information to the State .
Analysis
There is widespread recognition that consumers of health services often lack clear
information upon which to base their purchase decisions (e . g ., which provi der to
see , which hea l th plan to choose) .
For the private market system to work
effectively , consumers must be able to make informed decisions about their purchases .
The State has responded to this situation by legislating the development of a
state - run data system.
Information that is made public must maintain patient confidentiality and must
safeguard proprietary information .
It is critical to ensure that whatever
information is developed for consumer or other uses (e . g ., creation of practice
parameters) be reliable and accurate .
To encourage a productive private market , the government must respect and support
the confidentiality of proprietary information as well as support consumers with
the information they need to make informed decisions .
A government - run system cannot be as responsive as the private market to changing
consumer needs and to a changing environment . A government - run data system will
be expensive to develop and maintain , will be bureaucratically administered , and
will duplica t e information currently in the private market .
Position
BCBSF believes it is essential for consumers to have information with which to make
informed , value - based decisions to purchase health plans . This information should
be at an appropriate summary level to facilitate comparative shopping for health
plans (premium cost , benefit designs , pat i ent and customer satisfact i on , etc . ).
Standard industry indicators (e . g ., per member per month , cost per employee , etc . )
can be collected and disseminated for the bene f it of Florida ' s insurance buyers .
Insurers have the obligation to protect patient - specific information . Moreover ,
companies have the right to protect proprietary information -- information that
is important for them to remain competitive in the marketplace . This would include :
- Information that would disclose specific financial arrangements
with providers
- Provider - specific information necessary to maintain and manage
network arrangements
IP27 - August 11 , 1993

It is crucial that the industry proceed cautiously with the release of information
on quality of care . Careful evaluation of the accuracy and sensitivity of the data
must occur before information is released .
The government ' s role should be to support the private market system by encouraging
data
standardization ,
collection ,
and distribution
to
appropriate
users
(researchers , consumers , health p l ans , etc . ) .
It should also finance specific
research efforts (e . g ., to develop pract i ce parameters) . It is not the government ' s
responsibility to develop a data base that would lead it to micromanage the market .
The information needs of consumers , and of the scientific community , can be met
cost - effectively through the establishment of a private organization whose
membership includes all the stakeholders in the health care market (consumers ,
This organization can determine what
emp l oyers , providers , insurers , etc . ) .
information should be distributed to consumers for the market to work , and can develop
protocols for the standardization , automation , and storage of informat i on .
Pertinent , standardized information can be shared directly wi th consumers , health
plans , etc .
A private market alternative to a state - run data base wi ll save taxpayers money
and will be more responsive to consumer needs and a changing environment .
A
state - run data system will be expensive to develop and maintain , will duplicate
information currently in the private market , and will add another layer of
bureaucracy .
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INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE

Background
The vast majority of Floridians (under 65) purchase heal th insurance coverage through an
employer - sponsored plan . Those who don't , find and pay for health insurance coverage on their
own through the individual health insurance market .
In Florida , approximately 9 percent
(970 , 000) of insured Floridians currently hold an individual health insurance policy .
The
individually insured market is generally comprised of the following categories of people :
• self - employed individuals ,
• unemployed individuals ,
• employees of businesses that do not offer coverage ,
• early retirees who do not have employer coverage , and
• dependents of those above or dependents not covered by employer plans .

Individual Insurance Market
The individual heal th insurance market today covers a significant number of Floridians . However ,
many more Floridians who are uninsured at a given time , and who do not have access to group
coverage , could benefit from coverage through the individual insurance market .
The purpose
of this paper is to describe some improvements to the individual insurance market that would
make individual coverage more attractive and affordable to uninsured Floridians without making
it less affordable for those who have it now .

Uninsured Floridians
As concern about the number of uninsured Americans has increased , so have the number of studies
and reports that provide information about the uninsured population . As a result, we are learning
more and more about the characteristics of this population -- why they are uninsured and how
l ong they are without coverage .
This information is important for developing appropriate
solutions for the uninsured .
An important recent finding relates to the length of time people are without coverage . According
to studies conducted by the Urban Institute and the U. S . Census Bureau , the 37 million uninsured
frequently cited in the media represent all individuals who are uninsured at any particular
time . However , relatively few of these individuals remain uninsured for long periods of time .
•A 1992 Urban Institute paper notes that 48 percent of the uninsured obtain coverage within
five months of becoming uninsured , and more than two - thirds obtain coverage within a year .
•A 1990 Census Bureau study states that only four percent of the uninsured lack coverage for
as long as 28 months .
Another important point is that the uninsured are , in fact , a very heterogeneous group . Based
on the work by the Urban Institute , we can define at least 5 categories of uninsured Floridians :
• Temporarily uninsured workers , and their dependents .
This includes people in new jobs who
are subject to waiting periods and/or preexisting condition exclusions .
• Temporarily unemployed individuals (up to six months) and their dependents .
This includes
people who may be between jobs , laid off , or recent graduates looking for their first
job .
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• Chronically uninsured workers (over six months) , and their dependents . Most of these people
are in low wage jobs . A majority work for small companies , but some work f or large firms .
• Chronical l y unemployed individuals (over six months) , and their dependents.
early retirees .
Income levels for this group vary widely .

This includes

• Insured workers with non-insured dependents .
This includes employees o f firms that choose
not to offer depende nt coverage , or which o ffer dependent coverage , but do not cont ribute
to its cost .
Throughout these categories are the approximately 5 percent of Floridians who are chronically
ill . These people either never had coverage , had coverage cancelled , or had coverage that became
to o expensive .

Proposed Improvements to the Individual Insurance System
Below are some preliminary suggestions on changes to the insurance and regulatory systems to
improve affordability , continuity/portability , and availability of coverage in the individual
insurance market .
Affordability
To ensure the cost of individual coverage is more affordable:
• Exempt Individual Coverage from Certain State Mandated Benefits*
State laws which mandate that specific benefits be included in all health insurance policies
drive up the cost o f heal th care .
Be exempting individual policies from certain mandated
benefits premiums could be reduced.
Insurers would then have more flexibility in
developing products to meet the needs of low- income Fl oridians.
For example , some carriers
may choose to offer catastrophic coverage with high co - payments and deductibles in
traditional insurance products ; other carriers would choose to of fer managed care products
to individua l s .
In the aggregate , these additional choices will provide Floridians more
lower - cost options in the individual market and will bring more uninsured into the insurance
system .
• Exempt Individual Coverage from State Premium Taxes*
State premium taxes add to the cost of health care coverage . By exempting i ndividual policies
from state premium taxes , the cost of coverage for individual policies could be reduced .
This represents a relatively small off set to the " penalty " of federal tax treatment which
is much less favorable for individuals than for employers .
• Restrict Commission Structures*
Establish agent commission restrictions simil ar to those currently in place for Medicare
supplemental products : When an agent replaces an individual policy , compensation is based
on the renewal commission rate , not the " new cust omer " rate.
• Pricing
BCBSF believes the best pricing strategy falls between the two extremes o f pure community rating
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and pure durational/experience rating .
Current regulation prohibits the use of pure
durational/experience rating.
However , adopting the other extreme -- community rating
-- will deter purchase by those in good health and increase the cost of coverage for those
who can least afford it . We support defining allowable premium rate deviations from the
average , so that those with better - than - average health have somewhat lower premiums and
those with poorer health still have affordable premiums .

* While each of these changes taken separately would achieve only small reductions in premiums ,
taken together they can have a significant impact on the cost of individual coverage .
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•Rate and Financial Stability

In today ' s market individua l insurance exhibits a predictable pattern of low claims during the
early policy years and higher c laims in the later years . Current regulation requires ,
in effect , that these claims be " averaged" in setting premium rates .
This creates a
situation in which there are excess gains in the early years and excess losses in later
years.
Regu la tions should be tightened in two ways :
- The insurer should be required to set aside the excess ga ins as reserves . These reserves must
be developed using uniform standards , which do not penalize the insurer's federal
income tax status .
- The excess gains in the early years must be recognized in establishing future year rates .
This will help assure rate stability to policy holders .
BCBSF does not favor guaranteed issue of policies.
In this paper we are proposing a number
of changes to improve the individual insurance market .
These changes can achieve the goals
of bringing many more uninsured into the system , keeping the system viable for those currently
covered under individual policies, and providing for the chronically ill .
Guaranteed issue
will not achieve these goals.
In fact , if people are assured of being able to purchase health
care coverage when they become sick (that is , guaranteed iss ue) , many people will decide not
to purchase until they need coverage . The ef feet would be to undermine the indi victual insurance
system , as the "pool " of insureds shrinks and includes only those who are sick or who anticipate
medical care .
Continuity/Portability

To assure that the insurance system better supports continuity/portability of coverage , certain
changes must be made in the group market:
• Require COBRA- Like Coverage for Smaller Firms
Current COBRA regulations require firms with 20 or more employees to continue group coverage
for a certain period of time after an employee leaves the firm . Employees leaving a firm
that has fewer than 20 workers do not have the benefit of transitional coverage through
COBRA . BCBSF proposes that Florida require COBRA- like coverage be provided by insurance
carriers to employers with 2 - 19 employees.
• Ensure Understanding of Conversion Rules
Florida law requires all licensed insurance carriers selling group policies to offer conversion
policies (wit h a premium cap) to individuals who terminate their group coverage . Thus ,
Florida already has guaranteed issue of indi vidual policies for many Floridians . BCBSF
proposes that insurers be required to inform individuals terminating employment o f their
coverage options under federal and state conversion laws.
For example , insurers could
be required to send information packets with a toll free number to make the process as
easy as possible .
• Pre - existing Condition Provisions
BCBSF proposes that insurers be required in many cases to waive pre - existing condition provisions
upon the purchase of a new policy . Any Floridian who has maintained continuous coverage
for at least the period of a new policy ' s pre - existing condition provision , would have
this provision waived . Therefore , when an employee changes jobs , or an employer changes
carriers , in many cases no pre - existing condition provisions cou ld be imposed .
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Availability of Coverage

To improve access to coverage :
• Guaranteed Renewability
BCBSF advocates guaranteed renewability -- coverage cannot be terminated except for fraud or
non - payment of premium . This will prohibit companies from cancelling coverage for Florida
citizens , leaving them without access to insurance .
•Allow sma l l employers to facilitate purchase of individual policies for employees when the
employer does not (or cannot) provide group coverage .
• Re - open FCHA with Certain Changes
BCBSF suggests re - opening the FCHA program contingent on the following changes :
- allow premiums to reflect actual costs ,
- require program participants to contribute to premiums based on a percentage of income ,
- provide state subsidies to cover the remaining costs ,
- fund the program through a broad- based revenue vehicle , and
- allow insurers to competitively bid on the FCHA group .
By allowing FCHA premiums to reflect costs , insurers will have an incentive to bid on FCHA business
and to use managed care techniques to provide quality , cost - effective care .
Placing a
cap on out - of - pocket expenses for individuals participating in the FCHA will limit their
financial liability and increase access among Florida ' s high - risk/medically uninsurable
individuals.
Changing the state funding source to a broad- based tax will avoid the counter
productive increases in the price of insurance which result from insurer assessments .
Keeping the "medically uninsurable " separate from other individuals and small groups for rating
purposes is essential for maintaining the affordability of insurance coverage and small
groups . Pooling the chronically ill with individuals and small groups will dramatically
drive - up the cost of coverage for the whole pool of insureds and will increase the number
of uninsured Floridians .
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INDIVIDUAL MARKET HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM

Issue
The Governor and the AHCA have proposed reforms to the individual health insurance
market to achieve greater access and move closer to the goal of universal access
for all Floridians by December 31 , 1994 .
Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
For the most part , recommendations for the individual insurance market are similar
to the reforms passed for the small group market:
• require guaranteed issue of all individual policies , and
• require modified community rating with
classes .

limits

on

rate

differentials

between

Effects
•The number of uninsured Floridians is certain to increase.

- If people are guaranteed the purchase of health care coverage , most people will
wait to purchase coverage until they are sick .
- If modified community rating is mandated for the individual insurance market , the
price of coverage will increase for most individual policyholders .
If the price of coverage goes above what is viewed as a " good value , "
fewer and fewer people will purchase coverage .
•Florida employers who provide health care benefits will be subjected to greater
cost shifting as the number of uninsured increases , driving up their costs
and pushing some of them out of the small group market .
•Individual insurance policyholders who already made the prudent and responsible
decision to purchase insurance coverage will see their ra tes go up .

- Guaranteed i ssue will ensure that most new purchasers are sick , driving rates up .
- Community rating will raise the price of coverage for the majority of current
individual insurance policyholders , pushing some of them out of the
market .
•The number of insurers in the competitive marketplace for individual coverage will
decrease , similar to what happened in the small employer market when gua ranteed
issue was implemented . When insurers withdraw from a specific market , it
undermines the competitiveness of that market and usually causes prices to
rise .

Alternative Proposal

IP29 - February 1 , 1994

Implementing individual insurance reform discussed in the Florida Health Security
Plan will adversely effect the Governor ' s goal o f achieving universal access . To
increase access in the individual insurance market , coverage needs to be more
affordable and portable . To accomplish this , the following changes should be make :
• exempt individual coverage from state mandated benefits ,
• exempt individual coverage from state premium taxes ,
• e l iminate abusive pract i ces (i . e. , cancellation for claims ) ,
• require guarantee renewal of policies ,
• require COBRA- like coverage for small emp l oyers ,
• ensure understanding of conversion rules and options available to individuals ,
and
•waive pre - existing condition provisions when mo v ing from one policy to another
policy .
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INDIVIDUAL-BASED SYSTEM EXPERIMENT

A.

Introduction

In order to set up our discussion of the experiment , we first want to review some
of the characteristics of individual and employment-based systems.
Central to a market - based system is consumer choice . Market - based systems function
as a result of many sma ll decisions made by individual consumers . The effects of
these many decisions accumulate over time and direct change in the system, ultimately
satisfying the needs of the consumers .
A core decision in any market - based proposal for hea lt h care reform is to determine
the consumer ' s role in purchasing health care coverage .
In our current
employment - based system , the majority of Americans have coverage provided through
employers who decide what types of plans and benefit packages will be offered .
This system restricts ind i vidual consumer choice , as well as consumers ' sense of
personal responsibility for health care decisions , and conflicts with a fundamental
element of a market - based system.
Furthermore, an employment-based system may no longer meet the needs of a dynamic
economy and mob ile work force.
The present employment - based system was organized
when the concept of long - term employment was the prevail i ng practice and portability
of heal th care benefits was not a major consideration . However , in today ' s economy ,
job change is commonp lace, and often needed for career development and advancement.
The structure of pension programs has changed to reflect the changing work place ,
with benefits more individual - based and more portable . We may now need to re - think
the structure of health care benefits.
Alternatives to the employment - based system could give individual consumers a
greater role in deciding which plan to purchase , as well as the portability of
coverage needed in today ' s economy . That is , an individual - based system would make
the indi vidual consumer the pr i mary decision - maker for the purchase o f coverage
and the primary holder of the policy , rather than the employer .
The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe the current system ; outline the
advantages of an individual - based system and the possible ways to structure it;
point out limitations associated with both systems ; and develop a framework for
creating an alternative system experiment that incorporates the advantages of both .
B.Employment-Based System

In the current employment - based system , about 85 % of the 160 million Americans with
private heal th care insurance receive coverage through their employers . Most people
are both comfortable and satisfied with this system . Many of these Americans view
health care benefits as an impor tant part of an overall compensation package .
However , the effectiveness of this employment - based system varies .
Large employers and their employees tend to fare well in this system. Most large
employers who offer health care benefits have full - time benefits managers whose
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job is to understand and compare the range of heal th care plans available at various
prices and select the plan(s) that best meet the needs of their employees . Large
employers also receive the best prices for coverage , because from an insurer ' s
perspective , marketing to large groups 1) decreases the administrative costs for
distribution of policies and information , and 2) effectively spreads risk . Both
characteristics contribute to lower premiums .
In contrast , small employers and individuals who purchase health care benefits
(including self - emp l oyed) tend to fare less well . Small companies and individuals
do not usually have benefits managers and must work through insurance agents to
select a health plan . This approach means they pay a commission for the agent ' s
serv i ce in addition to a premium for the coverage itself . Small employers often
contribute little or nothing to the cost of coverage for their employees .
Furthermore , indi vidua l purchasers , i n addition to having no help from employers ,
receive only a fraction of the tax subsidy for health care coverage that covered
employees receive .
C.Individual-Based System

An alternative to the current employment - based system is an indi vidua l- based system
which gives the individual consumer the role of deciding which health plan to
purchase .
Many advocates of market - oriented reform regard the indiv i dual - based
system as the most attractive system available because it preserves the conditions
of indi vidual consumer dec i sion - making which are so important to ma r ket systems .
Proponents claim that the individual - based system places the consumer in a position
of power , closer and more involved in the decision - making process . Thi s has the
ef feet of increasing cost - conscious purchas i ng and personal responsibility without
sacrificing quality and efficiency . Consumers would demand better information on
the quality of care givers, prices charged , med i cal outcomes , and treatment
alternatives . Under this system , consumer demand would d i rect insure r s to offer
the types of plans and changes to plans which would best meet their needs .
An individual - based system would be portable , accommodating the work- force movement
in our economy . Employees could move from one job to another without experiencing
uninsured spells due to temporary unemployment and/or waiting periods .
Finally , individualizing health insurance would remove other constraints often
associated with th i rd- party payers systems .
This would allow providers to see
patients rather than employers as the principal buyers of health se r vices.
This
change would strengthen their relationships by helping both patients and providers
to feel more accountable for care .
D.Structuring An Individual-based System

Recently there have been a number of health care reform proposals , mostly from
politically conservative organizations , that have advocated individual - based
systems . These proposals design individual - based systems that vary in the degree
individual consumers are invo l ved in the purchase and financing of health coverage .
Some proposals describe systems that completely separate the employer from the
health care system , wh i le others maintain a role for the employer in the financing
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of coverage .
The purest form of an individual - based system places all information-gathering ,
purchase decision - making , and coverage - financing activities in the hands of
individual consumers .
In this type of system , the purchase of health insurance
would be entirely separate from employment , as the purchase of automobile insurance
is today.
The Heritage Foundation designed a reform proposal that closely resembles a pure
individual - based system . Under the Heritage ' s proposal , the financing system would
be changed through tax reform to place the consumer in direct control of the money
used to purchase health insurance and medical care . The employer ' s role would be
limited to handling premium payments and tax adjustments for their employees , and
if they wished , acting as sponsors for the purchase of group coverage.

The Heritage Foundation proposal cites the Federal Employee Heal th Bene£ its Program
(FEHBP) as a successful model of an individual - based system . The FEHBP provides
about nine million federa l employees and their dependents a choice of coverage
through a variety of competing health plan options . The federal government helps
finance coverage by contributing a fixed amount for the purchase of heal th insurance.
According to Heritage, based on data supplied by Lewin/ICF, the combination of
consumer choice and market competition has allowed the FEHBP to experience a lower
rate of premium increase in the past decade than the current private employment - based
system . To Heritage , this clearly demonstrates the success of the individual - based
system .
Moving away from the strict form of an individual - based system , there are a number
of organizations introducing reform proposals that expand individual consumer choice
while maintaining a role for the employer in the financing of coverage .
Organizations such as the American Conservat i ve Union , Citizens Against Rationing
Health , Council for Affordable Health Insurance , and National Center for Policy
Analysis , as well as a number of Republican sponsored House and Senate bills , have
proposed individual - based systems built on the concept of Medical Savings Accounts
(MSAs) .
MSAs , similar to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) , would be portable tax - free
accounts to which employers and emp l oyees wou l d contribute funds for the purchase
of coverage and/or health care services .
That is , MSAs would allow individuals
to make the purchase decision for coverage , take the coverage wi th them when they
change jobs , and still permit employers to contribute to employees ' health coverage
as part of their benefits package .
A leading proponent of MSAs and a source of much of the data and literature is the
National Center for Policy Analysis .
Under their system , a medical savings account
would be set up and the employer would deposit the same amount of money previously
paid on premiums into an employee ' s individual account . The individual employee
would then purchase a catastrophic health insurance with a high deductible.
This
insurance would then be used to pay for infrequent and expensive treatments , while
routine services would be paid directly to providers using funds from the MSA .
MSA funds not spent would be able to accumulate over time and would be availab l e
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to cover individuals during spells of unempl o yment , used for the purchase of
long - term insurance, or to supplement Medicare coverage .
D.Limitations of Both Systems

Employment - based
As mentioned earlier , in the current employment - based system , employees of large
companies receive advantages (i .e., benefit managers and lower premiums) not
available to employees of smaller companies . Additionally , individuals are also
discriminated against because they receive no help from employers and only a fraction
of the tax subsidy that employees receive . However , there are two other fundamental
problems with an employment-based system .
First , the employment - based system confl ic ts with a market approach because it
constrains individual decision - making for the purchase of coverage by turning over
the decision process to the employer.
This removes much o f the personal
responsibility from the selection , purchase , and use of coverage . It also impedes
awareness of the relationship between lifestyle decisions and personal health .
Secondly , the employment - based system does not support portab i lity . It was built
on an economy that experienced far l ess job change than today . Because of shifts
in the economy , corporate restructuring , development o f a world economy and the
mi gration of the population , the present labor force is changing jobs more
frequently .
This has created a demand for portable heal th care coverage t o
accommodate employee mobility .
Individual - Based
The first and most obvious limitation o f a pure indi v idual-based system is that
most Americans are not familar with an individual - based system for purchasing heal th
care coverage and are satisfied with the current employer - based system .
An
individual - based system would present many difficulties for individual consumers
choosing their own health coverage .
The complex ity of insurance plans and the
current lack of accurate information makes comparison shopping very confusing .
Secondl y , an individual - based system would lead t o increase administrative costs
associated with the distribution of policies and information on an individual basis .
Some of the economies of scale that are a feature of the current system would
disappear .
Insurers wo uld need to market their plans directly to individual
consumers , adding additional marketing costs to the price o f policies .
The third limitation , adverse risk selection , is a major problem with an
individual - based system , and one that is not adequately addressed in any of the
individual - based reform proposals mentioned ear lier . In an employment - based system
risk is spread among the purchase group and adverse selection is control led.
However , if the purchase of coverage is individual - based , insurers are much more
susceptible to the problem of adverse risk selection.
Finally , there are many unknowns wi th an individual - based system .
For example ,
there are aspects of an individual - based system (e . g ., medical savings accounts)
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that may be incompatible with managed care and other proven cost saving techniques .
Developing and implementing an individual - based system may add unnecessary
complexity to the system without achieving the perceived benefits .
E.Framework for an Alternative System

The purpose of this section is to stimulate discussion about an experiment with
an alternative approach to the health care system that could explore the
effectiveness of such a system without putting the mainstream system at risk .
The following is a framework of an alternative system that incorporates some of
the advantages of both the employment - based and individual - based systems .
This
system would increase personal responsibility for the selection and purchase of
heal th coverage while still maintaining health coverage as part of an employee ' s
benefit package.
The system would be developed around individual and portable Medical Savings
Accounts, similar to IRAs.
The tax subsidies available to employers that contribute
to their employees' coverage would remain in place but be limited to a fixed amount
(as described earlier in BCBSF's main health care reform proposal) .
The cap on
benefit tax deductibility would be set high to allow insurers incentives to design
plans that meet consumer needs . Employers contributing to their employees' health
coverage would continue to do so, but now would place the funds into employees '
MSAs . The employees would make the selection and purchase decision for coverage
using those MSA funds . Under this system , employees will have a strong incentive
to purchase value - based coverage , because the funds not spent on coverage would
be available for transfer to their IRAs or could be withdrawn at a lower tax rate
than their present rate .
Employers who did not directly contribute to their employees ' heal th coverage would
be required to act as group sponsors and handle premium payments and tax adjustments.
Employees would contribute to their individual MSAs from tax adjusted income and
would use those funds to select and purchase health coverage . Again , funds not
expended on coverage , deductibles , or copayment would be available f or transfer
to IRAs or could be taken out at a lower tax rate than their present rate .
Individuals , including self - employed and unemployed persons , would receive the same
tax subsidy as employed individuals.
They would be allowed to set up MSAs and
contribute to the accounts with pre-tax dollars for the purchase o f heal th coverage ,
or the payment of deductibles and copayments .
Monies left over within the tax
deductible cap amount would be transferable to IRAs or could be taken out at a l ower
tax rate than their present rate .
An experiment to test the above system would be designed and take place for some
period of time in a large geographic region . The Florida market , for example , with
its progressive positions on health care reform and diversity within the health
care system would serve as a good laboratory .
Any barriers for design and
implementation of the system would be suspended , i . e ., perverse tax codes , state
insurance regulation, etc.
The experiment would establish measures to elevate the
effectiveness of this system.
Such measures would include : changes in the number
of uninsured ; impact of adverse selection on insurers ; effects on employment levels
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and small employers due to an increased burden ; average cost of coverage f or
individuals , the amount spent on health care services , and the level of efficiency
achieved in the hea l th care industry .
Results would be carefully analyzed to
determine which changes in the system proved to be the most effective .
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INSURANCE REFORM

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports insurance reform that prohibits the
use of abusive rating practices such as durational rating . Many of the health care
reform proposals call for community rating as a " solution " to eliminate these harmful
pricing practices .
Some states (including Florida) have passed laws requiring
insurers to use this type of pricing system for certain segments of business .
However , the effects of community rating are also negative . Under community rating ,
those with poor health have their premiums subsidized by those with good health .
Community rating increases the price of coverage for those who are healthy .
If
the price of coverage for the healthy rise and coverage is no longer viewed as a
" good value ," fewer and fewer healthy people will purchase coverage . The average
premium price will reflect a less healthy community , and will continue to rise .
Eventually , the only people with coverage will be those who are certain of medical
bills , fatally undermining the health insurance system .
Some reform proposals mandate the purchase of coverage along with community rating
in an effort to ease the adverse selection problem described above .
However , a
requirement to community rate under mandatory coverage is an inequitable method
of health care financing .
To require insurance along with community rating is ,
in essence , a regressive tax . That is , the low income population (who tend to be
younger and healthier) would subsidize high income people .
In addition , community rating under a mandate to purchase coverage does not preclude
some carriers from " selecting " healthier purchasers through mechanisms other than
underwriting .
For example , some insurance carriers could use advertising
techniques , marketing campaigns , agent commissions and sales practices to skim
" better than average " risks from the market . To avoid this practice , risk adjustment
systems have been proposed along with community rating .
However , at this time ,
an equitable risk adjustment system has not yet been developed (and many experts
are skeptical that one will be) , and we believe there is a better rating and pr i cing
strategy available .
We advocate a pricing strategy which falls between the two extremes of pure community
rating and pure durational/experience rating .
We believe that prices based on
rating bands are best .
This could be accomplished , for example , by defining
allowable premium rate deviations from average . Within certain bands , those whose
health is better - than - average should receive treatment which will encourage them
to purchase . This strategy produces the most rate stability over time , and ensures
that affordable products are available , regardless of health status .
We also advocate guaranteed renewal of policies . However , we do not favor guaranteed
issue of policies because it encourages people to go without insurance until they
get sick .
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INSURANCE REFORM

Background
Insurance reform is a category of proposals that includes a var i ed assortment of
changes to the current health insurance system .
These proposals vary widely in
types of changes and effects they wil l have on the entire health insurance system .
Insurance reform was a ma j or aspect of both state and national hea l th care reform
proposals in 1994 (e . g ., the Fl orida Health Security Plan released by the Agency
for Health Care Administration in December of 1993 set out several changes which
appeared in proposed bills throughout the regular and special sessions) . On the
national level , most of the major national proposals included reforms to the health
insurance system .
Expected Proposals
The following proposals are expected to emerge in the 1995 Florida legislative
session :
• Mandate that all individual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue bas i s .
• Limit pre - existing conditions provisions to a 12 month look back and a 12 month
exclusion from coverage for the condition .
•Apply modified community rating to individual health insurance plans allowing only
age , geographic location , and fami l y composition as rate differential factors .
• Remove gender and age as rate differential factors for small groups .
• Requi r e COBRA- l i ke coverage for smaller firms.
Rationale for the Proposals
The proposed insurance reforms are seen as a continuat i on of the reforms made to
the small group insurance market in the last few years in an effort to achieve greater
access to coverage .
Concerns and Recommended Posit i ons
Most of the proposed changes will not achieve greater access , but are actually likely
to decrease access and increase the number of uninsured .
• Mandate that all individual pol i cies be offered on a guaranteed issue basis .
A mandate that all individual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue
basis wi ll increase the number of uninsured .
If people
are assured of being able to purchase heal th care coverage
when they become sick (that is , guaranteed issue) , many
people will decide not to purchase until they need
coverage . The effect would be to undermine the individual
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insurance system , as the " pool " of insureds shrinks and
includes only those who are sick or who anticipate medical
care , and premiums for such coverage would skyrocket .
Recommended position :

oppose guaranteed issue for individual policies .

• Limit pre - existing conditions provisions to a 12 month look back and a 12 month
exclusion from coverage for the condition .
Limiting pre - existing conditions provisions for people who maintain
continuous coverage would help prevent people from
exper i encing " job lock " and going for periods without
needed coverage .
However ,
limits on pre - existing
conditions provisions without requiring previous coverage
would cause the same problems associated with guaranteed
issue of i ndividual policies .
If people are guaranteed
coverage with limited pre - existing conditions without
having to have previous coverage , they will wait to
purchase coverage until they anticipate the need for
medical care .
reducing/eliminating
pre - existing
Recommended
position :
support
provisions for those who have maintained coverage .

condition

•Apply modified community rating to individual heal th insurance plans allowing only
age , geographic location , and family composition as rate differential factors .
Mandating modified community rating for the indiv i dual insurance market
will cause the price of coverage to increase fo r most
individual pol i cyholders .
I f the price of coverage for
the healthy rises and coverage is no longer viewed as a
" good value ," fewer and fewer heal thy people will purchase
coverage . The average premium price will reflect a l ess
heal thy community , and will continue to rise . Eventual l y ,
the only people with coverage will be those who are certain
of medical bills , fatally undermi ning the heal th insurance
system .
Recommended position :
insurance .

oppose modified

community

rat i ng

for

individual

heal th

• Remove gender and age as rate differential factors for small groups .
Removing gender and age as rate differential factors will cause the
pr i ce of coverage to increase for most small groups .
If
the cost of coverage goes up too much , fewer and fewer
small groups will purchase insurance .
Recommended position : oppose removing gender and age as rate differential factors
for small group

IP3l (b )

• Require COBRA- like coverage for smaller firms.
Requiring that small firms (less than 20 employees) offer COBRA- like
coverage would reduce the number of uninsured by providing
temporary coverage to people who are unemployed .
Recommended position : support COBRA- like coverage for small firms
workers) .
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INSURANCE REFORM

Background
Insurance reform is a category of proposals that includes a varied assortment of
changes to the current health insurance system .
These proposals vary widely in
types of changes and effects they will have on the entire health insurance system .
Insurance reform was a major aspect of both state and national health care reform
proposals in 1994 (e . g ., the Florida Health Security Plan released by the Agency
for Health Care Administration in December of 1993 set out several changes which
appeared in proposed bills throughout the regular and special sessions) . On the
national level , most of the major national proposals included reforms to the health
insurance system .
Expected Proposa l s
The following proposals are expected to emerge in the 1995 Florida legislative
session :
• Mandate that all individual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue basis .
• Limit pre - existing conditions provisions to a 12 month look back and a 12 month
exclusion from coverage for the condition .
•Apply modified community rating to indi victual heal th insurance plans allowing only
age , geograph i c location , and family composition as rate differential factors .
• Remove gender and age as rate differential factors for small groups .
• Require COBRA- like coverage for smaller firms .
Rationale for the Proposa l s
The proposed insurance reforms are seen as a continuation of the reforms made to
the small group insurance market i n the last few years in an effort to achieve greater
access to coverage .
Concerns and Recommended Positions
Most of the proposed changes will not achieve greater access , but are actually likely
to decrease access and increase the number of uninsured .
• Mandate that all individual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue basis .
A mandate that all indi victual policies be offered on a guaranteed issue
basis wil l increase the number of uninsured .
If people
are assured of being able to purchase heal th care coverage
when they become sick (that is, guaranteed issue) , many
people will decide not to purchase until they need
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coverage . The effect would be to undermine the individual
insurance system , as the " pool " of insureds shrinks and
includes only those who are sick or who anticipate medical
care , and premiums for such coverage would skyrocket .
Recommended position :

oppose guaranteed issue for individual policies.

• Limit pre - existing conditions provisions to a 12 month look back and a 12 month
exclusion from coverage for the condi tion .
Limiting pre - existing conditions provisions for people who maintain
continuous coverage would help prevent people from
experiencing " job lock " and going for periods without
needed coverage .
However ,
limits on pre - existing
conditions provisions without requiring previous coverage
would cause the same problems associated with guaranteed
issue of individual policies .
If people are guaranteed
coverage with limited pre - existing conditions without
having to have previous coverage , they will wait to
purchase coverage until they anticipate the need for
medical care .
Recommended
position :
support
reducing/eliminating
pre - existing
provisions for those who have maintained coverage .

condition

•Apply modified community rating to individual heal th insurance plans allowing only
age , geographic location , and family composition as rate differential factors .
Mandating modified community rating for the individual insurance market
will cause the price of coverage to increase for most
individual policyholders .
If the price of coverage for
the healthy rises and coverage is no longer viewed as a
" good value ," fewer and fewer heal thy people will purchase
coverage . The average premium price will reflect a less
heal thy community , and will continue to rise . Eventually ,
the only people with coverage will be those who are certain
of medical bills , fatally undermining the heal th insurance
system .
Recommended position :
insurance .

oppose modified commun i ty

rat i ng

for

individual

• Remove gender and age as rate differential factors for small groups .
Removing gender and age as rate differential factors will cause the
price of coverage to increase for most small groups .
If
the cost of coverage goes up too much , fewer and fewer
small groups will purchase insurance .
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health

Recommended position : oppose removing gender and age as rate differential factors
for small group
• Require COBRA- like coverage for smaller firms .
Requiring that small firms (less than 20 employees) offer COBRA- like
coverage would redu ce the number of uninsured by providing
temporary coverage to people who are unemployed .
Recommended position : support COBRA- like coverage for small firms
workers) .
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LONG-TERM CARE

Issue
In an effort to address Florida ' s long - term care needs , the Agency for Health Care
Administration , in conjunction with the Department of Elder Affairs proposed a plan
to fundamentally reform how Florida decides resource allocations in the long - term
care system .
The Florida Health Security Act Proposes
• Establishing a Long - Term Care Authority in state law to assure that the separate
agencies which make up the components of the long - term care system are
regulated by a common authority .
• Expanding home and community- based care options .
and
• Revising licensure , monitoring ,
outcome-related measures by 1996.

evaluating

requirements

to

focus

on

Effects
concerned about big government would disapprove of another
government bureaucracy which will surely follow the estab l ishment of a
Long - Term Care Authority ,
when what is needed is encouragement of
public/private partnerships to successfully manage Florida ' s long- term care
needs .

•Florida taxpayers

•Taxpayers and businesses would be concerned that the state will be financing a

program that competes with the private sector to provide a long-term care
infrastructure .
Alternative Proposal
• The Florida Health Security Program proposals are primarily concerned with the
disbursement of Florida ' s tax dollars among long - term care providers . This
approach ignores the benefits of financing long - term care through a
public - private partnership (as exemplified by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation ' s program in Connecticut) .
The state should work with private
insurers to develop high quality , ethical long - term care and home health
care insurance plans that could be offered to Floridians at reasonable costs .
Long - term care and home heal th care insurance furnished by the p r ivate market
would be more cost effective than yet another taxpayer - funded government
program .
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MANAGED COMPETITION (CHPAs)

Issue
To make affordable health care coverage available to small employers (50 or fewer
employees) , the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 created vo luntary ,
compet i tive CHPAs to create a competitive market for small employers ' insurance ,
l ower administrative costs , and provide comparative information on competing heal th
plans.
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
•Allowing CHPAs to " negotiate " prices with health plans.
• Expanding CHPAs to include public entities ,
individuals.

groups up to 150 employees ,

and

•Allowing different contribution and participation requirements inside and outside
CHPAs .
Effects
These changes will threaten the viability of the Governor's attempt to improve the
market through health alliances.

• CHPAs will become brokers of health care coverage rather than "market makers ";
they will be viewed by Floridians as entities that add costs (administrative
fees) while limiting consumers ' choice of plans.
•As brokers, CHPAs may " negotiate " rates too low for the health plan ' s rates to
meet DOI standards .
Thus , ob jective DOI standards designed to protect
consumers would have to be waived .
• Giving CHPAs the power to negotiate will not produce the best deal for CHPA
enrollees . If CHPAs " succeed " in negotiating rates below the market price,
AHPs will have to scrimp on service and quality . Just as likely , CHPAs will
get prices above the market level; AHPs will add a " negotiation factor " to
their bids and the CHPA will negotiate away only part of that cushion .
•Many more private and public sector employees will find their coverage at risk
if these unproven CHPAs are expanded and fail .
The CHPAs themselves will
be held accountable by the public for the l oss of insurance coverage .
• Larger employers and public entities do not need to be included in CHPAs ; they
already have access to a competitive market with good information , favorable
risk pools , and low administrative costs .
Including large employers and
public entities may divert the CHPAs from focusing on the needs of small
employers - which was the original legislative intent of CHPAs .
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•Many employers with under 150 employees and public entities have available the
option of self - insurance .
CHPAs
should expect
that
groups with
low- to - average claim costs will self - insure (because of the benefits , i . e .,
exemption from state premium tax) and wil l not use CHPAs . Only employers
and public entities with higher than average claims costs will find the
community- rate - based coverage through CHPAs attractive . This will increase
the price of coverage within the CHPAs for all CHPA members and harm the
small employers .

• The more variation the contribution and participation requirements are among
members (i . e ., allowing the employer to contribute less to the employee ' s
coverage) , the greater the degree of adverse selection wi thin the CHPAs will
become , causing higher cla i m costs among members , and the less competitive
CHPAs become.
• Consumers , insurers , and CHPA boards are already experiencing widespread confusion
from the number and complexity of changes being made to the new CHPAs and
the Florida ' s heal th care system .
Continued changes will further delay
implementation , as well as increase administrative costs .
Alternative Proposal
•Allow CHPAs to meet the needs of small employers
legislators - let CHPAs be "market makers ."

as

originally intended by

• Do not expand CHPAs beyond what is prescribed in the current laws ; confine CHPAs
to the segment of the market - small groups - for which they were designed .
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MANAGED COMPETITION COMPONENT OF SB1914

Background
Managed competition is a model for health care reform that has received a lot of
attention at the state and national level .
Developed by the Jctckson Hole Group ,
the original managed competition model proposes a market - oriented approach to heal th
care reform . Rather than relying on direct government control of the health care
system , managed competition proposes new ru l es for competition to improve the private
market system .
In this new market , health plans compete for business based on the
value of their products , not primarily on their ability to enroll healthy customers .
To bring about these changes , managed competition restructures the heal th care market
around large purchasing alliances and competing heal th plans .
It emphasizes managed
care and gives tax incentives for contracting with managed care plans .
The federal government will probably seek to restructure the national health care
system around some form of managed competition that permits state flexibility in
its implementation . Many states are considering introducing versions of managed
competition to reform the health care market within their borders . Washington and
Florida have already legislated different versions of managed competition.
Analysis
The managed competition model attempts to improve the efficiency of health care
delivery and financing in the private market . Under managed competition , " sponsors "
arrange coverage and "manage " competition among health plans on behalf of their
members . Large employers act as sponsors for their employees in much the same way
they do now . New structures , regional purchasing alliances , act as sponsors for
individuals and small employers .
Individual employees in both large and small
companies , choose a health care plan from among those offered . Health care plans
combine insurer and prov i der responsibilities by assuming risk and providi ng heal th
care to enrollees .
Heal th plans compete on the basis of price .
Purchasing
all i ances provide consumer information to members so that they can make informed
decisions about which health plan to purchase .
Florida introduced a version of managed competition in the Heal th Care and Insurance
Reform Act of 1993 (SB 1914) . Small employers (1 - 50 employees) will have the option
to enroll in one of Florida ' s eleven newly- created purchasing alliances , called
Community Heal th Purchasing Alliances (CHPAs) . Medicaid beneficiar i es wil l be able
to enroll in CHPAs after state agency " consultation " with the state legislature .
State employees may be required to enroll in CHPAs if this move ensures comparable
or richer benefits for state employees at no extra cost to the state .
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida Position
Reform of the health care system is necessary and shou l d support programs that
encourage private sector solutions . We support the intent of the Health Care and
Insurance Reform Act of 1993 to use the private market system to improve the health
care system in Florida , and the state ' s efforts to improve competition. We also
IP35 - August 11 ,
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support the legislation ' s reliance on managed care as a basis for reforming the
state ' s health care system .
However , Florida ' s current version of managed
competition may not be the best way to obtain the desired effects of greater
competition , nor the best way to increase access to quality health care coverage
at affordable prices .
Specific areas of concern include the following :
• It will be crucial for the state to give these reforms time to work . The public ' s
expectations about SB 1914 ' s effects and especially about the timetable for
improvements may be unrealistic .
Because of the size and complexity of
Florida ' s health care delivery and financing system , any beneficial change
will require adjustments from many different parties .
If the public , the
legislature , or the governor expect overnight results from SB 1914 , or any
other reforms , they will be disappointed .
• The purchasing alliances have a chance at being successful to the extent that they
act as market makers - bringing buyers and sellers together .
If they try
to micromanage the system by telling providers what they can do or how they
should provide services , they will fail and will add a huge layer of bureaucracy
to the system with no real benefit .
• The law , correctly , makes information on quality and cost a centerpiece o f Florida ' s
reforms .
Better information on the value buyers are receiving for their
heal th care dollars is essential to making the system work better . The problem
is that many of the data and tools necessary to provide better information
are only now being developed .
If the state tries to push too fast in requiring
physicians , hospitals , AHPs and CHPAs to disseminate and use information
that doesn ' t exist , it could do more damage than good .
• Unlike the Jackson Hole managed competition model in which the board of directors
is elected by the purchasing alliance members , in Florida ' s version of managed
competit i on board members are political appointees .
This raises concerns
about the politicization of the purchasing alliances in Florida .
It increases
the likelihood that CHPAs will act based on political influence rather than
the interests of CHPA members .
• The community rating provision for small groups may not have the unintended result
of reducing the number of uninsured Floridians . While community rating will
make health plans more affordable to high risk groups , it will raise prices
to many more low risk groups . These low risk groups are the people we need
to bring into the market to make the whole system work better ; the higher
prices will not encourage their participation .
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MANDATORY MEDICAID ENROLLMENT IN HMOs

Issue
•At the end of the 1993 session , Senate Bill 1802 (Appropriations Implementing
Law) was passed . This bill requires all licensed health maintenance
organizations having less than 40 percent of their enrollment comprised
of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to contract with the AHCA to enroll
Medicaid beneficiaries up to at least five percent of their total enrollment .
• Since this mandate was passed in the Appropriations Implementing Law , it must
be proposed and passed this year to remain in effect .
• Current Medicaid HMO payment is at 95 percent of Medicaid fee - for - service
reimbursement rate . Medicaid fee - for-service reimbursement is
approximately 68 percent of Medicare fee-for - service reimbursement rate .
Effects
• Medicaid beneficiaries will not be helped by this mandate . They are a unique
population that have certain special health care needs . Medicaid
beneficiaries will be placed in the position of seeking services from
providers and organizations who can not or do not want to serve them .
• Medicaid HMO rates are low ; under the Florida Health Security Program they would
be even lower in the future relative to HMO costs . To stay in business ,
HMOs will have to pass the additional cost on to the non - Medicaid HMO members .
As a result , non - Medicaid HMO members end up subsidizing the state ' s
Medicaid program.
• Florida HMOs will experience greater regu l ation and much higher costs . HMOs
will be less likely to expand their business.
This law wi ll l imit the access
of many Floridians to HMOs , a proven cost saving alternative .
• This mandate discourages new managed care companies from entering the Florida
market .
It will limit competition and eventually drive health care costs
even higher .

• The Florida Health Security Program would require that an additional 400 , 000
Medicaid beneficiaries be enrolled in HMOs .
If the state uses a mandate
rather than adequate funding to reach that level of enrollment , the state
will need a mandate much higher than five percent (an independent study
by Tillinghast estimated that the additional 400 , 000 Medicaid beneficiaries
would make Medicaid enrollees 36 percent of today ' s total HMO population .
Therefore , the negative impact of a mandate would be even greater .
Alternative Proposal
Health plans should not be mandated to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in HMOs .
If the state provides adequate payment rates , health plans will compete to serve
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Medicaid enr o llees (as happens now in South Florida) . This would be best for
the Medicaid beneficiaries as well as the entire Fl o rida HMO p opulation .
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MANDATORY POINT - OF- SERVICE
Proposal
Mandatory po i nt - of - service health maintenance organization (POS HMO) legislation
would mandate HMOs and Florida employers to offer a POS product to employees in
addition to the standard HMO product .
Myths
Organized medicine promotes mandated POS HMO as

oproviding choice to many Floridians who currently lack choice
ohaving no effect on the cost of HMO coverage in Florida
ogood public policy
oa good " compromise solution " between organized medicine and the position of
network - based plans , Florida employe r s , and members of network - based plans
The Facts
Do Floridians lack choice?
- No .

Most --- 99%
of the 11.2 million Floridians with health care coverage
have a choice of provider or of types of health care plans.
The number

who choose HMOs --- the type of health plan i n which members agree to use
network providers --- is growi ng . Approximately 1% of insured Floridians
are enrolled in HMOs by their employers without the choice of another type
of plan.

Will mandated POS HMO really have no effect on the cost of HMO coverage in Flor i da?
-Mandated POS HMO will increase the cost of HMO coverage for Floridians:

This legislation would force many HMOs into a new type of business . Start - up
costs and the costs of maintaining a new and different business wi l l drive
up costs for HMOs . To stay in business , HMOs must pass these costs along
to customers .
In addition to higher premiums , employers will face increased costs when
they have to educate employees about and administer the government product
in addition to the health care benefits they already provide.
Is mandated POS HMO good public po l icy?
POS HMO is a new and evolving product .
It is a good example of what a market
does well : customers wanted a personal physician - based network product
that also allowed employees to receive benefits out - of - network .
POS HMO

1

was developed to meet that need , and while it is still a very young product
with relatively small enrollment , it is an important part of the product
mix available to Floridians . Mandating POS HMO is an example of bad
regulation:
it will make the HMO product line more expensive and freeze
the mandated product in its current form, not allowing it to evolve as the
market and customers' needs change.
This mandate will likely increase the
number of uninsured Floridians .
IP36 . 1 -
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The POS HMO will be a product dictated by the government , not defined by
customers . Many HMOs and employers will have to admin i ster three HMO
products : the standard HMO already popular , the POS HMO that customers
want , and the government - mandated POS HMO product .
The cost of maintaining
a product that cannot change to meet customer needs and that eventually
few purchase will increase the cost of HMO coverage without adding any value
to Florida ' s health care system .
Some employers offer
for both the employer
administrative costs
health care coverage

HMOs to their employees as the only affordable option
and the employee . Mandating another option will raise
for both the HMO and the employer and could put quality
out of reach .

Why is mandated POS HMO a good " compromise solution? "
-It's not; there is simply no need for a mandate.
Floridians already have a wide
choice of products in the heal th care market - - - including POS HMO products .
Nearly all i nsured Floridians have a choice among various types of health
plans .
This proposal would add unnecessary regulation and in the process
raise HMO prices and limit the flexibility of the market to meet customers '
needs .

Action Recommended
None.

The bottom line is there is no problem to which mandated POS HMO is a solution .
Florida doe s not need unnecessary regulation .
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MEDACCESS

Background
Med.Access is a new program created under the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act
of 1993 . The program will be developed and administered by the Agency for Health
Care Administration (AHCA) to offer health insurance to people with incomes up to
250 % of the federal poverty level and who are not served by Medicaid .
It is an
insurance program designed to be sustained by the premiums paid by participants .
Med.Access is being presented as part of the state ' s attempt to provide all Floridians
with health care coverage .
Analysis
With the creation and implementation of Med.Access , the state is moving into the
insurance business (premium collection , provider contracting , claims payment , etc) .
However , the AHCA will have special advantages over private insurers who might
be interested in serving this population , since Med.Access will be exempt from
regulations that add cost to private insurance products . With the exemption from
regulations applicable to private insurers , the state will now be competing with
the private market , but not on a " level playing field ." By establishing the state
in the insurance business , Med.Access lays the foundation for increasing government
control of the health care industry .
Position
The role of government should be to facilitate private market solutions to health
care system problems . The government should not become an advantaged competitor
to the private market system .
• If the state believes that exemptions from its own regulations are necessary to
provide affordable health care coverage , then this exemption should be
extended to private insurers to encourage the development of low cost products.
• An effective private market system can provide universal health care coverage
efficiently , at affordable prices to all Floridians . We support the intent
of the state to ensure that all Floridians receive health care coverage.
However , we do not believe that the state can provide this service more
cost - effectively than the private market , nor that a government - run program
can respond as effectively as a private market to the changing needs of
consumers .

IP37 - August 11 ,

1993

Medicaid is a large issue that needs further analysis to establish our definitive
position.
This paper is intended to provide background for discussion of what
we should say about this program in the core proposal .

MEDICAID

Background
In 1965 the Medicaid program was created to finance minimum health care coverage
for people who were denied access to care because of their inability to pay for
it.
Medicaid is a means - tested program.
An individual ' s income level and other
resources are considered in determining eligibility for the program . Medicaid
is a federally mandated program , jointly financed by the state and federal
governments , and administered by the states .
The federal government sets broad
financial and service guidelines for the Medicaid program , but states have great
flexibility in its implementation . State responsib i lities for the program
include : ( 1) establishing eligibility standards ; ( 2) determining the type , amount ,
duration , and scope of services ; (3) setting the rate of payment for services ;
and , ( 4) administering the program . This results in wide variations between states
on income eligibility requirements , covered services , and provider participation
in the program .
Medicaid is a program of federal requirements and state choices . States define
their programs to meet federal requirements but can choose to broaden coverage
to include other benefits and groups . To receive federal funds , states must offer
a minimum set of federally mandated services to individuals participating in the
welfare - related Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) programs .
Federal legislation during the 1980 ' s broadened
these guidelines to include additional groups of people (such as pregnant women)
to whom states must offer coverage.
However , under the current guidelines , there are categories of people who will
never be eligible for Medicaid although they are poor . This is because Medicaid
eligibility is contingent not only on meeting strict financial requirements , but
also on meeting certain federal and state designated status requirements . Being
poor does not automatically qualify individuals for coverage under Medicaid ,
although the program was originally intended to help states finance medical
coverage for their poor constituents .
For example , 1 25 year - old childless man
who works full time at a minimum wage job earning just over insurance , cannot
qualify for Medicaid coverage .
Federal and state designated status categories can be classified broadly into
the following groups :
Mandatory Groups

• Low-income single - parent families and two - parent families with an unemployed
princ i pal earner (historically composed of individuals receiving cash
assistance through the AFDC program , although the guidelines for inclusion
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in this group have been expanded recently)
• Low - income pregnant women and children who do not qualify for AFDC
• Low- income Medicare beneficiaries (Medicaid pays only required Medicare premiums ,
deductibles and coinsurance unless the beneficiary qualifies for Medicaid
in some other way)
• Low- income aged , blind, or disabled individuals (usually individuals receiving
cash assistance through the SS I program, but includes some who do not)
• Persons requiring institutional care (individuals receiving care in nursing
facilities or intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded)
Optional Groups

In addition to the mandatory Medicaid groups, states have the option to extend
Medicaid coverage to several other groups .
• States may expand the eligibility requirements for the mandatory groups to allow
more people into the Medicaid program if federal funding has been made
available for them
• Medically Needy (individuals whose in come or resources are above the levels
generally required for eligibility but who have incurred large medical
expenses)
• State - only Eligible (groups o f people the state wishes to include , but who do
not qualify for matching federal funds)
Historically, these eligibility groups have been separated into two broader
classifications -- the " categorically needy " and the "medically needy ."
Individuals whose eligibility for Medicaid was linked to the welfare program were
considered " categorically needy ." Individuals eligible for Medicaid under
special Medicaid rules were classified as "medically needy ." Over the years ,
nonwelfare - related groups have been added to the "categorical l y needy " list making
the distinction between the two groups less clear . The difference between the
categor ically and medically needy groups is imp ortant , however , since the scope
of services that states must cover for the categorica l ly needy is much broader
than those for the medically needy . This can have great impact on state and federal
budgets since they share in financing the program .

Analysis
Medicaid expenditures have received increased attention from the federal and state
governments during the past few years . The federal government is facing a record
deficit and state governments are increasingly challenged to meet their
const ituents' needs with fewer resources.
In FY 1992 , Medicaid cost federal ,
state , and local governments $118 . 8 billion , about 15 % of total national health
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spending .
The federal share is estimated to have been $67 . 8 billion , about 57 %
of the total . Medicaid is the third largest social program in the federal budget ,
after Social Security and Medicare , and is one of the fastest growing components
of federal and state budgets .
There are several reasons why Medicaid costs have
ball oo ned .
In 1984 , the Federal government began An incremental , but continuous , broadening
of the eligibility criteria for participation in the Medicaid pr o gram . This
coincided wi t h an economic downturn that increased the number of people eligible
to apply for Med i ca i d . Additionally , between 1 985 and 1991 , the rate of average
annual increase in health care inflation was at its highest since the early 1970 ' s .
While there is controversy over how much of the percentage increase in medicaid
spending is attributable to medical price inflation , there is agreement that
changes in the practice of medicine (in the amount and intensity of services
provided -- especially to hospitalized patients -- and in the use of new , expensive
technology) have increased the cost of medical care .
In Florida , the combined effect of these factors resulted in unprecedented growth
in the Medi caid program during the 198 0 ' s .
The number of Medicaid claims processed
more than doubled from 1980 to 1990 .
In FY 1980 , there were 15 , 096 , 933 Medicaid
claims processed ; in FY 1990 , 48 , 633 , 073 claims were processed .
The average cost
per year per eligible tripled .
In FY 1981 , the average cost per eligible was
$1 , 149 ; in FY 1990 , it was $3 , 443 .
Legal decisions in the late 1980 ' s directly impacted state Medicaid payment rates .
Medicaid law required hospitals and nursing homes to be paid rates that are
" reas onab le and adequate " to meet the costs of facilities that are " efficiently
and economically " operated .
Providers have successfully brought suits against
several states for payment rates that failed to meet this standard . As a
consequence , several states increased their payments to these providers .
Demographics and epidemiology are also influencing Medicaid spending as the U. S.
population ages and the incidence of AIDS increases .
These factors especia l ly
impact Florida which has a large retirement community and one of the highest per
capita rates of AIDS .
Al though Medicaid was intended to increase the poor ' s access to mainstream medical
care , it has not been very successful in this regard . Medica i d provides health
care coverage to specific groups among the low- income population .
In 1991 , 42 . 2 %
of Medicaid expenditures paid for long - term care (nursing home care , i ntermediate
care facilities for the mentally retarded , and home heal t h care) .
The aged and
disabled accounted for nearly two - thirds of the costs of acute and long - term care
(among the Medicaid elderly , two - thirds of Medicaid spending in FY 1990 was for
nursing home care) .
In 1992 , 36 % of the U. S . population below the federal poverty
level did not have insurance coverage or fall within the Medicaid eligibility
requirements .
Medicaid ' s f inancing and delivery systems
occurred since the program ' s inception in
is inherently inflationary .
Physicians are
hospitals are reimbursed on a cost or per
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do not reflect the changes that have
1965 .
The Medica i d financing system
reimbursed on a fee - for-service basis ,
diem basis , depending on state

regulations.
Reimbursement practices encourage delivery systems to be slanted
toward providing acute rather than preventive care services .
Providers have no
incentive to provide cost - effective care , although in the mainstream health care
system financing mechanisms are now widely used that encourage providers to offer
preventive care and cost - effective care .
Conclusions
Medicaid needs to be reformed in order to serve its original purpose to provide
low- income individuals with greater access to mainstream medical care .
• To control the rising cost of preventive and acute care services , Medicaid
beneficiaries should be encouraged to enroll in private managed care systems ,
and the government should work with private industry efforts to include
the Medicaid population in managed care programs . Through reform of the
program , Medicaid benefic i aries wil l receive access to more preventive care
services which will be provided in a high quality , cost - effective manner .
• Long - term care financing comprises a significant portion of Medicaid
expenditures . Moving Medicaid beneficiaries into more efficient de l ivery
arrangements for preventive and acute care will not alleviate federa l and
state budget issues . The financing of long - term care for the poor should
be addressed separately.
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MEDICAID REFORMS

Background
The Medicaid program does not fully protect the indigent from high health care
expenses , or promote efficient patterns of care -- that is the lowest use of resources
to achieve given outcomes .
Many poor people are screened out of Medicaid by
categorical welfare eligibility rules .
Extremely low payment rates discourage
providers from serving Medicaid patients , leading to inappropriate patterns of care
such as use of emergency rooms for primary care , and , in some cases , delayed and
ultimately costlier care .
Recommendations
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida feels that much work needs to be done to better
understand the role of Medicaid in the overall heal th care system , and specifically
as a program to provide health care for low- income individuals and families . The
following approaches deserve consideration as the state deals with Medicaid issues :
•Analyzing existing Medicaid expenditures
allocated more efficiently by:

to determine whether funds

could be

- determining whether the state is buying services that provide the highest benefit
for the cost .
Consider use of the Oregon approach to establishing
priori ties among services as the basis for reallocation among services ;
and consider shifting some resources to preventive services and those
services provided at the earliest stage of disease.
- determining whether the state is buying services from efficient providers
• Using more selective cont ra cting in buying services , in order to secure a better
price
- using competitive bidding to award contracts to hospitals , physicians, and other
providers
-awarding contracts for some services, such as maternity on a global fee basis to
cover a l l the providers in a given case
• Promoting greater use of managed care programs to serve Medicaid enrollees
- evaluate the cost and quality results of existing use of HMOs and other managed
care programs in Florida and other states ; based on this analysis ,
develop a plan for shifting Medicaid beneficiaries into private managed
care programs
- provide rewards (possibly tax credits) to managed care companies for participating
in the Medicaid program
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MEDICAL PRACTICE PARAMETERS

Background
Medical practice parameters or guidelines are established recommendations for
clinical treatment in specific situations .
Practice parameters can be used by
managed care companies and providers as criteria for judging the necessity or
appropriateness of medical services . A variety of efforts are currently underway
to develop practice parameters .
Recommendations
Practice parameters are an important component of efforts to increase the cost
effectiveness and quality of health ca re . Provider groups , insurers , managed care
plans , employers and the government should work together to design mechanisms for
using practice parameters to determine the appropriateness of medical services .
The following points should guide the approach .
• Practice parameters vary widely in the methods used to construct them . We should
look to practice parameters which are based on sound scientific research
(as opposed to the consensus approach) and which are being established at
the national level.
• Study the Value Health Sciences program for using practice parameters and other
leading initiatives to determine their soundness and applicability in Florida .
• Explore the use of medical practice parameters as a defense in medical malpractice
suits , as some other states have begun to do .
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MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY REFORM

In Florida , as in other areas of the country , professional liability is cited by
physicians as well as other key players as a cause of rising medical costs.
The
cost factors include both the direct cost of professional liability insurance
premiums and the practice of " defensive medicine ," i . e ., justifying each action
with d i agnostic results such as l aboratory tests or x - rays .
Others defend the current professional liability tort system by noting the benefits
of the status quo .
They would claim that negligent physicians may only be
disciplined economically , and that other groups charged with quality assurance ,
including the Florida Department of Professional Regulation , professional societies
and hospitals , are ineffective and/or unwilling to discipline physicians .
Some approaches to malpractice reform that should be considered are :
1 . Use of binding arbitration for malpractice claims could be built into contracts
between/among network physicians , hospital and members/subscribers
2 . Use of the fol l owing as a means to reduce the number of suits filed :
- expanding the no - fault medical injury concept; and
- revitalizing and expanding the state patient compensation funds
3.Review and redefinition of the process of tort law making it more rational and
less emotional by :
- increasing the plaintiff ' s burden of proof in malpractice cases from " greater weight
of the evidence " to " clear and convincing "
- expanding juries from six to a greater number of persons in medical malpractice
cases
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Background

Medical Savings Accounts would allow people to use tax exempt income to pay for
medical expenses . Some proponents see them as an alternative to the comprehensive
insurance or heal th benefit programs most people have today ; the MSA could be combined
with a catastrophic policy to provide coverage for both routine and high cost , less
probable medical expenses.
-Most often proposed as income tax reform - Republicans will propose at national
level this year .
- FMA is proposing at state leve l with corporate income tax relief for small businesses
that create MSAs for their employees .
Assessment
Pros
- Might put some people in a better position to pay for medical care .
- Uses pure insurance - avoids the moral hazard problem for rout i ne medical expenses .
- Consistent with our stated philosophy of encouraging choice among a wide variety
of approaches for protecting against medical expenses .
Cons
- Under some proposals , MSAs threaten group insurance because the best risks would
take advantage of MSAs and poor risks would remain in the group .
- Under some conceptions , entire employer groups would convert to MSAs/catastroph i c
insurance . That would make MSAs less a threat to group insurance but it would
still be anti - managed care .
- The FMA proposal is probably not viable since small business payment of corporate
income taxes is extremely rare .
Potential BCBSF Posit i on
- Support MSAs that could be used for COBRA premiums , conversion policies , periods
of unemployment , and long - term care .
- Support MSAs for expenses not covered
accumulation beyond one year).

by

insurance

( change

FSAs

to

allow

- Support MSAs for individuals whose employers don ' t provide insurance .
- Oppose MSAs that would spl i t groups - don ' t allow employers to provide a
comprehensive health benefit to some and an MSA/catastrophic program for
others .
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MEDICAL LIABILITY

Issue
To achieve greater cost containment, the 1993 Legislature directed AHCA to consider
tort reform as a mechanism for reducing health care costs .
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
• Studying the effectiveness of previous reform measures and the impact of other
recent health care reforms on the costs and efficiency of Florida ' s medical
liability system .
• Enacting legislation to allow a provider ' s failure to comply with a state - endorsed
practice parameter to be admitted as evidence that the provider did not meet
the prevailing standard of care .
Effects
•Patients would suffer if their physicians cannot adopt innovative techniques for
fear that any deviation from the state - endorsed practice parameters would
lead to malpractice litigation .
Mandating the use of practice parameters
is inappropriate government intrusion in medical practice .
•The overall cost of health care would continue to rise as providers:

- become over reliant on practice parameters which may be excessive or unnecessary ,
and
-" defensive " medical practices increase to assure demonstrated compliance with
parameters .
As a result , Floridians would see health insurance premiums rise .
•Physician discontent would greatly increase with such a significant increase in
external interference in the practice of medicine , further lowering physician
morale and convincing new physicians not to practice in Florida.
•Patients will be put at risk needlessly if unnecessary or excessive procedures
or tests are performed in response to this legislation .

Alternative Proposal
The wording of AHCA ' s proposal on practice parameters is the opposite of the standard
legislation adopted by other states . Most states have adopted legislation stating
that adherence to a practice parameter can be admitted as a defense in a malpractice
action . The AHCA ' s proposal takes the opposite stance , allowing failure to follow
a practice parameter to be introduced against a medical provider in a malpractice
action.
This would only worsen the malpractice crisis .
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A more appropriate approach to tort reform as a mechanism to contain costs would
be to concentrate on 1) reducing defensive medicine practices ; 2) developing usable
standards for appropriate care ; and 3) testing alternative dispute resolution
techniques .
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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Background
The medical malpractice system influences all aspects of the health care system :
cost , access , and quality .
Cost

The cost factors include the direct costs of professional liability insurance
premiums which can exceed 20 percent of a physician ' s revenue , and the practice
of " defensive medicine ," (i . e ., justifying each action with diagnostic procedures
such as laboratory tests or x - rays) .
Recent studies indicate that defensive
medicine may increase medical costs by as much as 15 percent of the cost of physicians '
services (Relman , 1990) .
In a 1991 medical malpractice background paper , the Blue Cross and Blue Sh i eld
Association estimated that health care premiums might be reduced by 1 - 1 . 5 percent
if tort reform lowers physicians ' liability premiums by 10 - 20 percent.
Access

Whereas some people may be receiving more care than they really need because of
defensive medicine practices , others may find their access limited by providers '
malpractice concerns . A 1987 survey conducted in Maryland found that 51 percent
of physicians made practice changes to reduce or avoid risk .
Twelve percent of
internists , 20 percent of family or general practice physicians , and 30 percent
of OB/GYNS indicated cutting back on the number of high - risk patients they treated
(Weisman , et . al ., 1989) .
Quality

The current malpractice system provides little evidence of i mproving the quality
of care by deterring negligence .
First , only substandard care that results in injury
is identified and penalized . Many times negligent care does not cause lasting injury
and thus goes unrecognized and unpenalized .
Second , relatively few claims are filed . A recent study found that there was one
malpractice tort claim filed by patients for every 7 . 5 negligently i nflicted i njury
(Weiler , et . al ., 1992) .
Third , the system for recovering damages is imprecise and often arduous . A plaintiff
in a malpractice case must establish the duty or standard of care owed to him/her ,
prove the provider ' s conduct breached that duty or standard of care , and demonstrate
that it caused harm that constitutes legally compensable damaged .
Fourth , the effectiveness of malpractice claims in deterring negligence is diluted
by liability insurance (which is rarely experience rated) and the physician ' s ab i lity
to absorb liability premium expenses by raising prices to patients .
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Finally , the current litigious climate has caused an erosion of the patient/doctor
relationship . This erosion is perceived as reducing quality by reducing the level
of trust between doctors and patients which is necessary for the best care . Many
physicians feel the threat of a public suit and trial has changed their relationships
with patients to one of suspicion.
Efforts to Reform the Malpractice System
During the early 1970s and again in the mid- 1980s , significant increases in premiums
for professional liability insurance for physicians , and in some cases the refusal
of insurers to offer coverage , caused what is commonly referred to as medical
malpractice crises .
Following each crisis , states enacted legislation to reform the professional
liability system .
These efforts focused on improving the availability and
affordability of medical liability coverage for physicians .
Some reforms ,
particularly alternative dispute resolution systems and no - fault compensation
funds , have also sought to improve the injured person ' s access to a fair hearing
and to increase the proportion of system cost that goes toward compensation of claims .
In Florida , the skyrocketing cost for professional liability insurance prompted
the Florida Legislature to enact a number of reform measures in 197 5 . These efforts
(mandated internal risk - management , informed consent , a patient ' s compensation
fund , and medical liability mediation panels) stabilized the malpractice system
in Flor i da until the mid- 1980s .
Between 1979 and 1986 , professional liability claims increased at an annual compound
rate of 16 percent (Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort System ,
1987) . The increase in claims was followed by a significant increase in premiums .
The result of these premium increases caused some insurers to restrict and even
eliminate liability coverage for certain high risk medical special ties (e . g .,
obstetrics/gynecology) .
In response ,
the Florida Legislature passed the
" Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 " that further reformed
Florida ' s professional liability system .
Provisions include :
• certificate of good faith must be provided by the plaintiff ' s attorneys based on
reasonable investigation prior to initiation of a malpractice lawsuit ;
• per - suit notice requirements and screening periods ;
• comparative fault and contribution in malpractice cases ;
• disciplinary actions for engaging in unnecessary diagnostic testing ;
• court ordered non - binding arbitration ;
•mandatory settlement conferences ; and
• percentage fee schedules for attorney ' s fees in malpractice cases .
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BCBSF Positi o n
The current medical malpractice system is a growing concern for health plans -both because of the increased claims cost from defensive medicine practices and
because of the potent i al exposure to increased liability .
Defensive medicine practices and the added care necessitated when providers are
negligent contribute to the overall inflati o n of health care costs . Additionally ,
health plans that adopt a more active role in health benefits management (i. e .,
the development of managed care products ) increase their potential liability when
adverse medical outcomes occur .
To address these concerns and c o ncerns about the overall health care system , Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida is supportive of reform efforts that focus on :
1) reducing professional liability premiums and defense medicine practices ; 2)
developing usable standards for appropriate care ; and 3) testing alternative dispute
resolution techniques .
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BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA'S PROPOSAL FOR MEDICARE REFORM

We believe that curbing Medicare spending trends for the long term necessitates
significant improvement in the efficiency with which the program operates .
The
most effective way to improve efficiency is to restructure the program to take
advantage of private market methods . We support restructuring the Medicare program
to gradually move beneficiaries away from the current government - run , traditional
insurance program and into the mainstream , private - market based U. S . health care
system.
This paper describes our vision of the restructured Medicare program in the next
decade.
It also describes the significant technical barriers which must be overcome
to establish this vision .
These technical barriers require the development of
mechanisms , processes , and systems not available today and therefore , require some
time . Finally , given the urgent need for improvement in the Medicare program , the
last section offers recommendations for changes which can be undertaken immediately ,
to begin moving the current program in the right direction .
The Medicare Program of the Future

Overview
The Medicare program of the year 2005 should look quite different from the program
in existence today .
Changes made over the next decade will result in a program
which uses competition to achieve efficiency and enhances the exercise of personal
responsibility and consumer power in heal th care .
These changes ensure the
viability of the program for future beneficiaries .
This future Medicare program offers beneficiaries a wide range of choices among
competing health plans .
Beneficiaries share in the cost of coverage and select
plans which best match their own perceptions of value -- where value is a combination
of quality and cost . They use comparative information about the various plans to
make their selection.
The government provides Medicare participants a set amount
of funding regardless of the plan they choose .
For new Medicare beneficiaries , the transition from the private market - based system
enjoyed during their working eyars to the Medicare program is relatively easy , since
they continue to participate in that same private market system .
Older
beneficiaries appreciate the restructured program because it maintains the " safety
net ," yet allows them to exercise greater consumer power and control over their
health care decision- making.
Competition among health plans for customers in this large and growing market is
strong . The competitive climate ensures that heal th plans 1) strive for efficiency
in health care delivery and plan administration , and 2) continually innovate to
improve existing products and offer new products which effectively meet their
customers ' needs . This market is open to entry by all health plans meeting basic
standards for solvency and quality which are set , in large part , by private
organizations .
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Regulation of the Medicare program is limited and focuses on ensuring fair
competit i on , so that the successful health plans and providers are th o se which
provide the greatest va l ue to beneficiaries . The government does not manage product
design or the deli very of heal th care . Private heal th plans detect and punish fraud
and other system abuses . Funding for other programs , such as medica l research and
graduate medical education , is handled directly through other government funding
mechanisms .

Program Characterist i cs
This restructured program incorporates the following general characteristics .

Beneficiary Choice . Medicare beneficiaries are able to choose from a wide array
of products , ranging from classic HMOs , through point - of -service managed care
products such as PPOs , to traditional coverage . 1 Catastrophic coverage plans are
also available .
Federal law preempts state laws l imi ting the availability of
classic HMOs or other types of managed care products . Beneficiaries select health
plans annually during an o pen enrollment period . Beneficiaries have comparative
information on health plans for a defined set o f characteristics ; much o f this
information comes fr om private organizations offering health plan c omparisons and
evaluations .
Benefits .
A basic set of benefits is available to all Medicare participants .
Establishing a benefit standard aids comparison across health plans and ensures
a certain level of services arecovered for all beneficiaries, regardless of the
plan selected . All health plans particiapting in the Medicare market offer this
baisc package . Health plans may offer products with additional benefits, but the
basic benefit package marks the minimun level of coverage .
Medicare Contribution .
The Medicare contribution toward coverage reflects a
sliding scale based on a beneficiary ' s income.
The Meedicare contribution could
be based on the premium prices of competing health plans ; or it could be independent
of the cost of health care coverage . The Medicare contribution level ensures that
beneficiaries 1) have financial incentives to seek efficient health plans , and 2)
have the financial resources to choose among several plans when making their purchase
decisions .
Eligibility.
Eligibiilty for Medicare benefits remains the same.
To maximize the
incentives for selecting efficient heal th plans , all benef i viar ies with income above
the federal poverty level pay something toward the cost of coverage .
Dual
eligibility for Medicaid acute care benefits is no longer necessary . Lower - income
Medicare beneficiaries receive the maximum Medicare contribution , which provides
the full premium cost of several health plans offered in their area . doing away
with dual eligibility raises a set of difficult problems that must be resolved ,
but this step is important for reducing program complexity and ensuring adequate
1

The entire range of products might not be available in every
depending on that market ' s particular characteristics .
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market

financing for Medicare participants .
Pricing/ Payment .
Premium pricing is set by health plans competing for business
in the competit i ve Medicare market .
In order to attract customers , plans have strong
incentives to achieve quality care and service at the lowest possible price .
Product Flexibility.
Health plans are able to develop and offer new and innovative
products and services to Medicare beneficiaries , as long as the products cover at
l east the basic set of benefits . This flexibility in product design and development
allows the strangth of the market towork for Medicare beneficiaries : their consumer
demands and , to some extent , different needs will drive the development of new
products . A weakness ofgovernment programs is that they become frozen in the form
in which they are implemented .
Over - regulation would thwart the market and
contradict the reasons for using private market methods .

Health Plan / Provider Participation .
Health plans and providers can participate
in the Medicare market by meeting basic quality and financial criteria , and by
agreeing to provide certain comparative information for consumers . Private market
organizations play a large role in setting the standards for health plans and
providers .
Governance .
The government finances care for Medicare beneficiaries .
It has
oversight responsibility to ensure that public monies are spent respnosibly . The
goernment does not manage/direct product design or the delivery of care .
There
are a variety of alternatives for establishing and enforcing fair rules of
competition which ensure that the plans providing the best value (lowest price for
a given level of quality and service) are the ones that succeed in the Medicare
market .
Non - government alternatives , such as boards or commissions , should be
seriously explored . Under any alternative , Medicare regulation is streamlines and
focuses on performance . In the competitive Medicare market , private health plans
take the lead in identifying and eliminating fraud and abuse in the system .

Barriers to Establishing the Future Medicare Program
We believe that the future Medicare program described above will meet the needs
of beneficiaries for quality , accessible care and also bring program costs under
control . However , it is important to recognize that there are significant technical
barriers to implementing the changes needed .
With work , these barriers can be
overcome , but they prohibit establishing the future Medicare program via legislation
in 1995/96 .
Instead, interim changes (described in the next section) must be
implemented while resolving these problems .
1.Adverse Risk Selection
The proposal above establishes Medicare as an individual market
beneficiaries choose their coverage from a variety of health plans.
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in

which

Unlike the group market , individua l markets pose unique risks for health plans .
If a health plan enrolls a greater number of individuals with medical problems
compared to its competitors , its costs will rise higher than competitors ' costs .
The health plan will raise prices to cover its higher costs . Higher prices make
it less attractive to healthy individuals , and its own healthy enrollees switch
to other , lower - priced plans .
Sick individuals stay with the plan and the cost
spiral continues upward , eventually threatening the health plan ' s solvency .
Some insurers in the private individual market , well aware of the dangers of adverse
risk selection , have developed marketing practices to attract and keep healthy
enrollees and limit the number of enrollees with more costly medical problems .
Since a relatively small percentage of Medicare beneficiaries account for a large
portionof the program ' s total costs , a plan can limit losses sign i ficantly through
small reductions i n high risk enrollees .
In order to establish a good individual market for Medicare , in which competition
among health plans is based on quality and cost and not health status , the prob l em
of adverse risk selection must be addressed .
Many proposals assume a " risk
adjuster ," a mechanism which would measure the health of a plan ' s enrollees and
adjust the payment to the heal thp l an up or down according l y .
Thus , this risk
ad j uster would ensure that all heal th plans rece i ve adequate payment because payment
would be linked to the health risk of their enrollees .
The prob l em is that a risk adjuster is a theoretical construct . No adequate risk
adjuster has yet been developed . Much more technical work i s needed to resolve
the issue of adverse risk selection , including work on the potential for a " risk
adjuster ."
2.

Adverse Experience

Adverse risk selection refers to differential risk of il lness at the time of
enrol l ment . However , even if a perfect risk adjuster were developed there would
still be a problem wi th di f ferential exper i ence . In an indivi dua l choice situation ,
differential i l lness experience poses a significant prob l em that is not part of
the group health insurance market . Both health plans and the sick individuals in
this situation have strong incentives to engage in practices which would damage
the market (health plans could encourage sick enrollees to change plans ; people
could change plans to maximize benefits related to their new health care needs) .
This is not a problem in the large group market . Health plans would not drop a
large group because one employee has incurred major health care bills ; nor would
larger groups change plans to accomoda te the hea l th care needs of one member . Much
more technica l work is needed on the problem of adverse experience .
3.

Comparative Information

One of the most important conditions for a competitive market is that consumers
have adequate information about the cost , quality , and other characteristics of
heal th plans .
With adequate information , consumers can base their purchase
decisions on the perceived value of a product .
One of the most striking characteristics of the health care market is that such
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informationsimply has not been available . Both private and public or ganizations
are working on various aspects of this complex issue , including 1) defining and
organizing the development of the tools needed to measure performance inthe health
care system ; and 2) developing standards for information reporting by providers
and health plans .
These tasks require considerable technical work . The definition and measurement
of quality in health care is a good example of some of the challenges . Relative
to the number of treatments and services available , we have little scientific
information on the costs and benefits of different treatments/services for specific
conditions . These data are essential for defining quality care and setting quality
standards .
Further , there are as yet no standard industry mechanisms for gathering
information on specific patient conditions , treatments applied, and results
achieved .
Developing these mechanisms is essential for monitoring and evaluating
provider and health plan performance relative to quality standards .
Progress is being made toward developing meaningful consumer information , but the
preliminary forms of information are in the testing stages , and not ready f or
wholesale application in the Medicare market .
4.Setting the Medicare Contribution Level
Determining the Medicare contribution level is a significant issue .
Policymakers
must consider a number of factors , including the broad range of income levels of
Medi care participants ; the wide variation in medical co sts per Medicare beneficiary
across different areas of the United States ; and the nation's budget and deficit
situation . Technical work is needed to develop a Medicare contribution mechanism
which capitalizes on the price - competition among health plans , is fair to Medicare
beneficiaries with different income levels and living in different areas of the
country , and meets federal budget goals .
5 . Capacity
Most metropol itan areas today have a wide range of tpes of health plans competing
for business in the private market . However , this is not the case for all areas
of the United States . Some areas have few managed ca re products available ; many
rural areas have relatively few providers , making it difficult to develop competign
health care products.
Competition among a variety of health plans is necessary
for optimum pricing and market conditions . More technical study is needed on this
issue to ensure that Medicare benef i ciaries all over the coun t ry will have several
types of products from which to choose , and that compet ition among health plans
is occurring .
Steps to Take Immediately

The Medicare program is in a fiscal crisis .
In order to preserve the viability
of the program for future beneficiaries , the program must be more cost effective
than it has been in the past.
Initial steps toward improvi ng the program should
be taken this year . The longer policymakers wait to implement improvements , the
worse the fiscal problem becomes , and the harsher the measures to mi prove the program
must be .
These initial steps must be consistent with and support the vision of
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policymakers for the Medicare program in the future .
BCBSF proposes that the following changes be implemented in the near - term to begin
gaining control over program costs . These program changes establish the foundation
for the 2005 restructured Medicare program described above.
• Means testing
When the Medicare program was estab lis hed, 4 7 % of the elderly were living in poverty .
Today , only 1 7 % o f the elder ly have incomes below the federal poverty leve l .
Means testing should be established for the Medicare premium amount:
wealthier beneficiaries should pay a higher premium .
Means testing for
deductibles should also be considered .
Al though this makes the payment
process more complex , there are benefits to establishing means testing for
deductibles , and deductibles need to be higher f or this group to have the
intended dampening effect on decisions to utilize benefits .
Lower - income
beneficiaries , on the othe r hand , could have lowe r deductibles , so that the
deductible is not a barrier to seeking needed care .
• Indexing deductibles
The Medicare Part B deductible has been frozen for years and bears little relation
to today ' s cost of health care and health care coverage.
The $100 deductible
is far below the typical deductible for private coverage , an dit i s one -e ighth
of what it was in 1967 , compared to the annual average charges per person .
This low deductible distorts beneficiaries perceptions about the value of
their benefits , and further insulates them from the cost of health care .
It also increases the proportion of Medicare Part B paid by the government .
The deductible amount should increase in relation to increases in the cost
of other goods and services .
Increases in the deductible should be based
on some know measure, such as the Consumer Price Index, so that it better
tracks the cost of Medicare benefits . Means testing for the deductible would
protect lower - income beneficiaries from any adverse effect of the rising
deductible.
• Medigap policy requirements
Many Medicare beneficiaries purchase Medigap policies to cover the out - of - pocket
costs of the Medicare program -- such as deductibles and co -i nsurance . There
are ten standardized Medigap products available to Medicare beneficiaries ,
and Medicare Select . Medicare coverage itself, like all third party payment
arrangements , insulates beneficiaries from the cost of their care . Med i gap
policies magnify this effect .
Thus , many Medicare beneficiaries have few
incentives to seek efficient care .
For this reason , some proposals call for
banning Medigap policies .
However ,

we believe that a more prudent course would be to eliminate the two Medigap products
which offer the most " first dollar " coverage , and replace it with a new Medigap
product which provides catastrophic coverage .
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• HMO enrollment period
Today, Medicare beneficiaries who enroll in HMO plans can disenrol l on a monthly
basis .
This enrollment policy aggravates the problem of adverse risk
selection .
People know their health status and can often predict or p l an
for needed treatments .
Monthly enrollment allows beneficiaries t o make
enrollment decisions based on treatment expectatinos , biasing the enrollment
process .
In most employee groups, including the Federa l Employee Health
Benefits Program ( FEHBP) , enrollees can on ly change their plan choices
annually . Medicare policy should change to set an annual enrollment period
for beneficiaries to choose either traditional Medicare or HMO/CMP coverage .
• HMO application process
HMOs must apply to HCFA to participate in the Medicare program . This application
process can be very lengthy and is a barrier t o HMOs entering the Medicare
market .
HCFA should 1) reduce the time it takes to process and approve
applications from HMOs (b oth initial applications and applications for service
area expansions), and 2) simplify procedures for submitting and processing
applications .
Streamlining the application process requires that HCFA
standardize the policies and procedures o f regional offices reviewing
applications .
•Alternative plan information for beneficiaries
HCFA provides relatively little i nformation to Medicare beneficiaries about the
health plans available to them as alternatives to the traditional Medicare
program . HCFA should work with Medicare participating heal th plans to develop
comparative information for beneficiaries , and send this information to all
beneficiaries periodically .
• Fraud and abuse
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) estimates that 10-20 % of every dollar Medicare
spends is wasted due to fraud and abuse . Unde r any circumstances, this is
an unacceptable figure ; in the current climate of financial crisis for the
Medicare program , this level of waste must be addressed urgently . HCFA needs
to work with Medicare contractors and carriers, law enforcement officials,
and others to establish mechanisms to counteract fraud and abuse in the
program .
•Market ing practices
Health plans at risk for the medical costs of Medicare beneficiaries have strong
financial incentives for trying to enroll beneficiaries with lower health
risks.
Relative l y subtle marketing techn iques, such as offering exercise
classes , can be remarkably effective at attracting a larger portion of younder ,
healthier beneficiaries. Medicare should work with health plans to ensure
that
beneficiaries
receive
structured,
comparable
information
from
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participating health plans in a given regi on .

• Health plan payment
There are many problems with the current method of determining payment for Medicare
alternative health plans .
The government should work with health plans to
develop several alternative models for revising the payment method . These
models should
- eliminate the link between costs for the traditional Medicare (fee-for - service)
program and the payment to alternative health plans
- account for the differential heal th risk of different enrollees , and adjust payment
accordingly
- be piloted in limited demonstrations before a
selected.

IP43.l - Revise d July 13 , 2017

8

new program payment method is

BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA'S PROPOSAL FOR MEDICARE REFORM

• Vision .
Curbing Medicare spending trends for the long term necessitates
significant improvement in program efficiency .
Improving efficiency
requires restructuring the program to take advantage of private market
methods . We support restructuring Medicare to gradually move beneficiaries
away from the current government - run , traditional insurance program and into
the mainstream , private - market based U. S . health care system .
• By 2005 , the Medicare program looks quite different :
- Beneficiaries choose from a range of competing health plans , ranging from classic
HMOs to traditional insurance coverage .
They use comparative
information , much of which is provided by private organizations , to
compare and evaluate competing health plans .
- The government provides Medicare beneficiaries a set amount of funding regardless
of the plan they choose .
The amount is based on a sliding scale
reflecting a beneficiary ' s income .
- A basic

set of benefits is available to all Medicare beneficiaries , aiding
comparison across health plans , but plans can also offer products with
additional benefits .

- Premium prices are set by health plans competing for business in the competitive
Medicare market.
- Health plans and providers can participate in the Medicare market by meeting basic
quality and financial criteria , and by agreeing to provide certain
comparative information for consumers.
- The

government finances care for Medicare beneficiaries and has oversight
responsibilities , but does not manage/direct product development or
the delivery of care . Medicare regulation is streamlined and focuses
on performance.
Private health plans take the lead in identifying
and eliminating fraud and abuse in the system .

• Barriers . There are significant technical barriers to establishing the Medicare
program of 2005 .
These barriers can be overcome , but they require the
development o f mechanisms , processes , and systems not available today . Maj or
barriers include :
- adverse risk selection
- adverse experience
- comparative information
- setting the Medicare contribution level
- capacity
• Steps to take immediately .

The difficulty of removing these barriers prohibits
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establishing the 2005 Medicare program via 1995/96 legislation . Therefore
interim changes are needed to preserve the viability of the program for future
beneficiaries . We recommend that the following steps be taken this year:
- Means testing should be established for the Medicare premium amount -- wealthier
beneficiaries should pay a higher premium .
Means testing for
deductibles should also be considered .

- The size of deductibles should increase in relation to increases in the cost of
other goods and services .
Increases in the deductible should be based
on some known measure , such as the Consumer Price Index, so that it
better tracks the cost of Medicare benefits.
- Eliminate the two Medigap products which o ffer the most " first dollar" coverage ,
and replace them with a new Medigap product which provides catastrophic
coverage .
- Set an annual enrollment period for beneficiaries to choose either traditional
Medicare or HMO/CMP coverage .
- HCFA must reduce the time it takes to 1) process and approve applications from
HMOs (both initial applica t i ons and applications for service area
expansions ) and 2) simplify procedures for submitting and processing
applications .
-HCFA should work with alternative health plans to develop information on these
plans in comparison to traditional Medicare , and send this information
to all beneficiaries periodically .
- HCFA should work with Medicare contractors and carriers , law enforcement off icials ,
and others to establish mechanisms to counteract fraud and abuse in
Medicare .
- HCFA should work with heal th plans to ensure that beneficiaries receive structured ,
comparable information about participating health plans in a given
region .
- HCFA sho uld work with alternative health plans to develop several models for
revising payment methods and set up pilot programs to test these models .
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Medicare is a large issue that needs further analysis to establish our definitive
position.
This paper is intended to provide background for discussion of what we
should say about this program in the core proposal.

MEDICARE
Background
In 1965 Medicare was established as a federally - financed program to ensure that
Americans aged 65 and older would have access to a minimum level of mainstream medical
care . The Medicare program was built around several principles that continue to
shape (and restrict change in) the program . These principles include:
1 . Mainstreaming : Beneficiaries are covered under a program based on the financing
and delivery arrangements that existed in 1965 -- unrestricted choice of
providers who are reimbursed on a fee - for - service basis .
Where federally - approved Medicare
2 . Choice of Participation in Managed Care :
managed care programs exist , beneficiaries have the choice of participating
in them , or continuing under the traditional Medicare financing and delivery
system . Approximately 2 . 5 million (out of 36 million) Medicare beneficiaries
have enrolled in managed care programs .
Beneficiaries are entitled to
3 . Entitlement , Contribution , and Means - Testing :
receive the benefits of Part A Medicare as soon as they become eligible for
Medicare.
Part A pays for most hospital care and some non - physician nursing
home and home heal th care services.
To receive benefits from Part B Medicare ,
beneficiaries must contribute a premium or qualify for coverage by passing
the means test for Supplemental Security Income ( SSI) .
Part B covers
physician services and related expenses .
Most Medicare beneficiaries become eligible at the age
4 . Lifetime Entitlement :
of 65 and remain eligible until death . Medicare will pay for the costs related
to the final illnesses of virtually every beneficiary .
In 198 9 , approximately
one third of all Medicare claims expenses were incurred by the five percent
of beneficiaries who were in their last year of life .
The Medicare program follows the same principles as Social
5 . Pay- As - You - Go :
Security . The cost of benefits for current beneficiaries are paid from taxes
assessed on the currently employed (i . e ., future Medi care beneficiaries) .
Analysis
Medicare expenditures have received increased attention from the federal government
during the past few years .
Entitlement programs are consuming an increasingly
larger portion of federal revenues at a time when the government is pressured to
reduce a record deficit without significantly increasing federal taxes .
Due to
the structure of the Medicare program , the growth in expenditures is virtually
uncontrollable .
IP44 - August 1 993
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The elderly represent the fas t est growing segment of the U. S . population and tend
to use health care services more than other segments of the population . Reducing
Medicare expenditures will necessitate restricting eligibility requirements or
increasing the efficiency of the health care system . The federal government has
chosen to support the latter approach.
It has attempted to encourage greater
efficiency in hospital services through implementation of the DRG reimbursement
program .
However , Medicare ' s physician reimbursement system remains inherently
inflationary .
Medicare reimburses physicians on a fee - for - service basis .
This
encourages over - use of the health care system (more office visits , tests , and
procedures generate more income for physicians) .
In general , the Medicare program
does not promote cost - effective practices , and overall program costs continue to
rise .
Since the mid- 1970 ' s , Medicare costs have risen at a higher rate than
inflation and have outpaced the Consumer Price Index .
Because of its size , the Medicare program has a significant effect on health care
spending and on provider practice patterns .
In FY 1990/91 , Medicare expenditures
were $117 . 8 billion , or 17 % of tota l U. S . health care expenditures .
Medicare
expenditures account for a large portion of overall heal th care spending in Florida .
According to data from the Health Care Financing Administration , total Medicare
expenditures in Florida amounted to $8 . 3 billion in 1991 .
For many health care
providers in Florida , Medicare reimbursement comprises over 50 % of their revenues .
Through the Medicare program , the federal government can amplify or cushion the
impact of heal th care reform .
Reform measures will have a limited impact on
improving the effic i ency of the overall heal th care deli very system if the Medicare
program is not also reformed .
The primary purpose of the Medicare program , when it was established , was to provide
the elderly and disabled with access to mainstream medical care . Mainstream medical
care has changed since 1965 , but Medicare has not.
Since Medicare was established ,
new financing and delivery systems have emerged . Providers are being encouraged
to provide preventive care , and to seek cost - effective methods to deliver preventive
and acute care services . Medicare beneficiaries are increasingly being left behind .
Rather than benefiting from innovations in health care financing and delivery ,
they are being served by providers who are motivated to offer as many services as
possible for acute care needs .
Conclusions
Reform of the Medicare program should be inst i tuted with the goal of bringing it
back in line with mainstream heal th care financing and deli very .
In this way ,
beneficiaries , and tax - payers , can benefit from the program ' s use of health care
systems that provide more services , at a lower cost , while maintaining a high standard
of quality .
Reform will need to be introduced gradually .
Most Medicare beneficiaries are
unfami l iar with the changes that have occurred in mainstream medical care . They
would probably resist mandato r y part i cipation in alternative delivery systems .
Beneficiaries should be encouraged to voluntarily participate in alternative
programs , and the federal government should make these programs more accessible
IP44 - August 1993
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to the Medicare population .
Mandator y participati o n in alternative de l i very
programs can occur after the Medicare populati o n has become mo re familiar with
alternative health c are delivery systems .
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NATIONAL HEALTH BOARD

We believe that the heal th care industry should establish a pri v ate - industry
organization to develop information standards to allow informed c o nsumer purchasing .
This organization wo uld have as members all the stakeholders in the health care
market : consumers , employers , providers , and insurance .
The organizat i on would
be governed by a board of directors composed of representatives from the stakeholder
groups , and would be funded by the stakeholders .
The organization would have five main functions :
1 . define , guide , and organize the development of the to o ls needed to measure
performance in the health care system ;
2 . develop standards for informati on reporting by providers and insurer ;
3 . set standards for disseminating consumer in f ormation ;
4 . coordinate research and development on data reporting ; and
5 . establ i sh a benchmark benefit package .
Blue Cross
and Blue
Shield of
Florida believes
that
creating a
new
government - sponsored national health board is not necessary and would politicize
the process and restrict the public ' s involvement and input .
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PATIENT CHOICE AND MANAGED CARE

Patient Choice of Health Care Plan
The most essential element in managed care programs is the selection of providers
who can best serve the target population .
Selection enables the managed care
organization to work with the numbers and kinds of providers who can most effectively
and efficiently meet the needs of its customers .
For the patient , enrollment in a managed care program entails a sacrifice of some
choice of provider for the lower cost and greater assurance of quality that managed
care plans achieve through selection . Because people have varying needs and wants
regarding cost , quality , and provider choice , an ideal system would afford them
clear opportunities to make tradeoffs based on their own values .
Three conditions help maximize such opportunities :
l . There is a broad array of health insurance and managed care products available
in the marketplace .
They vary from traditional products that leave the
patient on his own to deal with the health delivery system to tightly integrated
HMOs that manage the delivery process.
2 . Employers have good informat i on about the benefits , rules of operation , quality ,
cost , patient satisfact i on , and financial conditions of the various companies
and their products . Employers use this i nformation to provide heal th benefits
that best suit their employee ' s needs .
3.Most employers provide their employees the opportunity to select the plan that
best suits their needs and wants .
The employer supplies comparable
information on each plan in a way that enables the individual employee to
consc i ously and deliberately choose the right plan for his or her family .
We can confidently make two conclusions about these conditions .
First , the Florida
marketplace meets these conditions today and it is meeting them more completely
all the time . We have a broad array of products and it is getting broader .
In
recent years , HMO point - o f - service has become more widely available and care manager
PPOs are also developing . These new products are appearing while the older products
-- HMO , PPO , and traditional , remain available .
Whereas employers once were only able to compare the costs of the plans available ,
they increasingly are getting comparable information on quality and patient
satisfaction . And most employers enable employees to choose from a menu of health
plans . Among Florida HMO enrollees , for example , more than 95 % could have chosen
some other plan .
The second conclusion is that government mandates could not improve patient choices .
For example , a government mandate to require managed care plans to accept any
provider who wants to contract with them (AWP) would significantly reduce patient
choice . Since , as stated above , provider selection is essential to managed care
programs , AWP would effectively eliminate HMOs and similar products from the
marketplace .
IP45

A mandate that managed care plans or employers provide certain products , such as
HMO POS , also does not benefit patient choice . HMO POS and other products are being
developed in response to customer wants and needs . As managed care companies , their
customers and providers gain experience with these products , they will be refined
and improved . A government mandated HMO POS would only stifle this process . The
product would be defined by law and regu l ation , not by patient needs . Managed care
companies would be constrained from working with customers and providers to improve
the product .

Pat i ent Choice Within Managed Care
It should be clear that , in electing a managed care plan , the patient is not giving
up choice al together .
PPOs provide broad choice of physician for most special ties .
For most people who have a personal phys i cian , his participation i n an HMO is an
important criterion in their choice of plan . When new members enroll in an HMO ,
they select a primary care physician (PPC) from the participating provi ders and ,
periodically , they have opportun i ties to change their PPC .
As with the choice of plan , government intrus i on is not l ikely to improve the
patient ' s choice within managed care plans . An example is the " direct access " ( DA)
proposal . While ostensibly providing the patient more freedom to see a spec i alist ,
i t would actually be a government mandate prohibiting pat i ents and managed care
plans from defining a coordinating role for the primary care physician .
If products
that include direct access are needed and wanted in the marketplace , managed care
companies will develop them (as they have with PPOs) .
The AWP , DA , and mandated POS examples point out the paradox of government attempts
to improve choice.
Government mandates , as the term implies , can not broaden choice ,
they can only sustain it .
If government does more to define how people must have
choice , it will only inhibit managed care plans and their customers from improving
choice in ways that meet the patient ' s needs and wants .
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POS COMPROMISE

1 . " Point of Service Plan " means a plan that provides payment of non - emergency ,
self - referred covered health care services obtained from providers who are
not otherwise employed by , not under contract with , and not otherwise
affiliated with the HMO or services obtained from an affiliated specialist
without a referral .
2 .A " nonparticipating provider " is a provider who is not employed by or under contract
with the health maintenance organization .
3. Each heal th maintenance organization shall annually make available in its service
area , upon the request of a group purchaser , a point of service plan as an
option to any other plan offered to the group purchaser . Contracts sold to
individuals shall not be subject to this ACT .
4 . Prior to issuing a point of service plan , a health maintenance organization shall
meet the requirements for health insurers licensed in the State of Florida
(e . g ., reserve requirements) to underwrite benefits payable under the health
maintenance organization contract to nonparticipating providers .
S . The indemnification of subscribers for the covered services of a nonparticipating
provider may be subject to deductibles , copayments , and differentials .
Differentials between the level of coverage offered through the heal th
maintenance organization for these out - of - network heal th care services which
health care services are not otherwise covered by the health maintenance
organization shall not exceed 40 %.
Differences in price between POS and
non - POS products must be actuarially derived . Charges payable under the POS
option may be based upon reasonable and customary charges , as defined under
plan .
6 . A health maintenance organization may also satisfy the requirements of this section
by offering the group purchaser an option of using a preferred provider plan
or indemnity plan of an affiliated insurer .
7.Subject to review by the Department of Insurance , the point of service option
may deny payments to providers who refuse to cooperate with health plan
requirements , including requirements related to quality assurance , data
collection and utilization management .
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PRACTICE PARAMETERS

Issue
The Health care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 requires the AHCA to coordinate
the development , endorsement , implementation , and evaluation of scientifically
sound, clin ically relevant-practice parameters .
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
• Requiring the use of practice parameters by AHPs .
•Authorizing AHCA to deny provider membership in AHPs unless utilization of practice
guidelines and medical review criteria are disclosed along with related
patient outcomes data .
• Disseminating practice parameters as consumer/patient guidelines to aid patient
decision making .
Effects
• Mandating the use of practice · parameters is inappr opriate government intrusion
in medical practice .
Patients who enroll in AHPs would suffer from the
inability of their physicians to adopt innovating techniques .
Citizens
concerned about big government, patients, and providers will not approve
of the heavy handed intrusion i nto the practice of medicine by one governmental
agency .
• The potential for causing confusion and jeopardizing sound clinical practices is
v ery high if these recommendations come about .
Floridians would not be
well - served if this occurs .
• There is limited scientific experience in the application o f practice parameters .
Many versions of practice parameters have been developed by various
organizations , some of which are conflicting.
Mandating that AHPs use
practice parameters would not be in the best interest of Floridians.
•AHPs and their customers would not favor requiring all AHPs to use the AHCA ' s
practice parameters since this could place the AHPs in a situation where
they are contradicting the medical judgment of physicians and health care
specialty societies .
•Providers could be put at greater malpractice risk and their reputation in the

community jeopardized if they deviate from the practice parameters ,
if the medical situation warranted such deviations .
•AHPs

even

(and therefore health plan members)
would experience increases in
administrative costs and bureaucracy as they develop a system to use the
practice parameters .
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Alternative Proposal
• Reaffirm the voluntary and educational use of practice parameters . After all ,
that was the original intention of the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act
of 1993 .
• Educate consumers on the value and effectiveness of universally accepted practice
parameters so that the competitive market can drive their adoption and be
used by health plans and providers .
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PRACTICE PARAMETERS

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida strongly supports the development of
information to help define appropriate patterns of care , against which providers '
performance can be measured .
Critical Issues
•A critical obstacle to efforts to define practice parameters is the availability
of valid and reliable information for identifying effective treatments and
cost - efficient providers .
- Practice parameters are not characterized by a single , standard approach to the
degree of flexibility allowed a practitioner , the structure of a
parameter , or the method used to develop parameters .
The term
"practice parameters " actually refers to a variety of approaches to
guiding appropriate medical care .
Parameters with different levels
of flexibility will have very different effects on patterns of medical
care .
- There is substantial variation being introduced because of the number of players
entering the field of parameter development . Practice parameters are
currently being developed by a variety of organizations , including
specialty societies ,
research groups , purchasers , the National
Institutes
of Health ,
and commercial utilization review and
precertification programs .
The result is tremendous variation in
parameters .
• Practice parameters will undoubtedly alter deli very patterns , but they will
probably not automatically result in reduced costs.
Practice parameters will
have different impacts on costs for different condi tions . For some conditions
a reduction in cost will result , for others a higher cost may result because
a parameter calls for more and more expensive services relative to current
practice .
• The government should encourage and support the development and application of
practice parameters , not take an active or directive role in this process .
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PRICE CONTROLS

• Government - imposed price controls have not successfully controlled costs in health care
or in other industries .
• Price controls tend to have higher volumes and therefore higher total costs .
• Price controls affect everyone equally -- both the bad and the good players .
no means to reward efficiency and effectiveness .

They have

• Limiting prices does not limit costs .
Costs will continue to rise rapidly until we
work on the underlying problems . Limiting prices eventually drives players out
of business , as prices lag behind costs.
• Public price setting is a slow and bureaucratic process .
It will take years , and many
resources , to develop the studies , regulations and enforcement mechanisms to budget
U. S . health care .

•A market - based approach which changes the incentives in the health care system will
be more effective at holding down costs , and rewarding quality , efficiency , and
innovation .
It will be much more responsive to the consumers ' own decisions about
value for their health care dollar .
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PRICING PRACTICES

1.Background

Several major health care reform proposals ca ll for " Community Rating " in setting
premiums for health insurance products.
Some states (including Florida) have
already passed laws requiring insurers to use this pricing system.
Legally imposed Community Rating limits insurers ' freedom to distribute premiums
among purchasers . Without Community Rating , insurers generally charge higher
For those whose
premiums to those whose expected expenses are above average.
expected costs are l ow , premiums fall below the average .
Community Rating is viewed as a solution to the abusive pricing practices of some
insurers.
The most common abuses are called "dura tional rating " and " full
credib i lity experience rating ."
• Durational rating is a system whereby premiums for new insureds are reduced to
reflect the very low early claims levels which result from underwriting.
As t ime passes, the health of those who bought policies changes to
more normal levels , and claims occur ; premiums in later years are
allowed to climb to levels considered unaffordable .
• Full credibility experience rating uses actual claims to determine future premium
levels . For a small employer with a catastrophic c laim, this practice
can produce unaffordable premium levels virtually overnight .
As described below, both systems are based on sound principles ca rried to an extreme .
In fact , full credibility experience rating is the norm for large employers '
plans , though it creates poor results for small employers .
Community Rating represents the opposite end of the spectrum of pricing practices.
It is the averaging of premium costs among purchasers.
" Pure " Community
Rating requires a single, average premium ; "modified " Commun ity Rating or
" Community Rating by Class " allows re cognit i on of some (usual l y demographic)
risk - related factors .

Durational/
Experience
Rating

Modified
Community

Pure
Community
Rating

Rating

2.Community Rating

Under Community Rating, both Durational and Experience rating are eliminated , so
the system is commonly viewed as a " solution" to those abuses . This is the
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It is possible , however ,
most common reason offered by those who favor it.
to prohibit the abuses and avoid unreasonable rate increases , without imposing
the opposite extreme in pricing practice .
Proponents of Community Rating usually claim that it is a " fair " system . No one
is forced to pay more for insurance because of poor heal th status or
greater - than - average chance of using services . Those with known or expected
medical expense needs have a greater need for insurance coverage . Proponents
believe it is more important to reduce premiums for those purchasers than
for those wi th lower - than - average needs .
They argue that all insurance involves pooling risk to some degree , and that this
merely extends that principle .
The implication is that Community Rating
merely redistributes funding for identical total costs , from those with less
need for medical care to those with more .
3."Risk-Adjusted Pricing

The fundamental principles and assumptions applied by those who oppose Community
Rating are :
a . In a free market , total costs will be higher under a Community Rating system .
b. Reassigning the funding of costs from low to high users is not necessarily " fair. "
In order to keep insurance costs reasonable , the "pool " must include many people
with low costs . Unless this happens , the overall (average) premium cost will
rise . At the same time , healthy people , when given a choice , will only buy
i nsurance if they view it as a reasonable deal .
Increasing premiums for heal thy people will discourage purchase , and many will choose
not to join the insurance pool . This makes the average health of those in
the pool poorer , so total costs ( and ave r age premium) will rise . This starts
a spiral of rising costs and of fewer and fewer i nsureds .
Not all high medical expenses can be anticipated ; many people with l ow expected
expenses will , in fact , need significant and costly health care .
This is
the element of pooling which exists in all insurance .
It is also the element
of chance that is most easily overlooked by potential purchasers and by those
who favor the Community Rating concept .
The chance of unexpected illness
or accident argues for keeping premiums low for those in good health , since
they are least likely to recognize risk (and , therefore , most likely to opt
against purchase when the cost is high) .
Failure to purchase until the need
for health services arises has two effects ; it lowers the revenue in the
insurance pool , and in increases the chance of uncovered services used by
otherwise healthy people .
Those who favor risk rating believe it is more " fair " to provide lower - than - average
premiums for those with low anticipated medical expenses than to reduce
premiums for those with higher - than - average needs . This is especially true
when lifestyle - related illnesses and accidents are considered .
IP48 -
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Not surprisingly , proponents of Durational Rating and Experience Rating apply these
same principles .
Durational and Experience Rating provide the lowest
possible premiums for those in good health , t hough they also create the highest
premiums for those in poor health .
Premiums immediately after initial
underwriting are lowest , so the purchase of insurance is appealing to the
majority of the population.
In theory , these practices should d o the most
to minimize the problem of the uninsured , at least in terms of numbers of
people not covered . The unfortunate consequence of the system is that those
who may have had coverage when they are healthy are likely to lose coverage
when they become ill
the exact opposite of the situation created by
Community Rating .

4.Balanced Approach

As in so many other business decisions , a pricing strategy which falls between the
two extremes is best .
It is this strategy which also produces the most rate
stability over time . Statute o r regulation may be needed to prohibit abuse ,
but forcing a pricing system to the other extreme will also surely deter
purchase among those in good health .
One other aspect of Community Rating ' s premium redistribution should also be
mentioned . Charging more to those in good health to subsidize those in bad
health confuses the issues of health status and affordability . The issues
are not necessarily related .
Put simply , poor heal th is not confined to those
with low income .
Attempting to implement social goals through insurance
pricing may have unanticipated and undesirable effects .
5.Impact on the Health Care Problem

Many small businesses do not provide heal th insurance to their employees.
The most
common reason these employers report is that they do not offer coverage because
it is unaffordable . Community Rating does not reduce average premiums ; it
increases them.
It tends to have a negative effect on those who can least
afford to purchase health care coverage . Low- risk customers may choose to
drop coverage and join the ranks of the uninsured .
Community rating is not a good solution for the small group market , and may actually
increase the number of uninsured .
If the Legislation ' s result is that many
high risk groups take advantage of Community Rating , premiums wil l rise and
low cost groups will be inclined to drop coverage .
(Historically , this has
been characteristic of carriers ' attempts to use Guaranteed Issue for small
groups . )
If , on the other hand , few high cost groups join the pool , the
" solution " will have had negligible impact , or even an unfavorable impact ,
on the problem of the uninsured .
Our proposal is to prohibit use of abusive rating practices , perhaps by defining
allowable premium rate deviations from average (per year and/or cumulatively) .
Beyond that , those whose heal th is better - than - average should receive
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treatment which will encourage them t o purchase .
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PRIMARY CARE

Issue
In the Florida Health Security Plan , the Agency for Health Care Administration
identifies the need to provide Floridians with timely primary care .
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
•Adopt into law a definition of primary care .
•Adopt

into law primary care objectives
physicians .

that

include quotas

for primary care

• Study a feasibility of limiting by specialty the number of out - of - state physicians
securing Florida licenses .
Effect
•Heal th care providers and citizens concerned about big government would be concerned
about any state - established quota system .
Quota systems usually have
unintended effects . The private sector is already effecting a change through
managed care programs that feature primary care providers.
•All players in the health care market and patients would be short - changed by the
state ' s efforts to limit the ability of the marketplace to respond creat i vely
and cost - effectively to shortages.
In the past , the marketplace has done
this successfully (e . g ., substituting physician extenders for primary care
physicians).

• Industry innovations in heal th care deli very and financing have resulted in various
forms of managed care. Managed care is now demonstrating excellent results
in containing costs while maintaining quality care .
Floridians will not
benefit from further innovations in managed care if the government f reezes
the system by adopting into law definitions of basic "managed care " concepts .
• Limiting, by specialty , the entry of out - of - state physicians securing Florida
licenses will act as a barrier to the free entry of professionals into the
marketplace .
Competition will suffer and all players in the health care
market, including patients, will be poorly served by the state ' s imposition
of barriers on market entry . A study to implement these actions should not
be pursued .
Alternative Proposal
• The state should encourage the continued evolution of innovative approaches to
the financing and delivery of care to meet Floridians ' needs . The state's
policy for primary care should be consistent with the Florida Health Care
and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 , which intends to use competition and market
forces to improve the accessibility and efficiency of health care . Rather
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than establish quotas for pr i mary care physicians and barriers to licensure
for specialists , the state should rely more on the continued evolution of
managed care to solve specialty distribution problems .
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PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO CARE

I.

Introduction

The United States health care system is among the best in the world.
It provides
users with sophisticated , technologically advanced services , ready access to a broad
range of medical specialties , and care in comfortable surroundings .
These qualities are greatly valued by Americans .
However , there are some aspects
of the heal th care system which must be improved for it to continue to meet Americans '
standards for quality , access , and cost .
Concern about the number of uninsured
Americans , and their risk of financial hardship if they face a severe illness or
injury , is one of the factors underlying efforts to reform the health care system .
The purpose of this paper is to define the problem called " the uninsured ," and to
propose actions needed to make significant progress toward solving this problem
in Florida .

II.

Understanding the problem

Who are the uninsured?
Despite the attention focused on the uninsured , it is surprisingly difficult to
develop a clear picture of this population .
There are relatively few academic
studies devoted to analyzing their characteristics .
Contradictions exist among
the studies available , and there is little objective information on how different
characteristics overlap or interact .
Much of our information about uninsured Americans and their characteristics is based
on data collected annually in March by the Census Bureau in its Current Population
Survey (CPS) . Most of the widely- quoted statistics regarding the uninsured come
from the CPS data . The CPS sample is based on the civilian , non-institutionalized
population , and interviews are conducted with approximately 60 , 000 households .
The data collected in March each year are for the previous year (i . e ., the data
from the March 1994 CPS reflect calendar year 1993) .
The CPS i s the most up - to - date and comprehensive source of information on health
insurance coverage available . However , analysts stress that the information the
CPS provides must be interpreted carefully , based on the nature of the survey ; and
they question the accuracy of some of the health care coverage data . 1 Concerns
about the CPS include :
•The CPS data probably represent the number of people without coverage at the time
of the survey -- not for the entire year .
If the CPS heal th insurance coverage
questions are answered correctly by respondents , the survey should capture
as " uninsured " only people who were without health care coverage for the
entire previous calendar year .
However , comparison of the CPS results with
other national studies which count people uninsured for the entire year shows
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that the CPS number is much larger ; 2 and comparisons of CPS numbers to studies
which count the uninsured at a g i ven time show much more similar results . 3
•The CPS data significantly underreport Medicaid coverage.
The number of people
reporting Medicaid coverage on the CPS is significantly lower than the number
of participants reported as enrolled in the program .
For example , the March
1991 CPS number is 21 % lower than the figures reported by HCFA . This indicates
that self - reporting of Medicaid coverage by CPS respondents is inaccurate ,
understating the importance of this program and overstating the number of
uninsured .
•The

CPS data probably understate the number of people covered by special
state-sponsored programs.
Analysis of the CPS questions shows that
respondents have no opportunity to report that they have coverage under some
of the special programs for the poor and medically indigent set up by many
states .
People covered under these types of programs could be l isted i n the
CPS data as uninsured .

There are other concerns about interpreting the CPS data on the uninsured .
Descriptions of the uninsured population based on the CPS data seem often to result
in a view of the uninsured as a static , little - changing group of people who never
have insurance coverage .
Other studies , structured to look at the uninsured
population over a period of time , yield a much different picture .
Both the Census Bureau 4 and the Urban Institute 5 have conducted long - term studi es
o f the uninsured . The results of these studies are consistent and indicate that
more than half of people who are un i nsured go without coverage for relatively short
periods -- five months or less . That is , many of the uninsured are people facing
a brief gap in their coverage.
Far fewer go wi thout coverage for long periods .
The Census Bureau study estimates that about 4 % of the population are chronically
uninsured , going without coverage for a ful l two years or more .
Two key points are clear from these ana l yses .
First , the CPS is best used to count
the people uninsured at the time of the survey.
The CPS survey probably somewhat
overestimates the number of un i nsured at that time .
However , the survey l ikely
underestimates the number of people who are without coverage for some period during
a calendar year , since many people who have a sho r t spell of uninsurance may not
be in that spell at the time of the survey.
Second , uninsured Americans are not
a static , changing group of people who are without health care coverage for long
periods .
In fact, the uninsured population is a very fluid, constantly changing
set of people.
There are several statistics about the characteristics of the uninsured population
which are often quoted and which must be understood in the context of the fluid
nature of th i s populat i on . These statistics include :
•There are 37 million uninsured Americans, and 2.7 million uninsured Floridians.
Both these f i gures come from recent CPS surveys (the Florida data are from
the March 1994 CPS survey -- reflecting calendar year 1993) . These numbers
are fairly accurate (probably somewhat high) as estimates of the number of

IP49 .l (sh ) - Rev i sed July 13 , 2017

2

uninsured on any given day .
However , more people are probably without
coverage for some period in a calendar year , and a substantial portion of
the total number of uninsured (as many as half) will be without coverage
People may temporarily la ck coverage for a variety
for less than six months .
of reasons - - for example , changing jobs , getting married , returning to school,
going off welfare , moving , divorcing, etc ., but they have probably left some
form of employment - based coverage and will soon have coverage again .
•More than half of the uninsured are full-time workers or their dependents, both
nationally and in Florida.
To reconcile this figure with the information
on the prevalence of brief spells of uninsurance, a substantial number of
full - time workers must be without coverage only briefly . American workers
are fairly mobile.
They move and change jobs frequently and thus may often
face qualifying periods before they are eligible for coverage in their new
jobs .
In addition , many of the uninsured are young people . At least some
may choose not to purchase health care coverage , even if it is offered by
their employer , because they see little value from dollars spent on a health
insurance policy when they are healthy and rarel y vis it a doctor .
•A large number of the uninsured are children.
Nationa lly, among the long - term
uninsured identified by the Census Bureau , more than a quarter (27 %) are
children under the age of 16 , and nearly another quarter (23 %) are young
people between the ages of 16 and 25 . 6 People who have been unemployed for
a long period are more likely to also be uninsured .
•A relatively small number of Americans, between 1 and 3 million nationally, have
medical conditions which make them uninsurable. 7 Many o f the descriptions
of problems with access to health insurance focus on people who have medical
problems and cannot purchase coverage .
However , the vast majority o f the
uninsured are not excluded from the insurance system because of heal th status ,
and could purchase a heal th insurance policy if their income made it possible ,
or if they chose to purchase . For people with existing medical conditions ,
the commercial insurance system , with its fundamental concept of protecting
aga i nst the risk of illness , does not work well .

Other data about the uninsured , especially for a single state , are less well known ,
but contribute significantly to our understanding of this population in Florida .

In Florida , only 50 % of people
•Ma.ny of those eligible for Medicaid do not enroll.
eligible for Medicaid are actually enrolled . 8 Some of those eligible under
the higher - income aid categories (for example , 185 % of the Federal Poverty
Level for pregnant women and infants) may have employer - sponsored coverage ;
but many Floridians eligible for this program are in the ranks of the uninsured .
•Just under half (47%) of the small companies in Florida do not provide health care
coverage for employees. 9 It is important not to assume that all the employees
of these companies are without heal th care coverage . Some have coverage under
a spouse ' s policy; othe rs may have individual policies .
Nevertheless ,
employees of small companies probably represent a significant portion of
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the uninsured in Florida .
It i s clear from the data available that the uninsured are not a homogeneous group
of people , with similar characteristics and reasons for being without coverage .
In fact , the uninsured population is quite heterogeneous .
The main shared
characterist i c may well be lack of health care coverage . This heterogeneity calls
for a multi - faceted solution .

Solving the Problem

III.

Our Proposal
Our solution is multi - faceted , containing a range of elements , because the problem
is complex.
The elements we propose are directly linked to the key characteristics
of the uninsured outlined in the first section .
II

II

The majority of the uninsured are without coverage for a relatively
l . Problem :
brief period .
These are people who had coverage , lost it for a period of
time , and then gained it back . I f an illness or accident occurs during the
per i od without coverage , it can devastate an indi vidual or family .
Solution : Make it far more attractive for those who leave an employer - sponsored
plan to remain in the insured pool , and not join the ranks of the uninsured .
II

II

- Encourage people to pre - fund the cost of continuing coverage , through , for example :
1) some form of flexib l e spending account (FSA) or medical savings
account (MSA) (these accounts would have to be carefully designed to
avoid biasing purchasers against managed care , splitting groups , or
discouraging employer sponsorship) ; 2) no penalty for 4 0lK withdrawals
for th i s purpose ; 3) early cash- in of savings bonds used for this purpose
would incur no tax penalty ; and so on .
- Establish

a state - level , COBRA- like coverage option for people l eaving
employer - sponsored plan in firms with 2 to 19 employees .

an

- Establish a COBRA subsidy program to help those who are unable to pay the full
cost of COBRA coverage .
Goal:

Reducing the number of uninsured who are temporar i ly without coverage would
significantly reduce the number of uninsured in Florida .

2 . Problem : A substantial number of working Floridians do not have employment - based
coverage. Many of these people work for small employers . These people are
long - term uninsured .
Solution : Make it more attractive for employers to offer coverage to employees ,
br i nging the employed uninsured and their dependents under employer - sponsored
coverage , and making it likely that employers who already offer coverage
wi l l continue to do so.
Some possible approaches include :
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- Allow insurers to offer a " good health " discount to employers with less than ten
employees and average wages below some amount who have not had coverage
for at least three years .
- Discount the workers ' compensation coverage cost for employers who also offer heal th
insurance to employees .
- Eliminate rules or laws which increase the cost of coverage for small employers
(under 50 employees) -- for example , modified community rating ,
mandated benefits .
- Guarantee renewal of policies , or prohibit cancellation of policies for health
or claim reasons (carriers could cancel policies for fraud or
non - payment of premium) .
Solution : Make it more attractive for employees with dependents to opt for dependent
coverage , especially in cases where the spouse is covered under his/her
employer ' s p l an .
- Encourage insurers to include a " children only " dependent rate in all group policies
(thus , four group policy options would be available : employee only ;
employee plus spouse ; employee plus spouse and children ; and employee
plus children) .
Solution : For those who do not have access to employer - sponsored coverage , improve
the indiv i dual insurance market .
- Eliminate rules or laws which increase the cost of coverage for individuals .
- People who lose coverage because their insurer no longer has a Florida license
or who move to a location where their company is not licensed to operate ,
should not face preex i st i ng condition exc l usions under their new
coverage .
El iminate preexisting condition exclusions for these
individuals who have ma i nta i ned continuous coverage with no more than
a 62 - day break .

- Guarantee renewal of policies , or prohibit cancellation of policies for health
care or claim reasons (carriers could cancel policies for fraud or
non - payment of premium) .
Goal :

Substantially expanding the number of small employers sponsoring heal th care
coverage for employees would further reduce the number of uninsured
Floridians . According to the AHCA , 2 . 1 million people are employed by small
companies and approximately half of these firms do not offer health care
coverage . 1 0 Some of these people already have coverage , because they have
indi victual policies or coverage under a spouse ' s policy , but many are probably
uninsured .

3 . Problem : A significant portion of the uninsured in Florida are living in poverty .
Many are eligible for Medicaid but are not enrolled in the program .
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Solution :

Enroll the eligible uninsured in Medicaid .

- Move Medicaid AFDC and SSI populati o ns into quality managed care in order to improve
efficiency of care delivery and ensure coordinated care .
·Apply quality and utilization management standards to the MediPass program .
·Require Medicaid pre - paid health plans to be licensed as HMOs , meeting HMO quality,
financial solvency , and applicable enrollment standards before
Medicaid recipients are enrolled.
•Create incentives for providers and health plans to participate in the Medicaid
program .
- Reform Medicaid administration to ensure accuracy and efficiency .
- Use savings from these two measures to extend Medicaid coverage to a greater number
of the poor , targeting those who are eligible for Medi caid but have
not signed up , with children as the top priority .
- Retain the Medically Needy program.
Goal:

Based on AHCA data , there are 700 , 000 people eligible for but not enrolled
in Medicaid . Some of them may have employment - based coverage , but many are
probably uninsured . Targeting children in enrolling Medicaid eligibles would
significantly ease the uninsured problem in Florida . It is also important
to acknowledge that there will always be some number of people in the " Medicaid
eligible but not enrolled " category .
If people do not have a presenting
medical problem they are unlikely to apply for Medicaid . Nevertheless , those
who are eligible but do not sign up for Medicaid do have access to health
care and comprehensive coverage benefits -- although they will be counted
as " uninsured ."

4 . Problem :
A small number o f Floridians do not have group coverage and cannot
purchase insurance coverage because they have existing medical problems .
Solution :

Subsidize the cost of care for the medically uninsurable .

- Re-engineer the state ' s approach to high - risk coverage .
·Fund a study by an outside firm to analyze the experience of othe r states and
recommend a program structure and financing method which
incorporates the best aspects of these programs .
Program
structure should not provide perverse incentives for people to
stay uninsured until they have medical problems.
Goal :

Achieving the o ther goals would stop the flow of new people who have existing
medical problems but do not have heal th care coverage .
Over time , this
category will be eliminated as a problem .
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Effect of Our Proposal
Implementing these measures would significantly reduce eh number of uninsured
Floridians . Florida should continue to search for ways to ensure that people have
some type of financing available for accidents or i llness .
It is important to recognize , however , that ours is a voluntary insurance system .
Realistically , there will always be some number of people who choose not to purchase
health care coverage (for example , young people in the 18 to 35 age range wh o have
had few hea l th prob l ems may view dollars spent on health care coverage as dollars
wasted) .
Some employers will never offer coverage to the i r employees ; and some
employees will not buy the coverage their emp l oyers offer .

IV.

This Proposal Versus Other Alternatives

This proposal offers a much different approach to the problem of uninsured Floridians
from more familiar alternatives . We believe that the approach presented here is
compelling for severa l reasons .
Foremost is that the elements of our solution
orig i nate in the var i ed characteristics of the people who are uninsured . To truly
help the uninsured , solutions must be targeted at their real problems .
Second ,
this approach recognizes and concentrates i mprovement efforts on the neediest of
our citizens -- those hundreds of thousands of poor and uninsured Floridians who
do not take advantage of the existing program designed to ensure their access to
care .
Finally , this proposal openly describes the principles which underlie the
elements which make up the solution , and we believe these principles are shared
by most Floridians.
I n the sect i ons below , we discuss two major a l ternatives to our proposal .
Insurance Reforms
Under the label " insurance reforms " a r e proposals at the national and state leve l
to change the private insurance market , ostensibly wi th the goal of increas i ng access
for the uninsured . Targeting mainly small compan i es (less than 50 employees) and
individuals , these proposals would require that all health insurers guarantee the
issue of heal th insurance po l icies to small group and individual applicants ,
regardless of their health status .
Preexisting condition exclusions wou l d be
strictly limited .
Pricing for products in the small group and individual insurance
market would be based on a " community average ," with no direc t relation to the
appl i cant ' s risk of accident or il l ness .
Instead of improving access for the uninsured , these proposals would have the
unintended and unfortunate result that more people would be uninsured . Why? The
vast majority of the uninsured have no trouble getting a health insurance pol i cy ;
they have troub l e paying for it . The only segment of the uninsured who are helped
by guaranteed i ssue are the medically uninsurable - - a tiny segment of the uninsured
population .
The Sma l l Group Market
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Results from a recent national survey of small employers underscore the fact that
the problem is affordability , not being denied coverage due to health problems. 10
Similar to the Florida experience noted above , overall about half (51 %) of all
small companies (less than 50 employees) offer health insurance.
The size of the
firm is strongly related to the likelihood of coverage being offered -- 85 % of
companies with 25 - 49 employees offer coverage , 70 % of those with 10 - 24 employees
offer coverage , and 44 % of companies with fewer than 10 employees offer health care
coverage .
Why did firms not offer coverage? The most common reason given was that premiums
were too high . Many a l so said that their profits were variable , year - to - year , and
premium increases too uncertain , and they worried that they would have to take this
benefit away in the future . Another reason frequently given was that their employees
did not value the benefit -- they preferred higher wages , or were already covered
elsewhere . A majority also cited adrninistrati ve hassles or not qualifying for group
rates as problems .
Firms who had recently dropped coverage cited similar reasons .
Is coverage available to smal l er firms (that is , is guaranteed issue needed)? The
study reports that health insurance is widely available to small companies . They
are approached by agents frequently , and often follow up on these contacts .
Preexisting conditions or other hea l th-r elated eligibility problems do not appear
to prevent small companies from getting coverage : few companies report a worker
or dependents being denied coverage due to poor heal th , and even fewer report being
denied group coverage for this reason.
A final point in the study is that small companies are very price - sensitive . As
the price comes down even 10 %, an additional 10 % of the companies could be expected
to purchase coverage . However , this prediction must be tempered by the knowledge
that companies fear having to withdraw coverage , and the workers may not value the
benefit highly .
In 1993 , Florida passed sweeping reforms of the small group ( 1 - 50 employees) market ,
including requiring guaranteed issue , modi fi ed community rating, and the offer of
two standard hea l th plans .
Many of these changes took effect in 1994 , barely a
year ago, and it is too early to judge their effect on the uninsured problem in
Florida .
The Individual Market
The same types of reforms are now being proposed in Florida for the individual market .
The effect of guaranteed issue and community rating will be severe in this market .
Unfortunately , these measures will not help the long - term uninsured , for most of
whom affordability is the key issue .
However , guaranteed issue wil l have an effect on the people who already have
individual coverage :
they wil l drop their coverage.
In theory , if people are
guaranteed a health insurance policy after becoming ill , ultimately no one will
purchase coverage before any sign of medical problems and pay all those premium
dollars before coverage is needed . Limiting preexisting condition exclusions further
strengthens the economic incentives to forego insurance until becoming sick , since
IP49 . l(sh)
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coverage would have to include current medical problems .
Combining guaranteed issue with modified community rating is especially devastating .
Community rating says that there must be one price for everyone covered ; guaranteed
issue ensures that only the sick will purchase coverage , so that the one price will
be very high . Before too long , no one will be able to afford individual insurance
products .
With the proposed individual market insurance reforms , a tiny segment of the
individual uninsured population , the medically uninsurable , will have access to
heal th care policies in the short term . Most individuals or family purchasers will
see rising prices put coverage even further out of reach . Over some period of time ,
few will be able to afford an individual market policy , and the private market for
individual coverage will collapse.
Subsidy Programs
Some proposals , at both the state and national level , would reduce the numbers of
uninsured by offering subsidies for the purchase of coverage to low- income families
and individuals . The subsidy proposals recognize that the cost of coverage is the
key factor for most of the uninsured .
By lowering the out - of - pocket cost of coverage
via a subsidy , more uninsured people would be able to purchase private health care
coverage . However , subsidy proposals tend to ignore the data indicating that the
majority of the uninsured are only temporarily without coverage .
In a system in which most people already have private coverage , analysts warn that
designing an effective subsidy program is very difficult . At most income levels
above the federal poverty level , far more people are insured than uninsured , and
the majority of those uninsured are not without coverage for long . A subsidy tied
to income levels may well give current or soon - to - be purchasers an incentive to
drop/not purchase coverage for some period in order to take advantage of a government
subsidy program . An income - based subsidy can also provide a disincent i ve for people
to achieve promotions or salary increases or to move from part - time to full - time
work .
If an increase in income makes a person or family ineligible for a subsidy ,
people might find themselves working longer and harder and yet receiving very little
return in terms of their total wages and benefits .
A recent study offers additional information on the effectiveness of subsidies for
purchasing private coverage . 11 The study analyzed data from a national survey of
medical care spending (including buying health care coverage) to better understand
people ' s decisions to purchase coverage , especially at lower income levels . The
study concludes that
• the availability of Medicaid and other public health services is a disincentive
for the poor and near - poor to purchase health care coverage ; and
• because of Medicaid and other factors , the perceived value of coverage relative
to premiums is low for lower - income families , and a small subsidy may not
encourage them to purchase coverage .
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There is much to be considered in designing an effective subsidy program to ensure
that it 1) does not undermine the existing system in which 8 in 10 people have coverage
and are satisfied with it ; 2) targets the neediest people first -- that is , children
and the very poor ; and 3) effectively brings the price of coverage within reach
for the targeted population.

IP49 . l (sh ) - Revised Ju l y 13 , 2 0 17

10

NOTES
1 . Pamela Loprest and Michael Gates , 1993 , State-Level Data Book on Heal th Care Access
and Financing (Washington , D. C .: The Urban Institute Press) .
2 . Katherine Schwartz , 1986 , " Interpreting the Estimates from Four National Surveys
of the Number of People Without Health Insurance ," Journal o f Economic and
Social Measurement 14 : 233 - 42 .
3 . U. S . Department of Commerce , Bureau of the Census , 1990 , Heal th Insurance Coverage :
1986-88 , Current Population Reports , ser . P- 70 , no . 17 (Washington , D. C .:
U. S . Government Printing Office) .
4 . See note 3 .
5 . Katherine
Swartz ,
John
Marcotte ,
and
Timothy McBride ,
199 2 ,
Personal
Characteristics and Spells Without Health Insurance (Washington , D. C .: The
Urban Institute) .
6 . Agency for Health Care Administration , 1994 , Florida Health Security : State of
Florida Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Application (Tallahassee ,
Florida : State of Florida) .
7 . Ryan J . Bur t , 1993 , Comprehensive Health Insurance for High-Risk Individuals :
Communicating for
A State-by-State Analysis ( Bloomington , Minnesota :
Agriculture , Inc . )
8 . See note 6 , page 100 .
9 . See note 6 , pages 4 - 5 .
10 . Michael A . Morrisey , Ga i l A . Jensen , and Robert J . Morlock , 1994 , " Sma l l Employers
and the Health Insurance Market ," Health Affairs Wint e r : 149 - 161.
11 . Kathleen Thomas , 1994 , " Ar e Subsidies Enough to Encou r age the Uninsured to
Purchase Heal th Insurance? An Analysis of Underlying Behavior ," Inquiry
31 : 415 - 424 .

IP49 .l (sh ) - Revised July 13 , 2017

11

APPENDIX A
Insurance Portability In Florida

Most Americans have hea l th care coverage sponsored by their employer . Some have
raised concerns that these people may be " locked into " their current jobs because
they fear losing their health care coverage if they change jobs .
Such loss of
coverage could occur if the new employer ' s heal th plan excludes benefits for
preexisting health conditions for some period , or if the employer has a waiting
period before new employees are eligible for the health coverage benefit .
For that reason , the U. S . Congress and Florida
" portability " protection to most Floridians :

Legislature

have

extended

1 . Floridians who leave/lose employment
• Federal law (COBRA) requires companies (both insured and self-insured) with 20
or more employees to offer continuing coverage to employees who leave
the company , and/ or to their dependents . Employees pay the group - rate
premium for the coverage plus a 2 % administrative fee . For those who
quit their jobs or reduce their work hours , this coverage lasts 18
months .
• For emp l oyees and their families who leave companies with insu r ed programs , Florida
law requires insurers to offer a " converted policy " to anyone who has
been covered under the group policy for at least three months .
For
insured groups with 20 or more employees , the conversion right is
available when COBRA benefits expire.
The converted policy cannot
add any preexisting condition exclusions . ERISA ( self - insured) groups
are exempt from convers i on requirements .
2 . Floridians who die or divorce and leave dependents uncovered , or who become
eligible for Medicare but still have non - Medicare - el i gible dependents
• In companies with 20 or more employees , Federal COBRA requires that a widow/widower ,
a divorced spouse and children , and a spouse nd children of an employee
who gains coverage through Medicare , be offered continuing coverage
for up to 36 months .
• For dependents of employees who die or divorce and who work/worked in companies
with fewer than 20 employees covered under an insured group policy ,
Florida law requires insurers to offer a converted policy . This offer
is also made to COBRA recipients after the COBRA period expires .
3 . Children who reach an age when they no longer qualify under their family ' s plan
• For group p l ans , in companies with 20 or more employees , Federal COBRA requires
that employers offer these children continuing coverage for up to 36
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months . After COBRA coverage expires (for those who had coverage in
an insured group) , insurers must offer a converted policy .
• For individual policies , Florida law requires that a converted policy be offered
to these children .
ERISA ( self - insured) plans are exempt from
conversion requirements .

4 . Floridians with health problems
• Florida law requires that an insured group policy give a person credit for the
time the person was covered previously under similar coverage in
determining if a preexisting condition exists . A gap of no more than
30 days must have occurred between the ending of the previous coverage
and the effective date of new coverage .
• If a person has not had continuous coverage (with a gap of less than 30 days) :
- a maximum 12 - month preexisting condition exclusion can be applied to a person
covered under a small group policy in a company with 3 - 50
employees .
During this period , the only conditions which can
be excluded are those which would have caused a " prudent " person
to seek care in the 6 months before the coverage took effect ;
and pregnancy existing on the effective date .
- a maximum 24 - month preexisting condition exclusion can be applied to a person
covered under a small group policy in groups with 1 - 2 employees .
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PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO CARE

I.

Introduction

The United States health care system is among the best in the world . It provides
users with sophisticated , technologically advanced services , ready access to a broad
range of medical specialties , and care in comfortable surroundings .
These qualities are greatly valued by Americans . However , there are some aspects
of the heal th care system which must be improved for it to continue to meet Americans '
standards for quality , access , and cost .
Concern about the number of uninsured
Americans , and their risk of financial hardship if they face a severe illness or
injury , is one of the factors underlying efforts to reform the health care system .
The purpose of this paper is to define the problem called " the uninsured ," and to
propose actions needed to make significant progress toward solving this problem
in Florida .

II.

Understanding the problem

Who are the uninsured?
Despite the attention focused on the uninsured , it is surprisingly difficult to
develop a clear picture of this population .
There are relatively few academic
studies devoted to analyzing their characteristics .
Contradictions exist among
the studies available , and there is little objective information on how different
characteristics overlap or interact.
Much of our information about uninsured Americans and their characteristics is based
on data collected annually in March by the Census Bureau in its Current Population
Survey (CPS) . Most of the widely- quoted statistics regarding the uninsured come
from the CPS data . The CPS sample is based on the civilian , non -i nst i tutionalized
population , and interviews are conducted with approximately 60 , 000 households .
The data collected in March each year are for the previous year (i.e., the data
from the March 1994 CPS reflect calendar year 1993) .
The CPS is the most up - to - date and comprehensive source of information on health
insurance coverage available . However , analysts stress that the information the
CPS provides must be interpreted carefully , based on the nature of the survey ; and
they question the accuracy of some of the health care coverage data . 1 Concerns
about the CPS include :
•The CPS data probably represent the number of people without coverage at the time
of the survey -- not for the entire year.
If the CPS heal th insurance coverage
questions are answered correctly by respondents , the survey should capture
as " uninsured " only people who were without health care coverage for the
entire previous calendar year . However , comparison of the CPS results with
other national studies which count people uninsured for the entire year shows
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that the CPS number is much larger ; 2 and comparisons of CPS numbers to s t udies
which count the uninsured at a given time show much more similar results . 3
The number of people
•The CPS data significantly underreport Medicaid coverage.
reporting Medicaid coverage on the CPS is significantly lower than the number
of participants reported as enrolled in the program . For example , the March
1991 CPS number is 21 % lower than the figures reported by HCFA . This indicates
that self - reporting of Medicaid coverage by CPS respondents is inaccurate ,
understating the importance of this program and overstating the number of
uninsured .
•The

CPS data probably understate the number of people covered by special
state-sponsored programs.
Analysis of the CPS questions shows that
respondents have no opportunity to report that they have coverage under some
of the special programs for the poor and medically indigent set up by many
states .
People covered under these types of programs could be listed in the
CPS data as uninsured.

There are other concerns about interpreting the CPS data on the uninsured .
Descriptions of the uninsured population based on the CPS data seem often to result
in a view of the uninsured as a static , little - changing group of people who never
have insurance coverage.
Other studies , structured to look at the uninsured
population over a period of time , yield a much different picture .
Both the Census Bureau 4 and the Urban Institute 5 have conducted long- term studies
of the uninsured . The results of these studies are consistent and indicate that
more than half of people who are uninsured go without coverage for relatively short
periods -- five months or less.
That is , many of the uninsured are people facing
a brief gap in their coverage.
Far fewer go without coverage for long periods .
The Census Bureau study estimates that about 4 % of the population are chronically
un i nsured , going without coverage for a full two years or more .
Two key points are clear from these analyses . First , the CPS is best used to count
the people uninsured at the time of the survey.
The CPS survey probably somewhat
overestimates the number of uninsured at that time .
However , the survey likely
underestimates the number of peop l e who are without coverage f or some period during
a calendar year , since many people who have a short spell of un i nsurance may not
be in that spell at the time of the survey . Second , uninsured Americans are not
a static , changing group of people who are without health care coverage for long
periods . In fact, the uninsured population is a very fluid, constantly changing
set of people.
There are several statistics about the characteristics of the uninsured population
which are often quoted and which must be understood in the context of the fluid
nature of this population . These statistics include :
•There are 37 million uninsured Americans, and 2.7 million uninsured Floridians.
Both these figures come from recent CPS surveys (the Florida data are from
the March 1994 CPS survey -- reflecting calendar year 1993) . These numbers
are fairly accurate (probably somewhat high) as estimates of the number of

IP49 . 2 ( lg ) - Revised July 13, 2 0 1 7

2

uninsured on any given day .
However , more people are probably without
coverage for some per i od in a calendar year , and a substantia l portion of
the total n umber of uninsured (as many as half) wil l be without coverage
for less than six months . People may temporarily lack coverage for a variety
of reasons -- for example , changing jobs , getting married , returning to school ,
going off welfare , moving , divorcing , etc ., but they have probably left some
form of employment-based coverage and will soon have coverage again .
•More than half of the uninsured are full-time workers or their dependents, both
nationally and in Florida.
To reconcile this figure with the information
on the prevalence of brief spells of uninsurance , a substantial number of
full - time workers must be without coverage only briefly . American workers
are fairly mobile . They move and change jobs frequently and thus may often
face qualifying periods before they are eligible for coverage in their new
jobs .
In addition , many of the uninsured are young people . At least some
may choose not to pu r chase health care coverage , even if it is o f fered by
their emp l oyer , because they see little value from dollars spent on a health
insurance policy when they are healthy and rarely visit a doctor .
•A large number of the uninsured are children.
Nat i onally , among the long- term
un i nsured i dentified by the Census Bureau , more than a quarter (27 %) are
children under the age of 16 , and nearly another quarter (23 %) are young
people between the ages of 16 and 25 . 6 People who have been unemployed for
a long period are more l ikely to also be uninsured .
•A relatively small number of Americans, between 1 and 3 million nationally, have
medical conditions which make them uninsurable. 7 Many of the descriptions
of problems with access to health insurance focus on people who have medical
problems and cannot purchase coverage .
However , the vast majority of the
uninsured are not excluded from the insurance system because of health status ,
and could purchase a heal th insurance policy if their income made it possible ,
or if they chose to purchase .
For people with existing medical conditions ,
the commercial insurance system , with its fundamental concept of protecting
against the r i sk of i llness , does not work well .

Other data about the uninsured , especially for a sing l e state , are less well known ,
but contribute significantly to our understanding of this population in Florida .

•Many of those eligible for Medicaid do not enroll.
In Florida , only 50 % of people
eligible for Medicaid are actually enrolled . 8 Some of those eligible under
the higher - income aid categor i es (for example , 185 % of the Federal Poverty
Level for pregnant women and infants) may have employer - sponsored coverage ;
but many Floridians eligible for this program are in the ranks of the uninsured .
•Just under half (47%) of the small companies in Florida do not provide health care
coverage for employees. 9 It is important not to assume that all the employees
of these companies are without hea l th care coverage . Some have coverage under
a spouse ' s policy ; others may have individual policies .
Nevertheless ,
emp l oyees of small companies probably represent a significant portion of
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the uninsured in Florida .
It is clear from the data available that the uninsured are not a homogeneous group
of people , with similar characteristics and reasons for being without coverage .
In fact , the uninsured population is quite heterogeneous .
The main shared
characterist i c may well be lack of health care coverage . This heterogeneity calls
for a multi - faceted solution .
III.

Vision for Improving Access

Vision Statement
Our proposal for improving access to care for Floridians is built on vision of
coverage in Florida . Our vision is that
the number of uninsured in Florida will be reduced significantly during the
next five years.

To achieve this vision , Florida must focus on improving the affordability of heal th
care coverage . We believe this realistic vision will come to fruition through three
main methods , all founded on a private market system which offers coverage at
affordable pr i ces . These three methods are :
1 . expanding the number of employers participating in the group insurance market ,
and keeping those employees/families with a group product in the group market ;
2 . for those to whom a group product is not available , easy access to individual
coverage ; and

3 . appropriate sponsorship by the state for financing care for those who cannot pay
for it themselves .
At the end of five years , most Floridi ans , including those who work for small
companies (less than 50 employees) , are covered under a group plan sponsored by
an employer .
Most sma l l employers offer and contribute to the cost of coverage
for employees because of incentives which make this benef i t for employees both
affordable and attractive .
Small employers unable to contribute to the cost of
coverage help employees with administrative services related to getting and paying
for coverage (for examp l e , automat i c payroll deduct i on/payment of premiums) .
For near - poor Floridians and their families whose employers do not provide coverage
or who are self - employed , and for whom cost is a major barrier to purchasing coverage ,
there are a variety of lower - cost coverage options in the individual insurance
market .
May of the poor , for whom paying anything for coverage is not an option , have their
care financed by the state Medicaid program . Many are enrolled in commercial managed
care programs which ensure that quality care is delivered in an effic i ent manner .
Medicaid recipients who participate in managed care programs understand the
benefits of managed care , know how their program works , and are pleased with the
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care they receive . The Medicare program itself is a model of an efficient state
program , streamlined administration , and a policy which supports privatization of
services where appropriate .
For the poor who do not qualify for Medicaid , public heal th clinics and other heal th
care facilities provide care . County governments continue to support local indigent
hea l th care programs and financing.
For the relatively small number of Floridians who already have major health problems ,
an insurance product , with its fundamental concept of protection against the risk
of illness , is not a good solution . These "medically uninsurable " people have their
care subsidized by the state based on income , so that the cost of the care does
not exceed a certain percentage of income.
Participants ' contribution to the cost
of their own care is high , so that this program does not make it attractive for
people to stay uninsured unti l they are sick .
The number of Floridians who are
medically uninsurable gradually shrinks as more have insurance coverage before
needing care .
Gu i ding Principles
Certain fundamental principles have guided our search for solutions to the problem
of uninsured Floridians .
1 . The

employment - based system , through which most insured Fl oridians receive
coverage , has many positive characteristics .
It should be improved and
strengthened , so that as many uninsured Floridians as possible gain and keep
employer - sponsored coverage .

2.Since the insurance system is voluntary , and should remain so , the system must
have rewards for employers who provide coverage , and lega l, regu l atory , or
tax disincentives to providing coverage must be removed .
3 . The hea l th care system must promote individual responsibility for taking care
of one ' s own health and for being conscious of health care costs .
While
structured so that most people have coverage sponsored by their employer ,
the system should reward people for pursuing healthy l i festyles and
accepting/purchasing health care coverage , so that Floridians exercise their
responsibility .

4 . Both the government and the pr i vate sector have a role in reducing the number
of uninsured Floridians . Government and the private sector must work together
to achieve this vision .
The role of the private sector is to continue to
improve the functioning of the market to ensure access to quality , affordable
care .
Government must ensure fair competition i n the marketplace , and
eliminate laws and/or rules that interfere with the competitive market and
increase costs . Government must also help those who cannot purchase coverage
on their own .
IV.

Solving the Problem
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Our Proposal
Our " solution " is multi - faceted , containing a range of elements , because the problem
is complex . The elements we propose are directly linked to the key characteristics
of the uninsured outlined in the first section .
The majority of the uninsured are without coverage for a relatively
l . Problem :
brief period .
These are people who had coverage , lost it for a period of
time , and then gained it back .
If an illness or accident occurs during the
period without coverage , it can devastate an individual or family .
Solution : Make it far more attractive for those who leave an employer-sponsored
plan to remain in the " insured " pool , and not join the ranks of the uninsured .
-Encourage people to pre -fund the cost of continuing coverage , through , for example :
1) some form of flexible spending account (FSA) or medical savings
account (MSA) (these accounts would have to be carefully designed to
avoid biasing purchasers against managed care , splitting groups , or
discouraging employer sponsorship); 2) no penalty for 401K withdrawals
for this purpose ; 3) early cash - in of savings bonds used for this purpose
would incur no tax penalty; and so on .
-Es tablish

a state - level , COBRA- like coverage option for people leaving
employer - sponsored plan in firms with 2 to 19 employees .

an

- Establish a COBRA subsidy program to help those who are unable to pay the full
cost of COBRA coverage .
Goal :

Reducing the number of uninsured who are temporarily without coverage would
significantly reduce the number of uninsured in Florida .

2 . Problem : A substantial number of working Floridians do not have employment - based
coverage . Many of these people work for small employers.
These people are
long-term uninsured .
Solution: Make it more attractive for employers to offer coverage to employees ,
bringing the employed uninsured and their dependents under employer - sponsored
coverage , and making it likely that employers who already offer coverage
will continue to do so . Some possible approaches include:
-All ow insurers to o ffer a " good health " discount to employers with less than ten
employees and average wages below some amount who have not had coverage
for at least three years.
- Dis count the workers' compensation coverage cost for employers who also offer heal th
insurance to employees .
-E l iminate rules or laws which increase the cost of coverage for small employers
(under SO employees)
for example , modified community rating ,
mandated benefits .
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- Guarantee renewal of policies , or prohibit cancel l ation of policies for health
or claim reasons (carriers could cancel policies for fraud or
non - payment of premium) .
Solution : Make it more attractive for employees with dependents to o pt for dependent
coverage , especially in cases where the spo use is covered under his/her
employer ' s plan .
- Encourage i nsurers to include a " children only " dependent rate in all group policies
(thus , four group po l icy options would be available : employee only ;
employee plus spouse ; employee plus spouse and children ; and emp l oyee
plus children)
Solution : For those who do not have access to employer - sponsored coverage , improve
the individual insurance market .
- Eliminate rules or laws which increase the cost of coverage for individuals .
- People who lose coverage because their insurer no longer has a Florida license
or who move to a location where their company is not licensed to operate ,
should not face preexisting condition exclusions under their new
coverage .
Eliminate preexisting condition exclusions for these
individuals who have maintained continuous coverage with no mo re than
a 62 - day break.
- Guarantee renewal of polic i es , or prohibit cancellation of policies for health
care or c l aim reasons (carriers could cancel po l icies for fraud or
non - payment of premium ) .
Goal :

Substantially expanding the number of small employers sponsoring heal th care
coverage for employees would further reduce the number of uninsured
Flo r idians . According to the AHCA , 2. 1 million people are employed by small
companies and approximately ha l f of these f i rms do not offer health care
coverage . 10 Some of these people already have coverage , because they have
indi victual policies or coverage under a spouse ' s policy , but many are probably
uninsured .

3 . Pro blem : A significant portion of the uninsured in Florida are living in poverty .
Many are eligible for Medica i d but are not enrolled in the program .
Solution :

Enroll the eligible uninsured in Medicaid .

- Move Medicaid AFDC and SSI populations into quality managed care in order to improve
efficiency of care delivery and ensure coordinated care .
·Apply quality and utilization management standards to the MediPass pr o gram .
·Require Medicaid pre - paid hea l th plans to be licensed as HMOs , meeting HMO qual i ty ,
f i nancial solvency , and applicable enrollment standards before
Medicaid recipients are enrolled .
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·Create incentives for providers and health plans to participate in the Medicaid
program .
- Reform Medicaid administration to ensure accuracy and efficiency.
- Use savings from these two measures to extend Medicaid coverage to a greater number
of the poor , targeting those who are eligible for Medicaid but have
not signed up , with children as the top priority.
- Retain the Medically Needy program .
Goal :

Based on AHCA data , there are 700 , 000 people eligible for but not enrolled
in Medicaid . Some of them may have employment - based coverage , but many are
probably uninsured . Targeting children in enrolling Medicaid eligibles would
significantly ease the uninsured problem in Florida .
It is also important
to acknowledge that there will always be some number of people in the " Medicaid
eligible but not enrolled " category .
If people do not have a presenting
medical problem they are unlikely to apply for Medicaid . Nevertheless , those
who are eligible but do not sign up for Medicaid do have access to health
care and comprehensive coverage benefits -- although they will be counted
as " uninsured ."

4.Problem :
A small number of Floridians do not have group coverage and cannot
purchase insuran ce coverage because they have existing medical problems .
Solution :

Subsidize the cost of care for the medically uninsurable .

- Re - engineer the state ' s approach to h igh - risk coverage .
·Fund a study by an outside firm to analyze the experience of othe r states and
recommend a program structure and financing method which
incorporates the best aspects of these programs .
Program
structure should not provide perverse incentives for people to
stay uninsured until they have medical problems .
Goal :

Achieving the other goals would stop the flow of new people who have existing
medical problems but do not have health care coverage .
Over time , this
category will be eliminated as a problem .

Effe ct of Ou r Proposal
Meeting our goals would significantly reduce the number of uninsured Floridians .
Florida should continue to search for ways to ensure that these people have some
type of financing available for accidents or il lness .
Implementing these measures would significantly reduce the number of uninsured
Floridians .
Florida should continue to search for ways to ensure that people have
some type of financing available for accidents or illness .
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It is important to recognize , however , that ours is a voluntary insurance system .
Realistically , there will always be some number of people who choose not to purchase
health care coverage (for example , young people in the 18 to 35 age range who have
had few health problems may view dollars spent on health care coverage as dollars
wasted) .
Some employers will never offer coverage to their employees ; and some
employees will not buy the coverage their employers offer .

V.

This Proposal Versus Other Alternatives

This proposal offers a much di£ ferent approach to the problem of uninsured Floridians
from more familiar alternatives . We believe that the approach presented here i s
compelling for several reasons .
Foremost is that the elements of our solution
originate in the varied characteristics of the people who are uninsured . To truly
help the uninsured , solutions must be targeted at their real problems .
Second ,
this approach recognizes and concentrates improvement efforts on the neediest of
our citizens -- those hundreds of thousands o f poor and uninsured Floridi ans who
do not take advantage of the existing program des i gned to ensure their access to
care . Finally , this proposal openly describes the principles which underlie the
elements which make up the solution , and we believe these principles are shared
by most Floridians .
In the sections below , we discuss two major alternatives to our proposal .
Insurance Reforms
Under the label " insurance reforms " are proposals at the national and state level
to change the private insurance market , ostensibly with the goal of increasing access
for the uninsured . Targeting mainly small companies (less than 50 employees) and
individuals , these proposals would require that all health insurers guarantee the
issue of heal th insurance po l icies to small group and indi victual applicants ,
regardless of their heal th status .
Preexisting condition exc l usions would be
strictly limited . Pricing for products in the small group and indi victual insurance
market would be based on a " community average ," with no direct relat i on to the
appl i cant ' s risk of accident or illness .
Instead of improving access for the uninsured , these proposals would have the
unintended and unfortunate result that more people would be uninsured . Why? The
vast majority of the uninsured have no troub l e getting a health insurance policy ;
they have trouble paying for i t . The only segment of the uninsured who are helped
by guaranteed issue are the medically uninsurable -- a tiny segment of the uninsured
population .
The Small Group Market
Results from a recent national survey of small employers underscore the fact that
the problem is affordability , not being denied coverage due to health problems . 1 0
Similar to the Florida expe r ience noted above , overall about half (51 %) of a l l
small compan i es (less than 50 employees) offer health insurance . The size of the
firm is strongly related to the likelihood of coverage being offered -- 85 % of
companies with 25 - 49 employees offer coverage , 70 % of those with 10 - 24 employees
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offer coverage , and 44 % of companies with fewer than 10 employees offer health care
coverage .
Why did firms not offer coverage? The most common reason given was that premiums
were too high . Many also said that their profits were variable , year - to - year , and
premium increases too uncertain , and they worried that they would have t o take this
benefit away in the future . Another reason frequently given was that their employees
did not value the benefit -- they preferred higher wages , or were already covered
elsewhere . A majority also cited adrninistrati ve hassles or not qualifying for group
rates as problems.
Firms who had recently dropped coverage cited similar reasons .
I s coverage available to smaller firms (that is , is guaranteed issue needed)? The
study reports that health insurance is widely available to small companies . They
are approached by agents frequently , and often follow up on these contacts.
Preexisting conditions or other health - related eligibility problems do not appear
to prevent small companies from getting coverage : few companies report a worker
or dependents being denied coverage due to poor health , and even fewer report being
denied group coverage for this reason .
A final point in the study is that small companies are very price - sensitive . As
the price comes down even 10 %, an additional 10 % of the companies could be expected
to purchase coverage . However , this prediction must be tempered by the knowledge
that companies fear having to withdraw coverage, and the workers may not value the
benefit highly .
In 1993 , Florida passed sweeping reforms of the small group ( 1 - 50 employees) market ,
including requiring guaranteed issue , modified community rating , and the offer of
two standard health plans .
Many of these changes took effect in 1994, barely a
year ago , and it is too early to judge their effect on the uninsured problem in
Florida.
The Individual Market
The same types of reforms are now being proposed in Florida for the individual market .
The effect of guaranteed issue and community rating will be severe in this market.
Un f ortunately , these measures will not help the long - term uninsured , for most of
whom affordability is the key issue .
However , guaranteed issue will have an ef feet on the people who already have
individual coverage :
they will drop their coverage .
In theory , if people are
guaranteed a health insurance policy after becoming ill , ultimately no one will
purchase coverage before any sign of medical problems and pay all those premium
dollars before coverage is needed . Limiting preexisting condition exclusions further
strengthens the economic incentives to forego insurance until becoming sick , since
coverage would have to include current medical problems.
Combining guaranteed issue with modified community rating is especially devastating .
Community rating says that there must be one price for everyone covered ; guaranteed
issue ensures that only the sick will purchase coverage, so that the one price will
be very high . Before too long , no one will be able to afford individual insurance
products .
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With the proposed individual market insurance reforms , a tiny segment of the
individual uninsured population , the medically uninsurable , will have access to
heal th care policies in the short term . Most indi victuals or family purchasers will
see rising prices put coverage even further out of reach . Over some period of time ,
few will be able to afford an individual market policy , and the private market for
individual coverage will collapse .
Subsidy Programs
Some proposa l s , at both the state and national level , would reduce the numbers of
uninsured by offering subsidies for the purchase of coverage to low- income families
and individuals . The subsidy proposals recognize that the cost of coverage is the
key factor for most of the uninsured . By lowering the out - of - pocket cost of coverage
via a subsidy , more uninsured people would be able to purchase private health care
coverage . However , subsidy proposals tend to ignore the data indicating that the
majority of the uninsured are only temporarily without coverage .
In a system in which most people already have private coverage , analysts warn that
designing an effective subsidy program is very difficult . At most income levels
above the federal poverty level , far more people are insured than uninsured , and
the majority of those uninsured are not without coverage for long . A subsidy tied
to income levels may well give current or soon - to - be purchasers an incentive to
drop/not purchase coverage for some period in order to take advantage of a government
subsidy program . An income - based subsidy can also provide a disincentive for people
to achieve promotions or salary increases or to move from part - time to full - time
work .
If an increase in income makes a person or family ineligible for a subsidy ,
people might find themselves working longer and harder and yet receiving very little
return in terms of their total wages and benefits .
A recent study offers additional information on the effectiveness of subsidies for
purchasing private coverage . 11 The study analyzed data from a national survey of
medical care spending (including buyi ng health care coverage) to better understand
people ' s decisions to purchase coverage , especially at lower income levels . The
study concludes that
• the availability of Medicaid and other public health services is a disincentive
for the poor and near - poor to purchase health care coverage ; and
•because of Medicaid and other factors , the perceived value of coverage relative
to premiums is low for lower - income families , and a small subsidy may not
encourage them to purchase coverage .
There is much to be considered in designing an effective subsidy program to ensure
that it is attractive to the people it targets and does no harm to the existing
system in which 8 in 10 people have coverage and are satisfied with it .
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APPENDIX A
Insurance Portability In Florida

Most Americans have health care coverage sponsored by their employer . Some have
raised concerns that these people may be " locked into " their current jobs because
they fear los ing their health care coverage if they change jobs.
Such loss of
coverage could occur if the new employer ' s heal th plan excludes benefits for
preexisting health conditi ons for some period , or if the employer has a waiting
period before new employees are eligible for the health coverage benefit .
For that reason , the U. S . Congress and Florida
" portability " protection to most Floridians :

Legislature

have

extended

l .Fl oridians who leave/lose employment
• Federal law (COBRA) requires companies (both insured and self - insured) with 20
or more employees to offer continuing coverage to employees who leave
the company , and/or to their dependents . Employees pay the group - rate
premium for the coverage plus a 2 % administrative fee . For those who
quit their jobs or reduce their work hours , this coverage lasts 18
months .
• For employees and their families who leave companies with insured programs , Florida
law requires insurers to offer a " converted policy " to anyone who has
been covered under the group policy for at least three months .
For
insured groups with 20 or more employees , the conversion right is
available when COBRA benefits expire .
The converted policy cannot
add any preexisting condition exclusions . ERISA (self - insured) groups
are exempt from conversion requirements.
2 . Floridians who die or divorce and leave dependents uncovered , or who become
eligible for Medicare but still have non - Medicare-eligible dependents
• In companies with 20 or more employees, Federal COBRA requires that a widow/widower ,
a divorced spouse and children , and a spouse nd children of an employee
who gains coverage through Medicare , be of fered continuing coverage
for up to 36 months .
• For dependents of employees who die or divorce and who work/worked in companies
with fewer than 20 employees covered under an insured group policy ,
Florida law requires insurers to offer a converted policy.
This offer
is also made to COBRA recipients after the COBRA period expires.
3 . Children who reach an age when they no longer qualify under their famil y ' s plan
• For group plans , in compan ies with 20 or more employees , Federal COBRA requires
that employers of fer these children continuing coverage for up to 36
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months . After COBRA coverage expires (for those who had coverage in
an insured group) , insurers must offer a converted policy .
• For individual policies , Florida law requires that a converted policy be offered
to these children .
ERISA ( self - insured) plans are exempt fr om
conversion requirements.

4 . Floridians with health problems
• Florida law requires that an insured group policy give a person credit for the
time the person was covered previously under similar coverage in
determining if a preexisting condition exists . A gap of no more than
30 days must have occurred between the ending of the previous coverage
and the effective date of new coverage .
• If a person has not had continuous coverage (with a gap of less than 30 days) :
- a maximum 12 - month preexisting condition exclusion can be applied to a person
covered under a small group policy in a company with 3 - 50
employees .
During this period , the on l y conditions which can
be excluded are those which would have caused a " prudent " person
to seek care in the 6 months before the coverage took effect ;
and pregnancy existing on the effective date.
- a maximum 24 - month preexisting condition exclusion can be applied to a person
covered under a small group policy in groups with 1- 2 employees .
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PURCHASING ALLIANCES

Florida ' s CHPAs
We support Florida ' s CHPAs , established in the Health Care and Insurance Reform
Act of 1993 , because they are designed to be market makers .
If CHPAs provide buyers
with good information , ensure that everyone follows the same rules , and lets the
market do the rest , this plan should help moderate costs over time .
BCBSF
participates in all CHPA regions .

Purchasing Alliances
In the debate about how the American health care system can be improved , the use
of purchasing groups has received a lot of attention .
Purchasing alliances are
being introduced as a way to provide affordable heal th care coverage · to small groups
and individuals .
Purchasing alliances can be structured in many different ways ,
which affects the i r impact on cost and access to health care coverage.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida believes the best way to assist small groups
and individuals is to allow the market to respond to the needs of consumers .
Private - sector alliances -- many of which are already in existence throughout the
United States (i . e ., Florida Gulf Coast Health Coalition , the Council of Smaller
Enterprises/Group Services , Inc . in Cleveland) -- are already working to accomplish
this . These organizations meet the needs of their members by providing them with
useful purchasing information and drawing them together to help them influence the
market in the same manner as large groups . Because these alliances are voluntary
and competing in the market , they are well - suited to respond to the changing needs
of their members .
Government - sponsored alliances are another proposed way to provide coverage to small
groups and individuals . However , government - sponsored alliances have the potential
to interfere with the market and add another layer of government to the system ,
adding cost without accompanying benefits . For example , health alliances in the
Clinton proposal are large , regulatory entities that have the power to limit
competition and stifle the market . These types of purchasing alliances will force
most people to enroll in them and then largely determine which hea l th p l ans may
be offered .
If the purchasing alliances fail to achieve the expected savings , become
unresponsive bureaucracies , or unacceptably limit the public ' s choices , no
alternatives exist.
A large , costly regulatory system will have been created ,
displacing existing ( and future) financing and deli very systems in favor of a system
that may be unsatisfactory or inappropriate in the long run .
We are opposed to mandatory government - sponsored health alliances . We think they
would harm the development of the competitive market .
However , we can support
government - sponsored purchasing organizations for small businesses as long as they
are market - makers ; voluntary and nonexclusive .
These types of purchasing pools
must prove their value if they are to survive because they operate under competitive
market principles .
Ideally , they should compete with privately- organized
purchasing organizations and the traditional market for small employer business .
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PURCHASING ALLIANCES

In the debate about how the American health care system can be improved , the use
of purchasing groups has received a lot of attention .
Purchasing alliances are
being introduced as a way to provide affordable heal th care coverage to small groups
and individuals . Purchasing alliances can be structured in many different ways ,
which affects their impact on cost and access to health care coverage .
Blue Cross and Blue Shield believes the best way to assist small groups and
individuals is to allow the market to respond to the needs of consumers . The type
of purchasing alliance that can best accomplish this is a private - sector alliance
- - many of which are already in existence throughout the United States (i . e ., Florida
Gulf Coast Health Coalition , the Council of Smaller Enterprises/Group Services ,
Inc . in Cleveland) . These organizations meet the needs of their members by providing
them with useful purchasing information and drawing them together to help them
influence the market in the same manner as large groups . Because these alliances
are voluntary and competing in the market, they are well - suited to respond to the
changing needs of their members .
On the other hand , government - sponsored alliances are not the best way to provide
coverage to small groups and individuals , and we do not support their establishment .
Government - sponsored alliances interfere with the market and add another layer
of government to the system , adding cost without accompanying benefits .
For
example , health alliances in the Clinton proposal are large , regulatory entities
that have the power to limit competition and stifle the market .
These types of
purchasing alliances will force most people to enroll in them and then largely
determine which health plans may be offered . If the purchasing alliances fail to
achieve the expected savings , become unresponsive bureaucracies , or unacceptably
limit the public ' s choices , no alternatives exist .
A large , costly regulatory
system will have been created , displacing existing ( and future) financing and
delivery systems in favor of a system that may be unsatisfactory or inappropriate
in the long run .
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QUALITY
Myths
Physician specialists
access to providers.
and that they have no
network based plans is

insist that personal physician based plans restrict patient
They claim that members of such plans are forced into them
choice .
Finally , they contend that the quality of care in
lacking in comparison to traditional fee - for - service plans .

Facts
Choice -- People in Florida do have a choice in which type of health plan they
purchase , and personal physician based plan members specifically are enrolled by
choice . According to a survey of over 12 , 000 consumers (Sachs Group/Scarborough
Research Corp . ) , 67 % of enrollees in personal physician based plans had a choice
of plans , compared to only 42 % in fee - for-service plans.

Quality Medical Care
• Personal Physician Based Network Plan members were diagnosed at considerably
earlier stages for four types of cancer than those enrolled in fee - for - service
plans.
(The American Journal of Public Health.)
• Personal Physician Based Network Plan results equal to or better than results in
fee - for - service plans in 14 of 17 quality of care measures . (Journal of the
American Medical Association .
•According to the National Health Interv iew Survey , physician based network plans
offered screening in 5 out of 6 cancer screening tests , more often than
fee - for - service providers .
(Medical Care . )
Patient Satisfaction with Personal Physician Based Network Plans
•According to a December 1994 public opinion poll ,

(Luntz Research Cos . ) :

- 91 % o f personal physician based network plan members are satisfied with the quality
of care , 87 % are satisfied with their choice of provider , and 77 % are
satisfied with the cost of their health plan .
Action Recommended
None . Personal physician based plans offer unequivocal quality , choice , and savings
for the consumers who choose them . Any legislation which restricts network based
plans would harm the consumer by eliminating the type of plan they have already
chosen , and increase health care costs for all .
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QUALITY OF CARE REGULATION

Issue
The Heal th Care Reform Act of 1992 directed the Agency on Heal th Care Administration
to simplify and modernize their regulatory programs , including those directed to
quality of care .
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
• Enhance quality assurance programs that rely on the measurement of desired outcomes
and the identification of deficient care .
• Ensure the delivery of high quality care and prevent quality of care deficiencies
prior to their occurrence .
Effects
•Providers and citizens concerned about big government would be disturbed by the
vague wording of these recommendations , which would give a government agency
inordinate power in developing policies , measures , and standards to define
the quality of care .
•Providers would question the AHCA ' s purpose in this area given the fact that there
is currently little scientific experience in the development and utilization
of quality of care standards .
•Patients and providers would be concerned that these recommendations would cause
confusion and jeopardize sound clinical practices .
•Taxpayers would criticize the state for wasting large sums of money to develop
policies and standards when the federal government and national organizations
are already committing vast resources to this effort.
•Patients and providers would resent the heavy- handed intrusion into the practice
of medicine by one governmental agency .

Alternative Proposals
The state ' s proposa l s rely too heavily on the AHCA to develop quality of care
policies , measures , and standards . Quality of care policies , measures and standards
should be developed through health care industry consensus , then adopted by the
AHCA.
The industry and the AHCA ' s efforts should be guided by the following:
• Use

scientifically- tested standards and policies supported by the federal
government and private , national organizations as they are released .

• Have the AHCA adopt only standards and policies for which scientific , medical
consensus has been reached .
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• Reaffirm the voluntary and educat i onal use o f practice parameters , (as was the
original i ntention of the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993)
• Support the qual i ty assurance programs which are driven by customer needs .
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RURAL HEALTH CARE

Issue
The Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 authorizes the development of rural health
networks as a means to ensure that quality health care is available and efficiently
delivered to all persons in rural areas of Fl or ida .
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
• Continue implementation of the rural heal th networks , defined as anon - profit legal entity ,
consisting of rural and urban health care providers and others , that is organized
to plan and deliver health care services on a cooperative basis in the rural area.
• Al low the Agency specific rule writing authority .
• Broaden network membership requirements to require all providers to abide by conditions
of provider network agreements , including reimbursement and criteria for provision
of uncompensated care .
Effects
• Requiring physicians to participate in rural health networks could result in physicians
leaving rural areas and could increase the difficulty of recruiting physicians into
these areas .
•Commercially insured individuals currently living in rural areas may face fewer choices
in the number of physicians available to them if greater numbers leave and fewer
enter .

• An intent of rural health networks is to maintain the existence of rural hospitals and
reduce outmigration of health care services . Patients and taxpayers may not want
some of these facilities to survive if they are inefficient (costly) , or substandard
because they have insufficient patients for the staff to maintain their medical
skills at a consistently high level .
•Players in the competitive health care market would be harmed .
Proliferation of
regulatory control in rural areas would be a barrier to the development of managed
competition .
Once a monopoly environment was established through state
intervention , it would be difficult for the marketplace to change it .
•Citizens concerned about big government and urban health care market players will be
concerned with the AHCA ' s use of a regulatory approach to rural health networks .
No one knows what the impact of rural health networks will be ; the only model
presented by the state is a private sector initiative in Iowa , not a regulatory
approach .

Alternative Proposals
• The marketplace should determine which services are provided cost - effectively .
• Rather than expanding a program whose implications are unknown , the state should evaluate
the ability of the rural health netwo rks established in 1992 legislation to meet
the needs of their markets .
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• Participation in rural health networks should be voluntary and more than one rural health
network should be allowed to operate in an area to promote competition and give
consumer choice .
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SELF-REGULATION

A . Introduction

A major component of BCBSF ' s draft comprehensive reform proposal is the establishment
of a priva t e organization to develop information standards to allow informed
consumer purchasing.
Called the Health Insurance Standards Board (HISB) ,
this organization would establish a form of self - regulation of the health
care industry by 1) defining tools needed to measure heal th plan and provider
performance , 2) developing standards for information reporting , 3) setting
standards for disseminating consumer information , and 4) developing a
benchmark benefit package for comparison shopping .
The purpose of this brief paper is to explain industry self - regulation , and describe
the elements that make self - regulation effective .
B.Self-Regulation

Self-regulation of an industry exists when members from within an industry develop
regulatory or standard-setting activities in the absence of explicit legal
requirements .
Self- regulation can take a number of forms .
The most
prevalent form is establishment of codes of ethics , mostly associated with
professional
organizations .
Other
forms
include
standard- setting
organizations like the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and
accreditation organizations such as the Joint Commission of Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO ) .
The

primary reason industries estab l ish self - regulation efforts is to adopt
regulation at their own initiative and to respond in their own style to
opportunities and threats posed by the external environment . Industries that
self - regulate can use it to their advantage by control l ing the f l ow of
information a regulatory agency receives , and by getting the government to
endorse industry self - regulation so that t he i ndustry can manage itself .

C.Effective Self-Regulation

Effective self - regulation depends on three things : 1) intra - industry cooperation ;
2) agreement upon the regulation ; and 3) mechanisms for monitoring and
compliance .
Intra - Industry Cooperation
The first step to achieving intra-industry cooperat i on is to bui l d consensus among
members of an industry that there is a problem and self - regulation is needed .
The threat of governmenta l regulation to so l ve the problem is often a powerful
motivator to spur industry action . However , the movement of an industry to
regulate itself must be perceived t o be in the public interest and not
self - serving . The development of authority solely in the self - interest of
the industry may provide government with an impetus to init i ate its own
regulation .
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For example , the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) has recently called
for self - regulation to restrict prescription drug prices in an effort to
limit average annual drug price increases to the general rate of inflation.
Their initiative came within weeks of a damaging Congressional report which
suggested the industry was pricing products too high . In this case , PMA ' s
voluntary effort to self - regulate was too late

and perceived as self-interested regulation , and only reinforced perceptions
generated by the Congressional report that prescription drug prices need
to be controlled.
Agreement on the Regulation
Once agreement within the industry is reached on the need for self - regulation and
the regulatory activity is not perceived as industry self - interest , effective
self - regulation requires uniform acceptance of regulation .
That is , all
members of the industry must agree on similar processes for guiding the
development of regulation .
When building agreement on regulation , one
important aspect to consider is the members ' interpretation of the regulation .
While some members will follow the regulation very narrowly and
legalistically, some will allow for more individual interpretation .
To
resolve this problem , industry members need to be monitored and held
accountable for their actions .
Monitoring and Compliance Mechanisms
Monitoring and compliance also requires industry- wide acceptance of standards and
agreed upon sanctions to be effective .
Some experts believe that
effectiveness of self - regulation is positively related to the number of
provisions for sanctions for noncompliance and their perceived threat of
sanctions . Critics of self - regulation claim that regulation by an industry
often lacks adequate sanctions because regulators many times do not have
legal mandates for compliance .
They claim that without legal mandates,
industry compliance and monitoring may be superficial . Furthermore , unless
the audit procedure used for monitoring is seen as a legitimate and effective
vehicle of accountability , it will serve more as a buffer from criticism
than as a true monitoring device .
The problem of compliance without legal mandate is illustrated in FASB ' s history .
Originally , FASB ' s authority for setting general accepted accounting
principles was established when it was endorsed by state boards of public
accounting and by major professional organizations . However , real authority
did not come until the Securities and Exchange Commission required that all
registrants ' reports filed with the Commission follow FASB standards .
In sum , effective self- regulation depends on 1) intra - industry attention to a problem
and cooperation in establishing self - regulation that is perceived to be in
the public interest ; 2) industry agreement on the processes used for developing
regulation; and 3) industry consensus on the standards that will be used
IP54 - August 1 993
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to monitor and agreed upon sanctions for noncompliance (it is also helpful
if industry self - regulation receives government endorsement to strengthen
member compliance)
D.BCBSF Position

The

external conditions necessary to initiate self - regulation of consumer
i nformation are present within the heal th care industry . There is widespread
agreement that our current system does not allow for informed consumers ,
an essential ingredient of a well - functioning market . Additionally , there
is a real threat of more government regulation .
However , despite the
recognition of these problems and external threat , the health care industry
is so complex , with such variety of stakeholders , that building intra - industry
cooperation to address these problems is probably the most difficult step
in implementing effective self - regulation .

BCBSF believes that the HISB organization designed comprehensive reform proposal
will be able to effectively initiate and implement self - regulation that will
improve conditions in the system , eliminating the need for further government
regulation .
First , the HISB organization would have members from all
stakeholders in the heal th care market (e . g ., consumers , employers , providers ,
insurers) , and be governed by a Board of Directors composed of representatives
from each stakeholder group .
This will facilitate cooperation within the
industry and open the way for successful self - regulation . Secondly , the HISB
organization will work closely with the government to craft legislation that
grants the HISB organization authority to develop information standards ,
set information reporting and collection requirements , and establ i sh
monitoring and compliance rules .
This will strengthen HISB ' s influence
within the industry and provide for effective self - regulation .
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STANDARD BENEFIT PACKAGE

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports a benchmark benefit package to be
used to promote comparability between health plans , in supp o rt o f employer and
employee decision making . The purpose of this package would not be t o limit the
products offered in the market or make this package t he minimum (the floor ) . Rather ,
the benchmark package would provide a baseline measure , against which industry
actuaries , employers , employees , and individual consumers could evaluate health
plans for comparability of services and price .
Government could use the cost of the benchmark package to establish the basis for
a purchase subsidy for low- income Americans .
Purchasing groups could use the
benchmark as a measuring tool for pro viding information to members .
We envision that the benchmark plan would be relatively lean in terms of benefits ,
to keep it affordable for mo st people .

I P55

STANDARD BENEFIT PLAN - ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

Background
• SB 2390 (1992) directed
1 . the Department of Insurance (DOI) to update the Basic and Standard plans for small
employers , which insurers in the small group market were mandated to
offer (inside and outside the CHPAs) ; and
2 . the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to develop by 12/31/93 , and
subject to legislative approval , a Basic Benefit Standard to be used
as the " floor " set of benefits for all Floridians .
• Insurers in the small group market began offering the DOI ' s revised Basic and
Standard products on 01/01/94.
•AHCA has proposed its Basic Benefit Standard be adopted by the 1994 Legislature .

Analysis
• There is a need for a standardized set of benefits to allow consumers in the small
group market to compare health care plans .
•A standardized set of benefits is also necessary to establish a benchmark premium
for a state - funded subsidy program for low- income Floridians to purchase
private health insurance .
•AHCA ' s Basic Benefits Standard (BBS) is not a good " package " for low- income
Floridians : to keep the premium price down , the co - insurance amounts are
extremely high for the non - HMO versions (50 - 50 or 60 - 40)
Low- income
Floridians cannot afford this level of out - of - pocket costs .
• The DOI ' s Standard product reflects the benefits included in traditional insurance
products .
It is priced a little lower than independent actuarys ' estimated
prices for the AHCA ' s BBS ; more importantly , it has 80 - 20 co - insurance , making
out - of - pocket costs much lower for this product .

Proposal
• Do not enact the AHCA ' s BBS .
• Consumers in the small group market should use the DOI ' s Basic and Standard products
for comparison purposes .
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STANDARD-SETTING/ACCREDITING
ORGANIZATIONS
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HIGHLIGHTS

Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
• Not - for - profit organization that sets standards of quality for accreditation of
hospitals
• Twenty- eight member Board of Commissioners with 22 members from the medical industry
and 6 from the general public
• Financed from survey fees and membership dues

Financial Accounting Standards Board
• Independent , private - sector organization that sets general accounting standards .
• Six member board with senior - level accounting experience appointed by the Financial
Accounting Foundation

• Funded by the Financial Accounting Fo undation through sales of publications and
donations from constituents

Florida ' s) Health Care Board
•Arm of the Agency for Health Care Administration that reviews and approves all
Florida hospital and nursing home budgets
• Eleven member board appointed by the Governor
•All fund i ng is from HCA

National Association of Insurance Commissioners
• Private organization of state insurance commissioners that sets reporting
requirements for U. S . licensed insurers and optional standards for regulators
• Twelve member Executive Committee with representation for all regions of the country
• Financed from filing fees , publication , and subscription sales

National Committee for Quality Assurance
• Independent quality assurance review organization for managed care organizations
• Fourteen member Board of Directors comprised of providers , users , and purchasers
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• Financed from accreditation review fees and grants
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JOINT COMMISSION OF ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS (JCAHO)

History/Origins
In 1917 , the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hea lthcare Organ izat ion (JCAHO)
was established by the American Col lege of Surgeons to survey hospitals and accredit
them for minimal acceptable standards.
In 1966 , JCAHO refocused its direction and revised its standards to reflect optimal
achievable standards , rather than minimal acceptable standards.
This change
occurred for two reasons: 1) most hospita ls in the country had achieved the minimum
standards , and 2) other organizat i onal entities , such as federal and state regulatory
agencies , had incorporated similar standards into their regulations .
In addition , during the 1960's , there was increased concern about the quality of
care provided by other types of healthcare organizations .
The JCAHO took this
opportunity to expand its orig inal scope, and , in collaboration with national
professional organizations , began developing standards and programs to accredit
other facilities , such as:
- long term ca re facilities (established in 1965) ;
- psychiatric/substance abuse/community mental health programs
- ambulatory care ( 19 75) ;
-hosp i ces (1983 , terminated in 1990) ;
- managed care (1988 , terminated in 1990) ; and
- home care (1988) .

(1970) ;

In the past few years , criticism from external groups that the JCAHO is "merely
a t rade organization " has prompted additional significant changes . These changes
in clude :
- requiring that the commission share
confidentiality policy ; and

more

information

and

liberalize

its

- appointing non - health care professionals to the board ; and
- developing more sophisticated accreditation categories.

Miss i on
" The mission of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
is to improve the quality of heal th care provided to the public . The Joint Commission
develops standards of quality in collaboration with heal th professionals and others
and stimulates health care organizations to meet or exceed the standards through
accreditation and the teaching of quality improvement concepts ."
Structure
The Joint Commission is governed by a 28 - member Board of Commiss i oners with the
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members from the following organizations :
-7
-7
-3
-3
-1

from
from
from
from
from

the
the
the
the
the

American
American
American
American
American

Medical Association
Hospital Association
College of Physicians
College of Surgeons
Dental Association

- 1 from the American Nurses Association
- 6 from the public (2 seats will be filed in 1994)
JCAHO staff is made - up of more than 500 physicians , nurses , health care
administrators , medical technologists , psychologists , respiratory therapists ,
pharmacists , durable medical equipment providers , and social workers who are
employed part of full - time to perform surveys .
JCAHO surveys are scheduled every three years .
Accreditation requirements for
hospitals consist of compliance with 2 , 000 standards in 23 general categories ,
including medical staff , governing body , quality assurance , surgical and anesthesia
services , social work , special care units , utilization review and plant , technology
and safety management.
Financing
The JCAHO is a not-for - profit organization (files a 990 form) financed from survey
fees and membership dues . In 1990 , total revenues of $44 . 4 million were up 16 . 5 %
from the previous year . JCAHO ' s net income also rose more than 300 % to $1 . 4 million
in 1990 from $329 , 631 in 1989 . The increase in revenues was largely due to a 20 %
increase in the number of surveys performed by the JCAHO and a corresponding 16.7 %
increase in survey fees collected .
Relationship to the Industry
In 1990 , 5 , 408 accreditation surveys of various healthcare facilities were performed
collecting $30 . 9 million in survey fees , or an average of $5 , 710 per survey. About
80 % of the nation ' s hospitals are accredited by the commission .
Fewer than 1 % of
hospitals surveyed fail to meet standards and are denied accreditation outright .
However , the JCAHO has long maintained that it is an " educational and consultative
service " less interested in not granting accreditation than it is in improving the
situation .
Regulatory Authority
JCAHO has no statutory authority to regulate hospitals . However , JCAHO ' s hospital
accreditation program is recognized by 43 states for hospital licensure purposes
and , more importantly , by the federal Health Care Financing Administration as a
requirement to receive Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements .
Relationship to the Government
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In recent years , HCFA (and some consumer groups) has expressed concern that the
JCAHO is too close to the industry and that its surveys were too lax in some areas .
In Congressional testimony in 1990 , Gail Wilensky reported that HCFA began to see
an increase in the number of significant deficiencies found by state agencies , which
had not been identified by the Joint Commission .
HCFA found about one - third of
the hospitals reviewed were out of compliance with Medicare conditions .
Mechanisms for Dissemination of Information
Information is disseminated to facility members in a number of ways :
seminars , and telephone help - lines.
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publications ,

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (FASB)

History/Origins
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were passed to
help get the U. S . economy moving again in the midst of the Depression and bring
confidence to the financial markets by regulating and setting accounting and
reporting standards .
These laws also granted authority to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue regulations concerning the contents o f financial
statements.
From the onset , it was clear that the SEC would require experts to provide adequate
guidance in the development of standards . Thus , in 1938 , the American Institute
of Accountants (now the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants)
responded by upgrading the activity of its Committee on Accounting Procedure to
help auditors identify " generally accepted accounting principles " (GAAP) .
This
committee (whose name has changed over the years) operated until 1970 , when the
perception that it was protecting the interests of auditors and their clients more
effectively than the public ' s interest caused irreparable damage to its credibility .
In response , a cross - section of business leaders agreed to establish the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 1973 , as an independent , private - sector
organization that sets accounting standards .
The FASB organization differed from its predecessors by not being part of the auditing
establishment .
FASB was designed to stand alone with full - time Board members ,
accountable only to the public for their performance in determining what constitutes
GAAP .
Mission
FASB , empowered by the Securities and Exchange Commission , has a fiduciary duty
to protect the public interest by gett ing relevant and reliable information to the
capital markets and identifying and setting " generally accepted accounting
principles ."
Structure
Located in Norwalk , CT , FASB has six board members and a chairman . Board members
are appointed by a 16 member board of trustees from the Financial Accounting
Foundation (FAF) . All seven members are experienced senior - level accountants with
different backgrounds (public accounting firms , university faculties , and corporate
settings) .
The members serve a five year term with the possibility for one
reappointment.
The Board is supported by a 40 person professional staff .
In 1991 , members received $290 , 000 annual sa l ary and the chairman $350 , 000 .
FASB , usually follows a six step problem- solving process :
Step lidentifying a problem :

A problem is identified when FASB discovers divergent
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practices for reporting transactions resulting in significantly different
presentations and impaired comparability . Sources for problems are:
SEC ,
business publications , and corporate financial managers and analysts .
Step 2Agenda setting :
The Board determines what issues they will address .
One
of their criteria is that a consensus is likely to be reached -- if consensus
seems difficult to achieve , a project is typically not created .

Step 3Preliminary deliberations : The Board , with staff support , defines the issues
and identifies all possible resolutions . This step involves a substantial
amount of time and effort .
Input is requested from constituents through
formal channels , such as task force meetings , responses to " discussion
memoranda ," and occasionally public hearings. Once research is complete ,
the Board turns to sorting through the arguments , prioritizing and building
consensus .
Step 4Tentative solution :
A working draft is produced which includes all the
arguments and possible outcomes .
Step SContinued deliberations :
The Board firms up the tentative resolution and
works out the technical glitches .
Some input from outside sources takes
place at this phase , primarily through informal channels .
Step 6Final resolution : A final resolution is released in a " Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards ."
These resolutions must be used in financial
statements.
The compulsion comes from professional ethics standards , state
licensing laws , and the SEC .
Financing
In an attempt to insulate the Board from political pressures , the Financial
Accounting Foundation ( FAF) was given responsibility for raising the funds to operate
FASB . In 1991 , the operating budget was approximately $12 million . The two primary
revenue sources are sales of publications and donations from constituents .
FASB does not receive any government funding .
Relationship to the Industry
Considered at one time to be protecting the interests of auditors and their clients ,
the present FASB organization was established in 1973 by a cross - section of business
leaders.
Although not as damaging , the influence of special interest groups in
today ' s FASB continues to cause credibility problems . The appointment of FASB board
members and a large portion of funding (companies and accounting firms provided
35 % of FASB ' s $15 million annual budget in 1992) is conducted by the Financial
Accounting federation which is heavily influenced by accounting firms and corporate
America .
Regulatory Authority
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FASB ' s authority for setting GAAP was established when it was endorsed by state
boards of public accounting and by major professional organizations (including the
AICPA , the Fi nancial Executives I nstitute , the National Association of Accountants ,
the Securities Industry Association and the American Accounting Association) .
However , real authority did not come until the SEC required that all registrants '
reports filed with t he Commission follow FASB standards .
Relationship to Government
FASB ' s relationship to government is one of a standard and policy setting
organization . The FASB organization i s a political structure designed to settle
significant financing and accounting controversies .
FASB is not designed to be
a democratic body , in that i ts r ulings are not supposed to reflect the desires of
the majority of those who participate in the process .
Instead , FSB is supposed
to protect the public interest and bring confidence to the financial markets when
resolving problems .

Mechanisms for Dissemination of Information
Final resolutions are typ i cally expressed in the " Statement of Financia l Accounting
Standards ."
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(FLORIDA'S) HEALTH CARE BOARD

History/Mission
The Heal th Care Reform Act of 1992 created the Agency for Heal th Care Administration
and also established the Heal th Care Board . The 11 member board is a reconstituted
Heal th Care Cost Containment Board , responsible for hospital and nursing home budget
and expenditure regulation , other health care provider data reporting , and special
studies requested by the governor and the legislature .
Structure
The board is made up of 11 members appointed by the governor , subject to confirmation
by the Senate , to service a 3 year term.
Members of the board consist of :
- four members from the provider community ; one individual physician with experience
in a ambulatory setting , one representative of nursing homes , and two
representatives from hospitals (one for - profit and one from a not - for - profit) ,
- three members from the business community ,
- one member f r om the insurance industry , and
- three members that are consumers

(one from a major consumer organization) .

The board reviews each hospital and nursing home budget on a micro - management level
to determine whether the gross revenue per adjusted admission or the net revenue
per adjusted admission contained in the budget is " just , reasonable , and not
excessive ."
In determining the budget , the board considers the following criteria :
a . the ability of the hospital to earn a reasonable rate of return based on reasonable
and justifiable costs ,
b . the impact of patient days attributable to the medically indigent ,
c . the impact of patient days reimbursed by Medicaid and Medicare ,
d . the research and educational services provided by the hospital if it is a teaching
hospital ,
e . the cost and efficiency of providing the current and proposed services ,
£ . the change in hospital costs as measured by changes in the severity of illness ,
including changes in the case mix , and
g . the accuracy of precious budget submissions compared to the actual experience
of the hospital .
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The board is also responsible for hearing all appeals .
Financing
All funding for the Health Care Board is from AHCA .

Relationship to the Industry
The board works on a individual basis with hospitals and nursing homes . Presently ,
there is movement by AHCA to be more supportive of the hospital industry in an effort
to enlist their support for the agency ' s reform efforts .
Regulatory Authority
The board has statutory authority to review and approve all Florida hospital and
nursing home budgets .
Relationship to the Government
The Health Care Board is a heavily politicized organization .
In addition to all
the members being appointed by the governor , all resources ava i lable to the board ,
including staff , is controlled by the agency .
Mechanics for Di ssemination of Information
Pursuant to the statute , the board may " publish its finding in connection with any
review conducted under this section in the newspaper of the largest circulation
in the county in which the hospital is located. "
Moreover , AHCA has recently expressed some desire t o move the board away from a
micro - management level of budget review to a more informational type funct i on .
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS
History/Origins
Created in 1871 to help the states monitor multi - state insurance companies , the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) established reporting
requirements for U.S . licensed insurers and optional standards for regulators.
NAIC is a voluntary association made up of the heads of the insurance departments
of the 50 states , the District of Columbia , and four U. S . territories .
NAIC also develops and adopts model laws and regulations that state insurance
commissioners collectively believe are needed to regulate the insurance business .
Many states adopt NAIC ' s models , but NAIC has no authority to require individual
states to adopt these models .
Mission
" The objective of this body is to serve the public by assisting the several state
insurance supervisory officials , individually and collectively , in achieving the
following fundamental insurance regulatory objective :
l . Maintenance and improvement of state regulation of insurance in a responsive and
efficient manner ;
2 . reliability of the insurance institution as to financial solidity and guaranty
against loss ;
3 . fair ,

just , and equitable treatment of policyholders and claimants. "

Structure
Membership of the NAIC is made up of the heads of each state insurance department ,
the Distr i ct columb i a , and four U. S . territories . NAIC divides the country into
four regional zones where a chairperson , v i ce - chairperson , and secretary are
elected . These officers serve on the national Executive Committee that is in charge
of managing and directing subcommittees , task forces , and the Support and Services
Office (SSO).
The SSO is the management and staff for the NAIC and i s responsible for research ,
analysis , data collection , report generating and dissemination , government liaison ,
regulatory drafting and educational development.
Staffing of the SSO has grown
in the last few years , from 72 in 1987 , to 142 in 1991 . NAIC ' s employment growth
reflects its efforts to provide more service to state regulators.
Much of the staff
expansion has occurred in the information systems department .
NAIC holds two national meetings in June and December .
Financing
In 1991 , NAIC estimated its total revenue to be $16 . 2 million .
NAIC relies on
insurance data filing fees for the majority of its funding , (46 % of its revenue) .
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The remaining revenues are received through the sale of publications ,
subscriptions , services , and software.
State assessments ( government funding) were
estimated to be about 5 . 3 % for 1991 .
Relationship to the Industry
NAIC establishes solvency regulations and insurance standards for insurers and state
regulators . However , NAIC has no governmental authority to enforce its standards .
That authority resides with state insurance departments .
Regulatory Authority
In 1945 , Congress enacted the McCarran - Ferguson Act delegating the day - to - day
business of insurance to the states ; each state has the exclusive authority to
establish and implement solvency regulation within its jurisdiction .
Relationship to the Government
As mentioned above , NAIC establishes only voluntary standards for insurers and state
regulators .
In the state - by- state system of solvency regulation now in place , NAIC
cannot compel states to accept and implement its standards because Congress has
allocated that authority to the states themselves .
Even if states voluntarily
granted the authority to the NAIC to enforce solvency standards on insurers , the
NAIC ' s standing as a regulator would always be weak because its authority would
be subject to revocation at any time by each state ' s legislature . Moreover , even
with universal adoption by state insurance departments , NAIC ' s solvency standards
are too genera l to be effective to achieve uniformity since they do not set specific
criteria or practices .
In an effort to strengthen the relationship to government , NAIC recently adopted
an accreditation program to encourage state insurance departments to comply with
its new financ i al regulation standards .
States that satisfy NAIC ' s financial
regulation standards wi l l be publicly recognized by NAIC as " accredited " while
departments not in compliance will rece i ve guidance on how to comply .
(The
accreditation period lasts for 5 years . )
Mechanisms for Dissemination of Information
NAIC has expanded its data base services extensively in the l ast few yea r s . The
most recent s i x years of financia l data for about 5 , 200 i nsurance companies are
maintained on - line for regulatory analysis .
NAIC has legal and regulato r y data bases to help state regulators share information
about troubled multi - state insurers . Among these data bases there was an on -l ine
access to the names of more than 49 , 000 insurance companies , agencies , and agents
that have been subject to some type of formal regulatory or disc i plinary action .
NAIC has also developed a national complaint data base that will help each state
assess policyholder complaints from other states about multi - state insurers and
agencies .
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In 1990 , NAIC established a new computer - based financial analysis system to identify
potentially troubled companies requiring state action.
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NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE
( Prepare d by : Karen Stoops , Quality/Utiliza t ion Program Man a gemen t)

History/Origins
NCQA is part of a unique partnership between Managed Care Organizations and
purchasers of managed care . The organization was founded in 1979 as a joint effort
by Group Health Association of America (GHAA) and American Managed Care and Review
Association (AMCRA) in response to Federal concern about the quality of care and
service delivered by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) .
In 1987 , NCQA revised
their Board of Directors . In 1988 , the organization conducted a feasibility study
relative to the NCQA becoming independent.
NCQA received a grant from the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation for $308 , 000 .
In addition , GHAA conducted a " fund drive "
with Managed Care Organizations and purchasers and matched grant funds . NCQA is
currently self - supporting through Accreditation Review fees and grants .
The organization has performed external reviews since 1979 and began accreditation
surveys in January 1991. NCQA Standards include Quality , Improvement , Utilization
Management , Credentialling , Members Rights and Responsibilities , Preventive Health
Services , and Medical Record Documentation .
Mission/Goals
The principal purpose of the NCQA is to provide a survey process which will assist
in ensuring the delivery of quality care by prepaid health care organ izati ons .
The survey will result in recommendations regarding the adequacy of the Plan ' s
process for monitoring care and appropriate response to all aspects of care ,
including but not limited to the quality of medical care and service , appropriate
utilization , accessibility , availability , and acceptability.
The NCQA Board of Directors recognizes that the growth of HMOs and managed care
systems has intensifie d the interest of employers , unions , and other purchasers
and consumers of heal th services in evaluating the quality of care provided by managed
care systems .
In response , the NCQA review process provides the additional measure
of assurance to purchasers of health ca re services that HMOs not only have internal
quality improvement mechanisms , but a l so that these mechanisms function in an
effective manner .
Specific goals include :
- Foster development and strengthening of internal systems for quality improvement .
- Assess quality of medical management .
- Develop re liab le and comparable measures of system performance relative to Quality
of Care and Quality of Service .
Structure/General Organization
NCQA incorporates a unique partnership through the organ iz ation of their Board o f
I P56 - July 1993
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Directors , Users Group , Review Oversight Committee , and Standards Committee .
The Board of Dire ctors is self-perpetuating and is comprised of 14 members .
membership includes:
-

4
3
3
1
1
1

The

managed care organization industry physicians
health services researchers
employee representatives
union representative
consumer representative
physician consultant

The Users Group is comprised of 10 members who are purchasers of heal th care services .
The group has active participation , meets twice a year , and provides input into
standards and revisions . Membership includes AARP , Bank of America , Communications
Workers of America, Ford , GE , GM , National Consumers League , Pacific Bell , United
Auto Workers , and Xerox .
The Review Oversight Committee (ROC) provides NCQA ' s internal quality assurance .
The ROC reviews every survey assessment report , checking for consistency and makes
the official accreditation decisions . The committee is comprised of 5 physician
directors and chief executive officers .
The Standards Committee is comprised of 8 members who are active in the managed
care organ izati on field . The members are appointed by the board and receive input
from the Review Oversight Committee and the Users Group .
The Committee ensures
that NCQA standards are comprehensive , consistent with quality improvement theory ,
and responsive to the needs of NCQA customers .
Financing and Cost
The National Committee for Quality Assurance is a non - profit , independent, external
quality assurance review organizat i on for managed care organizations .
NCQA is
currently self - supporting on Accreditation Review fees and grants .
Relationship to the Industry
NCQA provides external assessment of Managed Care Organizations , including HMOs ,
Preferred Provider Organizations ( PPOs) , Point of Service ( POS) , and Medical Groups .
NCQA has performed resear ch and development and consultation to the Managed Care
industry .
For example , NCQA worked in a coordinated effort with GHAA on the Heal th
Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) project .
In addition , NCQA has worked with the Michigan Project , which includes the State
of Michigan , three automobile companies (Chrysler , Ford, and General Motors) , and
the United Auto Workers collaborating in the development and implementation of a
review process . The project has four components :
- The Plan's quality improvement systems will be assessed using NCQA ' s established
standards .
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-Medical record reviews will be conducted , using explicit criteria , to assess the
quality of care provided to patients in five diagnostic categories : hypertension ,
diabetes , prenatal care at initia l visit , prenatal care at 28 weeks , and otitis
media follow - up .
In addition , four preventive services have been identified
for review : prostate cancer screening , breast cancer screening , cholesterol
screening , and childhood immunizations for Hemophilus Influenza B .
- Level of employee satisfaction with individual HMOs will be assessed using a survey
instrument developed for GHAA .
-Access to mental heal th and substance abuse services will be assessed; the measures
employed address , for example , the organization , availability, and utilization
rates of these services .
NCQA has worked closely with the Ford Motor Company and the United Auto Workers
to conduct reviews of HMOs out side of Michigan .
The reviews focused on the structure
and operation of the quality improvement system, the Plan's policies and
implementation of these policies relating to preventive services , and access to
mental health substance abuse services .
Several national and local accounts specifically require accreditation by NCQA .
GM goes so far as to ask , " if not pursuing accreditation with NCQA - why you have
chosen not to ." These accounts include , AT&T , Ryder , Ameritech , GM , Xerox , Ford ,
SunTrust , Barnett Bank , Alachua County School Board , and Southeast Bank.
Blue Cross
Association National Accounts has found that NCQA is encouraging employers to request
NCQA accreditation in their Requests for Proposals to assure that effective quality
programs are in place .
Regulatory Authority
NCQA currently is contracted to perform accreditation surveys and/or external
reviews in Florida , Oklahoma , Kansas , and Pennsylvania .
Florida is the first state
to require HMOs to receive accreditation every two years to maintain state licensure .
NCQA is one of three organizations (NCQA , Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations , Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care ,
Inc . ) approved to conduct accreditation reviews . Oklahoma chose NCQA to perform
accreditation surveys . Their state HMOs can choose to have NCQA conduct the survey
rather than having a state review .
Kansas approved NCQA to conduct HMO reviews
for licensure purposes . NCQA is one of three organizations that has been approved
by the Commonweal th of Pennsylvania to review HMOs for purposes of state licensure .
Relationship t o the Government
NCQA is an independent , non - profit organization .
The organization has no official
relationship to the federal and state governments .
It has provided consultation
to the National Health Care Reform.
In addition , NCQA has consulted the Health
Care Financing Administration (HC FA ) relative to Medicaid and Medicare , NCQA
currently is contracted to perform accreditation surveys and/or external reviews
in Florida , Oklahoma , Kansas , and Pennsylvania .
Mechanisms for Dissemination of Information
IP56 - July 1993
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Mechanisms for the dissem i nation of information include , but are not limited to ,
conferences , press releases , trade associations , and employer groups .
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OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Federal Reserve Board
• Independent body of the executive branch
• Seven members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate
• Funded through Federal Reserve System , no federal funding is appropriated
Securities and Exchange Commission
• Independent body of executive branch
• Five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate
• Funding is half federal , half by fees
Prospective Payment Assessment Commission
•Advisory arm of Congress ; also makes recommendations to HHS
• Funded separately by Congress
• Twenty- five professional staff members
• Sometimes works in subgroups
Physician Payment Review Commission
•Advisory arm of Congress ; also works with HHS
• Thirteen members appointed by Office of Technology Assessment
• Funded separately by Congress
• Twenty- five professional staff members
•Works only in commission as whole
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STANDARDIZED CLAIM FORMS

Issue
The Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 directed the AHCA to develop
standardized claim forms t o be used by all Florida licensed insurers and health
care providers in an effort to reduce administrative costs .
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
• Requiring all insurers to accept certain HCFA forms .
• Requiring all insurers either bill a patient ' s insurer directly o r provide the
patient with a properly completed claim form .
• Providing flexibility on the use of provider identifiers until a federal standard
is defined .
•Authorizing the AHCA to adopt EDI standards as they are adopted officially by the
federal government .
• Establishing a task force , coordinated by AHCA , to assist insurers and providers
in simplifying explanations of benefits ,
standardization of claims
attachments , and to promote other consumer protection and administrative
simplification projects.
Effects
•Physicians who have manual claims filing systems , especially those in solo practices
or in small offices (many of which exist in rural areas) could be financially
at risk if the AHCA moves too quickly in requiring the automation of claims
filing .
•Floridians concerned with big government would disapprove of AHCA establishing
a government - funded task force to assist insurers and providers in their
business options , when there are other organizations already performing these
tasks .

• Considerations for changing the filing procedures for all health care players must
include the necessary time and expense to educate patients, employers, and
providers.
• The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is developing and adopting
national standards for the exchange of electronic data . National standards
must be thoroughly tested to ensure that all players in the health care market
have a workable system . A poorly designed and tested system will only increase
costs for everyone in the end . The state should not adopt interim standards .
Alternative Proposal
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• Encourage and support the efforts of the health care industry to standardize and
automate data and claims processing .
The market has a vested interest in
ensuring as fast a change as possible , yet the market also understands the
cost - effectiveness of doing it right the first time .
• Encourage the AHCA to adopt ANSI standards for providers and insurers as these
standards are officially adopted in both the public and private arenas .
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STATE EMPLOYEE PLAN

Issue
The Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 (SB 1914) allows the AHCA to move
the State Employee Program into CHPAs if certain criteria are met . The state needs
to determine whether and how to proceed with placing state employees in CHPAs .
If CHPAs are not used for state employees , the Legislature may consider other changes
in the structure of the state health benefits program .
The Florida Health Security Plan Proposes
• Instituting a financial incentive which will allow state employees to consider
their own costs in selecting plans (i . e ., varying the employee ' s contribution
for health insurance depending on the cost of the plan selected) .
• Designating the AHCA , in consultation with the Department of Management Services ,
as the state agency responsible for determining the health benefits for state
employees .
• Granting AHCA maximum flexibility in choosing health plans available to state
employees (i . e ., authorizing the AHCA to consider only cost and additional
benefits when selecting insurance car riers , reducing the requirement of S
HMOs and S PPOs to 2 and 2) .
Effects
• Some state employees might be asked to contribute more to the cost of their coverage ;
the increase could be quite large depending on how the state ' s contribution
is determined .
•State employees might lose substantial control over their health care insurance
choices if the AHCA is granted maximum flexibility in choosing heal th benefits
for state employees . One form this could take is limiting state employees '
choices of health plans from S to 2 .

Alternative Proposal
The state should not substitute decision - making by the AHCA for the decision - making
of state emp l oyees . State employees should choose from among S PPOs and S HMOs ,
and the state should assure that the AHCA uses multiple criteria (e . g ., access to
quality care , member satisfaction) in selecting the 5 , not just price .
If the state employees are moved into CHPAs :
• The state/AHCA should ensure that the SB 1914 criteria are met :
- no reduction in state employee health benefits ,
- no increase in costs for the state of its employees , and
- quality of care for state employees increases .
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• The state should structure the state employee program like the Federal Employee
Program , allowing choice among a wide variety of AHPs , recognizing geographic
differences in the cost of medical care and health care coverage , and basing
the employer ' s contribution on an average of the largest plans .
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TARGETS

Introduction
The Florida Health Care Reform Act of 1992 calls for the establishment of targets
for health care spending and coverage . We support the attempt to develop targets
and believe they are consistent with a results - oriented approach to government .
The current approach calling for cost and access targets must be broadened to include
efficiency and quality of health care .
Cr i tical Issues
• Need t o be concerned about efficiency - the value per cost not just cost
- Need to make the system more efficient so that for a given level of benefit , costs
will be lower
- Need to understand that people will want more and more benefit , so overall costs
are not likely to decrease
• Defining the problem in efficiency terms leads to a concern that we have quality
targets , not just cost and access targets
• Need to appreciate the inf l uence on targets of factors external to the health care
system
- violence , illegal drugs , and AIDS are having a great effect on costs
- Florida ' s economy greatly affects access ; fluctuations in the economy will affect ,
positively or negatively , the progress toward meeting targets
• Concern that :
- targets are developed and used in a way that takes into account the enormous
conceptual and measurement challenges ; and
- targets are real i stic , given the problems and feasible solutions

IP59 - November 1992

THE UNINSURED

Background
We have developed a comprehensive problem statement to guide our approach to
reforming the health care system . Our problem statement emphasizes the issues of
access and cost . A major component of the access issue is the number of Americans
who have no health insurance coverage .
These people are dependent on their own
financial resources to pay for both ordinary medical services and those related
to chronic and catastrophic illnesses .
Policy makers and others have tended to oversimplify the problem of the uninsured
by defining it as a small employer problem .
Tow of the most frequently cited
statistics affecting recent or proposed policy reforms related to the uninsured
are that 1) the majority of the uninsured are workers or the dependents of workers ;
and 2) the majority of these workers are employed by small companies.
while these
statistics could lead to the conclusion that sma l l companies and their workers are
the uninsured problem , in fact , the uninsured are not a homogeneous group .
Furthermore , health care system reforms aimed at the uninsured which focus only
on the small group market will not have a substantial impact on the uninsured problem .
In order to address the problems of the uninsured adequately , we must understand
the facts related to this population .
The Uninsured
At any given time , approximately 1 in 5 Floridians are uninsured .
In Florida ,
BCBSF ' s 1992 Under 65 Market Segment Study indicates that 24 % of the population
is uninsured (2 , 710 , 287 people) .
• Half of the uninsured Floridians will be without coverage for less than 6 months
(based on 1992 Urban Institute findings) .
- Some Floridians are temporarily uninsured because they are between jobs .
- This category also includes the majority of working Floridians who are without
coverage for some period of time , for example , because of eligibility
waiting periods .
• Some Floridi ans are chronically uninsured even though they are working ( " chronic "
means their spells without insurance last longer than 6 months)
• Other Floridians are chronically uninsured while they are chronically unemployed
(that is , they are unemployed for longer than six months) .
Discussion
These facts about the uninsured make several things very clear . The bas i c issues
remain access and cost . However , assuming that the uninsured represent a relatively
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homogeneous group of peop l e , for whom relatively simple (uni - dimensional)
will suffice , will lead us to the wrong solutions .
In fact , uninsured
are a very heterogeneous population .
Because of the differences
uninsured , grounded primarily in the reasons for their lack of health
coverage , solutions which provi de access to health care coverage for the
must be heterogeneous as well .

solutions
Americans
among the
insurance
uninsured

We have defined f i ve categor i es within the uninsured population (the estimates 1 of
size are rough approx i mations at this time , de ri ved from available data , and have
been rounded to simp l ify comparison) :
l . Those who are working but temporarily uninsured , and their dependents (estimate :
1 , 000 , 000)
This category includes people in new jobs who are subject to waiting periods and/ or
pre - existing condition exclusions .
I t also includes those who wo r k for
employers who temporarily drop (lapse) their heal th care plans . These people
have an income during their uninsured period . Nevertheless , they have probably
chosen to go wi thout coverage until el i gible for the i r new employer ' s plan .
2 . Temporarily unemployed ( that is , for up to six months) people and their dependents
(estimate : 300 , 000)
People who are temporarily out of work may be be t ween jobs or laid off , or they
may be recent graduates looking for the i r first job .
The people in this category of the uninsured have chosen to forego coverage while
they are unemployed .
They are not representative of most temporarily
unemployed Floridians . The majority of those who are between jobs have some
kind of interim health care coverage .
3 . Those who are working but chronically uninsured worke r s , and their dependents
(estimate : 600 , 000 - 700 , 000)
The majority of these people work for small companies , but some work for la r ge f i rms .
Most of these people are in low wage jobs , and the cost of individual coverage
represents a s i gnificant part of their income .
(Note :

We hope to break this group down by company characteristics , includi ng size)

4 . Chronical l y unemployed peop l e and their dependents (estimate : 500 , 000 - 600 , 000)
Those who have not been working for 7 or more months include the long - term unemployed ,
early retirees , and the very wealthy .
For the long - term unemployed , paying for insurance coverage becomes impossible or
1

These numbers are ver y preliminar y .
Fo cus sh o uld be o n the
categ o ries, n o t their estimated size, while we de v elop mo re
a ccurate figures.
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is a much lower priority than purchasing other necessities , such as rent
or mortgage payments , food , and clothing . As the economy has sl o wed , this
group has grown . Reforming the health care system will have little impact
if lack of coverage is due to the overall economic conditions of the nation
and Florida : inadequate funding of programs for the poor ; a growing
lower-income population , and few government programs to help the near - poor ;
and unemployment due to poor economic conditions .
For ear l y retirees , the expense of insurance coverage may be weighed against health
status , and these uninsureds may decide to risk go i ng without coverage until
Medicare coverage begins.
That is , these early retirees might be able to
afford some type of coverage , but have chosen to spend disposable income
on other goods and services .
5 . Insured workers with non - insured dependents

(estimate : 150 , 000 dependents)

A certain percentage of these workers are in large companies , but most probably
work for small companies . Some of these workers are employed by firms which
choose not to offer dependent coverage ; in other cases , employers may offer
dependent coverage , but contribute little or nothing to its cost .
In either
situation , workers have chosen (probably for reasons of cost) not to cover
dependents .
Many workers have grown children who do not yet earn enough to afford health care
coverage , or who may be working for a company which does not offer coverage .
These children add to the rolls of the uninsured .
Sprinkled across all of these categories are the approximately 5 % of Floridians
who are chronically ill . They have lost their coverage , given it up due to cost ,
or never had it .

Solutions
Focusing on small employers to solve the problem of the uninsured in
be ineffective : if all chronically uninsured , working Floridians
coverage tomorrow (and some of these people work for large companies)
of uninsured Floridians would be reduced from 2 . 7 million to roughly

Florida will
somehow got
, the number
2 . 1 million .

A variety of solutions must be developed , tailored to the needs of each sub - group
of the uninsured population .
There are ranges of solutions for each sub - group .
In this section we recommend sets of solutions and point out other alternatives
available .
(Fora summary of these solutions , and a comparison to Florida government
measures targeting the various types of uninsured , see Table 1.)
As these solutions are reviewed , it is important to keep in mind that , by law , Florida
already offers protection to Floridians when they lose coverage (see Appendix A) .
The solutions proposed below are designed to coordinate with these existing laws .
l.Temporarily uninsured workers and their dependents
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We recommend :
- Temporary policies
- Limited benefit policies
·catastroph ic coverage policies (either with high deductibles ,
[e . g . , approximately $30])

or price - driven

·policies with strictly limited number of benefits
- Make the cost of health insurance tax deductible for self-employed individuals
- Make continued coverage under COBRA available for all size groups and individuals
- Encourage employers to make coverage available on the first day of employment
- Require employers to communicate health insurance choices to departing employees

Other alternatives :
- Prohibit waiting periods
- Mandate that individuals purchase continued coverage
job

(COBRA)

when they leave a

- People in this category are temporarily without coverage , have an income, and have
chosen not to purchase interim coverage ; do nothing
- Mandate that employers make coverage available on first day and that employees
buy it
2 . Temporarily unemployed people and their dependents

We recommend :
- Increase the unemployment insurance premium by a small amount to pay for continuing
heal th insurance coverage during a spell of unemployment (e . g ., include
a voucher with the unemployment insurance check which recipients could
use toward continuing their previous employer ' s coverage (COBRA) , or
toward a temporary coverage policy)
- Temporary policies
- Limited benefit policies
·catast rophic coverage policies (either with high deductibles ,
[e . g. , approximately $30])
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or price - driven

·policies with strictly limited number of benefits
- Make the cost of health insurance tax deductible for self - employed individuals
- Make continued coverage under COBRA available for all size groups and individuals
- Encourage employers to make coverage available on the first day of employment
- Require employers to communicate health insurance choices to departing employees
Other a l ternatives :
Sarne as #1
3 . Chronically uninsured workers and their dependents

We recommend :
- Require employers to allow insurers to do sales presentations to employees o n
company time
- Allow employers to handle administration of insurance for employees who choose
to purchase coverage as individuals
- Offer limited benefit products
·catastrophic coverage policies
·policies with a limited number of benefits
- Require employers to provide information (e . g ., payroll stuffers) on available
plans
- Employees who pass on income test are eligible for government subsidies
- Make coverage tax deductible for individuals
We realize these measures will not solve all the problems of this group .
Nevertheless , if the measures we recommend only increase the number of employers
offering cove r age by 15 %; increase the number o f employers facilitating the purchase
of individual coverage by 15 %; and increase the number of employees purchasing
coverage even without employer help by 15 %; the number of chronically uninsured
workers will be reduced from 600 , 000 to 330 , 000 -- nearly cut in half .
4.Chronically unemployed people and their dependents

We recommend :
- Define an income break ; make government subsidies ava i lable for the poor and
near - poor to purchase private coverage
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- Extend the COBRA time period
- For the group who pass the income test :
coverage for the healthy :

FCHA- type program for the sick ; low- cost

-catastrophic coverage (either with high deductibles , or price - driven [ approximately
$30])
·other limited benefits coverage
5.Covered workers with non-covered dependents

We recommend :
- Require that all group policies include a " children only " dependent rate (thus ,
four group policy options would be available : employee on ly ; employee
plus spouse ; employee plus spouse and chi l dren ; and employee plus
children)
- Extend the current group coverage for children to all unmarried children up to
the age of 30 , unless the child is eligible for some other group policy

Summary of Solutions for the Uninsured
- Temporary policies
- Limited benefit policies
·catastrophic coverage policies (either with high deductibles ,
[e . g. , approximately $30])

or price - driven

·pol i c ies with strict l y limited number of benefits
- Make the cost of health insurance tax deductible for individuals

- Make continued coverage under COBRA available for all size groups and individuals ;
extend COBRA time period
- Encourage employers to make coverage available on the first day of employment
- Require employers to communicate health insurance alternatives to current (e . g .,
payroll stuffers) and departing employees
- Increase the unemployment insurance prerni urn by a small amount to pay for continuing
health insurance coverage during a spell of unemployment
- Require employers to allow insurers to do sales presentations to employees on
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company time
- Allow employers to handl e a dministration of insurance for employees who choose
to purchase coverage as individuals
- Define an income break ; make government subsidies available for the poor and
near - poor to purchase private coverage
- For the group who exceeds the income test : FCHA- type program for the sick ; low- cost
coverage for the healthy :
·catastrophic coverage (either with high deductibles , or price - driven [approximately
$30])
·other limited benefits coverage
- Require that all group policies include a " children only " dependent rate
- Extend the current group coverage for chi l dren to all unmarried children up to
the age of 30 , unless the child is eligible for some other group policy
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APPENDIX A:

COVERAGE PROTECTION

Current federal law required insurance carriers and employers with more than 20
employees to offer COBRA coverage to peop l e who leave their jobs .
In add i tion , Florida statutes require that :
• If a person who is disabled , pregnant , or undergoing treatment for dental problems ,
works for a company which terminates health care coverage , the carrier must
extend coverage for these conditions for up to 12 months following termination .
• If a person is eligible for coverage under a prior employer ' s plan , the succeeding
carrier ' s plan must meet the minimum level of benefits offered by the prior
carr i er .
•I f an employee becomes disabled prior to the date a succeeding carrier ' s policy
takes effect , the succeeding carrier is limited in setting pre - existing
condition restrict i ons .
•All licensed insurance carriers selling group policies to Florida residents must
offer conversion po l icies to individuals who terminate their group coverage .
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APPENDIX B:
(Source :

STATISTICS ON THE UNINSURED IN FLORIDA
BCBSF Market Research staff , 08/93)

This population breaks down as follows :
Employee uninsured
group market
self - employed

1 , 022 , 935
195 , 238

Sub - total

1 , 218 , 173

Unemployed uninsured
not in active job market
early retirees

383 , 131
27 , 931

Sub - total

411 , 062

Temporarily unemployed (unemployed
for 6 months or less)

204 , 729

Dependents

863 , 747

TOTAL UNINSURED (99. 5% OF 2,710,287)

2,697,711

The total number of temporarily unemployed people in Florida is 460 , 465 . From the
above figures , 4 4 % of these people have no coverage . However , the majority of these
people , approximately 56 %, have interim coverage of some kind :
Government

(CHAMPUS , Medicaid , Medicare)

Private group coverage (COBRA)

61 , 815
163 , 539

Individual policies

30 , 382

Total

255,736
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UNIVERSAL ACCESS

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida supports the nation setting a goal of " access
to health care " for all Americans , with 95 % of the population having " insurance
coverage " (either private or public) , by the year 1999 . Achieving this goal requires
implementing changes designed to improve the functioning of the market -- making
sure that purchase information and appropriate incentives are in place to make the
market operate more efficiently , and that rules and regulations which restrict
suppliers (insurers) ability to offer a variety of lower - cost , innovative products
are revised .
Rapid expansion of access without these accompanying structural
changes would just make an already serious cost problem even worse .
We do not support achieving universal access through an employer mandate to purchase
coverage for their workers . While an employer mandate is intended to help achieve
universal access , it would actually end up making universal access more difficult
to achieve and hurting workers in small companies .
Employers with thin profit
margins would be forced to reduce other forms of compensation , cut their work forces ,
or in the worst cases , go out of business -- placing more people out of reach of
coverage . The impact on the Florida economy would be especially devastating because
we have so many small businesses and low wage jobs .
We also believe that an employer mandate to provide health insurance would set a
bad public policy precedent and expand the role of the government beyond what we
believe it should be . The government mandating that employers are responsible for
their employees ' health care would extend the authority of government to place the
responsibility for a social service , like insurance coverage , on an employer.
If businesses can be mandated to include health insurance in their compensation
to their workers , why not auto , property , and life?
We acknowledge that even with the changes in the system to make coverage more
affordable , there may be some people who choose not to purchase heal th care coverage
(sometimes called " free riders " ) .
The appropriate action for dealing with the
" free rider " problem depends on the size of this group . After all of the other
reforms have had a chance to demonstrate their effectiveness , if the number of free
riders is small , the health care system can still function well and ignore their
behavior . However , if the number of free riders is large enough to cause problems
for the system , there may be a need to mandate purchase of basic health care coverage
for everyone. As a last resort , we would support an individual mandate to purchase
insurance coverage .
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